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By  
JAYA DEVA



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## PREFACE

Following the well-known precept of Spinoza, I too have, while describing the variegated actions of the leaders of Japan's Kampf, "sedulously endeavoured not to laugh at human actions, not to lament them, nor even to detest them, but to understand them."

In the available space I have tried to assemble a large number of essential facts about Japan—historical, socio-economic, political and cultural—and at the same time, tried scrupulously to eschew all subsidiary or irrelevant issues. A maximum number of such hard facts rightly understood, coupled with a high degree of intellectual honesty in boldly expressing them, has alone distinguished the few indispensable books we have on international problems from the all too many that need not have been written at all. I can only hope that "Japan's Kampf" will stand these tests.

Politics, which involve an objective study of correlation of continuously shifting social forces at home and abroad, have—strange as it may seem—really little room for personal prejudices. But since even mathematics, the most exact of all sciences, is not entirely unsullied by individual and social prejudices, all one should and could do, is to attempt to discover the real nature of any such prejudices, and whether, with our always limited though ever increasing knowledge of the laws of social dynamics, any other set of "prejudices" or attitudes would have been less prejudicial to the right understanding of the problems.

It is also hoped that the book will help to fight, by pointing out the motivating forces behind them, some of the most dangerous and least warranted notions of the "Oriental" and "Occidental", the "races" the Original Sin applied to whole nations and all such others, which may collectively be described as hyphenated Hitlerism.

JAYA DEVA

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TO

PATRICIA



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY

Japan's struggle had reached a decisive stage. True, domestic crises and external "incidents", both of inevitably increasing magnitude, had always in the past marked each stage of this long struggle of the Island Empire, which has continued to expand, trying to find for herself in her own way a "place in the sun"—her *lebensraum*. But the latest crisis was distinguished from the earlier "affairs" by being, as a spokesman of the Japanese Army said, "titanic". Addressing a huge patriotic rally recently, General Tojo, the then Minister of the Army, described it as "the greatest crisis the nation has ever witnessed".

Any socio-economic structure like that of this most densely populated country in the world is bound to become a breeding-ground of crisis. In the Mikado's Empire, with its legend of the Sun-goddess and feudal gospel of the Bushido, where the majority of the people still struggle to eke out their meagre livelihood from agriculture with pre-industrial methods of cultivation, semi-feudalism dovetails into a most modernised economy of a few large-scale industries. While the bulk of the national wealth is being more and more concentrated, controlled and owned by the few Shoguns of high finance in this land of the Rising Sun, the masses live in the dark depths of poverty, and even of starvation.

What are the usual dire consequences of such an

unequal, unstable and unjust system? What is to be done to avert them?

History has shown that unless and until such a system is overhauled and fundamentally transformed, the socio-economic inequalities of the people sooner or later produce the disunity, political instability, cultural lethargy and general weakness and decay of the country, which then, usually, becomes an easy prey to foreign marauders. China is as good an example of this as any country. If, however, the ruling class in such a society were to be strong enough at one stage to take over the entire direction of its socio-economic and political activities, there would no doubt ensue, for some time, some kind and some amount of stability, organisation, unity and strength. But all the same, and all along, the mechanism of its original, internal contradictions has been operating, influenced in addition by the systaltic movement of the international situation—that is, the contradictions of a similar and larger world system. A time will surely come when the systole and diastole of the internal and international parts of the system combine to forge inexorably the radical transformation of its structure, in peril of destruction. As we shall see later, Japan seems to have reached this stage.

The Nippon had arrived late in the world of industrial economy and new Empires. Empires cannot be built without a necessary equipment of objective conditions and subjective preparations. It was only after a higher form of industrial economy was organised and democratic Constitutions introduced, that the business of Empire-building was assiduously pursued by the new industrial classes of Britain and France, and by the Germany of Bismarck. Similarly, the Irridenta Japonica became possible only after the Restoration of 1868, the establishment of a new Constitution and an

industrial economy.

How is it that this Island Empire, until very recently admired by most people who would not like to be reminded of it now, has become a first-rate Power in the world, challenging seriously her powerful rivals like Great Britain and the United States? By what processes has the "young nation", still semi-feudal in its socio-economy, vulnerable as regards the chief raw materials and helplessly dependent on its foreign trade, been able to hold at bay old China and great Powers of the West? In any such objective analysis of Nipponism, and in any such study of its root causes, growth and consummation, we must not let ourselves be diverted by subsidiary issues: or every cause we want to serve would thereby suffer, and Nipponism alone would prosper.

The question of whether, and how far, empires are built deliberately, or in "fits of absent-mindedness", is one of different historical circumstances, and not a subject for the puerile arguments of sophists. A pertinent answer to those who particularly single out Japan for attack may be found in a rebuke administered by Mr. L. S. Amery. A former British Colonial Minister, the present Secretary of State for India said at that time: "I confess that I see no reason whatever why, either in fact, or in word, or in sympathy, we should go individually, or internationally, against Japan in this matter. . . . Who is there among us to cast the first stone and to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of creating peace and order in Manchuria and defending herself against the continual aggression of vigorous Chinese nationalism? Our whole policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stand condemned if we condemn Japan."

Another question often asked is this: Is Japan a Fascist nation? Is she organised on the Italian-Fascist

model, or on the Nazi model? How have her social, industrial and political institutions been modified recently? In what way does her totalitarianism differ from that of Russia?

The fundamental aims of Nipponism are essentially similar to those of Fascism—power and domination. Incidentally, therefore, they are bound to clash. Hitler, declaring in his *Mein Kampf* that the Aryans alone can be considered as founders of culture, says that the Japanese are only the “depository of culture” of the West. “The foundations of actual life in Japan today are not those of the native Japanese culture.” But General Araki, a former Cabinet Minister and leading spokesman of the extremists in the Japanese army, who in personal habits, as well as in purple ideas, resembles Hitler, claims, “Our Imperial spirit, which is the embodiment of the union between the true soul of the Japanese State and the great ideal of the Japanese people, is by its nature a thing which must be propagated over the Seven Seas and extended over the Five Continents. All obstacles interfering with this must be destroyed with strong determination, not stopping at the application of real force.”

The methods and tactics of the Nipponists and the Nazis are not dissimilar either: the declamatory slogans of a “New Order in the East”; the “Asiatic Monroe Doctrine”, and the general claim to serve humanity with a special mission in the world and the more immediate claim for special privileges in China; the bogey of Communism held to compel “appeasement” policies from the rival Powers of the West and to effect suitable alliances among others. For domestic propaganda there are the racial superiority and anti-foreign (Britain and the U.S.A.) campaigns; the policy of “stabilisation of the national livelihood” and of

counteracting the so-called "encirclement", leading to a call for national "unity", to the suppression of individual liberties, democratic institutions and voluntary dissolution of political parties, and to the progressive extension of State control.

A close study of the growth of Nipponism makes clearer our ideas of the nature of Fascism in general, and thus much of the confusion that is still embedded in the minds of many even of the radical-minded people will be cleared. The politics of Japan not only reveal once again the well-known mistakes made by the various anti-Fascist and labour organisations in their attitudes towards the incipient Fascism elsewhere; they also demonstrate unmistakably how much and what kind of "mass support" Fascism secures, and whether and how far it is true to contend that it is the existence of extreme Communist elements alone which gives rise to their counterpart, Fascism; how cunningly and surreptitiously fascistic contents are poured into the existing democratic institutions, which will apparently be kept intact; and how the State control and totalitarianism are gradually introduced, until the quantity becomes changed into quality and the erstwhile democratic institutions become indistinguishable from autocracy in uniform. Japan is a classical example of how Fascism comes creeping by the back door and strangles the unsuspecting stripling of democracy.

Though still young in such experiences, but living on hope, the Mandarins of modern Japan have watched and learnt the most up-to-date methods of fascisation of institutions and States elsewhere. As in their industrial economy, so in their statecraft, they have benefited greatly by the working of what is called the Law of the Combined Development. It is this that enables them to skip through several intermediate stages, now ren-

dered superfluous, of development that other great industrial countries had to pass through. It is this that enables them to graft a most modern technique, borrowed ready-made from others, on to parts of a semi-feudal structure of their own. It is this that broadly determines the general shape and contour of the socio-economic and political life, so that, despite the differences of material surroundings, mental outlook and particularities of traditions, one finds today a great resemblance in the general economic and political trends of Japan and of the Western countries. But it is this, too, that increases a thousand-fold the tempo and the inherent social antagonisms and leads to autocratic rule and *ersatz* culture. Here is to be found the basic explanation of why it is that the Japanese have, as Bertrand Russell has said in his book on China, "adopted our faults and kept their own".

How will Japan emerge from the great crisis of today? War is a continuation of politics by other methods; this Clausewitz's maxim, honoured by being quoted so often by so many, is so rarely remembered after the Cry Havoc has gone, letting slip the dogs of war. Acute aggravation of the chronic issues, wars, by themselves, do not solve the inherent social conflicts. The greatest danger that awaits the post-war world lies in the probability that the statesmen who, in the past, failed or would not understand the world's issues may still be there to dominate it in the future. Today, when grim-visaged war has shown its wrinkled front to all and sundry, it has become imperative, more than ever before, to analyse and understand the fundamental issues from which the inevitable outcome could be gleaned long ago.

Even if Japan had not joined the World War now, its basic crisis would have remained there unexorcised,

and had got to be faced. It was then obvious that the Japanese rulers were unable to solve the issues of the "China Incident", which really began in 1931, independently of the outcome of the World War. And, according to an able prognosis made long ago, it was highly probable that the issues of the World War itself might be decided not in the small lake of the Mediterranean, nor even in the Atlantic, but in the strategic waters of the Pacific. Thus viewed, Japan's struggle had reached a decisive stage. The national leaders themselves made no secret of this. The then Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, addressing a conference of the representatives of the Government and of war industries, said that Japan was facing the gravest crisis of her history, and declared that the only way out for her was an effective total mobilisation of the nation's economic power. That was later done in a large measure, and a General Staff for the defence of Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin has already been created. All that for what? In the past the well-known methods of suppressing social revolts and staving off the crisis have been the extension of autocratic rule at home and of Imperialistic expeditions abroad. But now, in the gravest crisis of Nipponism, what is to be done?

Colonel Mabuchi, the chief of the Army Press Bureau, in a broadcast which had the approval of the Government, declared that it was "the height of folly to sit idly by and await death" while the A. B. C. D. Powers were encircling Japan. The situation was "so appalling that there is no longer any difference between the war front and home front. The longer we delay our efforts to surmount the envelopment threatening us, the greater will become the danger to our Empire." While making such an analysis of the critical situation which faced Nippon, of whom, of course, the world

is not worthy, this spokesman of the army had undoubtedly misgivings as to Japan's war potential and the strength of the Russian air force in the Far East, as well as to President Roosevelt's current talks with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. Thus when he came to suggesting concrete action, he said that if all negotiations failed, Japan must use force, no matter how long the war might last, "in a death-struggle to save our great history, even to the last man and at the cost of reducing our land to ashes".

## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL

The nature and compass of Nipponism, and the immortal longings of the Evangelists of Kodo (Imperial Spirit) like General Araki, as well as their more mundane methods of materialising serially (*or pro tanto*) their extensive ideals, all of which we shall examine in later chapters, will be understood better if we first make a study of the historical-materialist conditions which have nursed them.

As among flowers the cherry is queen,  
So among men the samurai is lord.

So runs a Japanese saying. An estimation of the ideas, fads and fancies of these lords of men will be greatly facilitated by the knowledge of the sordid material existence which the majority of these men themselves are constrained to lead. An appreciation of this cherry flower of Nipponism will be helped by a morphological study of the soil, roots, stem and other organs of vegetation in the form of the geographical, historical and contemporary conditions of the people.

What are the facts of Japan's problem of population, which forms such a large part of her irredentist demands for *lebensraum*? According to the figures given by the Japanese Cabinet Statistical Bureau in April last, the population of Japan, Korea, Formosa, Sakhalin, Kwantung and the South Sea Territories is a little over 105 millions. Of half the size of her

Empire, and one and a half times the size of the U.K., Japan proper alone has over 73 million people. Consisting of four large and about 600 smaller islands, mountainous and volcanic, with only 15 per cent. of her total area cultivated and another 19 per cent. cultivable, she is the most densely populated nation in the world; the density of population per square mile of arable land being 2,774, compared with 2,170 in Britain, 1,709 in Belgium, 806 in Germany and 229 in the U.S.

In the last fifty years the aggregate population of Japan proper has increased by nearly 150 per cent. The rate of the annual increase approached the high mark of 1 million in 1937, the year of the Sino-Japanese War. Since then, however, the general exigencies of the war, with its heavy toll of lives—1 million Japanese have been killed and wounded since this war began—as well as reduced number of births, have slowed down this process. Thus a contradiction faces the leaders of Greater Japan, who prosecute continual wars of conquest in order to expand, and at the same time advocate an increased surplus of population to people the new lands of conquest.

In the quenquennium of 1935-40 the population increase has been less by 20 per cent. than in the 1930-35 period. Yet on October 1, 1940 there were 3,860,000 more people in Japan proper than on October 1, 1935. During October 1938 to October 1940, the two latest war years for which the official statistics are available, the annual increase has been less than half the pre-war rate. Even then, her high figure of 450,000 contrasts well with 140,000, which was the increase of the U. K. in 1936.

Such inordinate annual increases in the total number of inhabitants inevitably produce serious problems,

upsetting the balance of the whole social economy of a country. In Japan they have ultimately meant a greater pressure on the already over-populated countryside. And this is so in spite of the fact that, during the last decade, a large portion, especially the skilled, of the population increase has been absorbed by the heavy industries which have continued to emerge in the largest cities. Japanese emigration to countries holding industrial and commercial prospects has been restricted by such measures as the U. S. Exclusion Act of 1924, while they are none too eager to sell in agricultural countries with lower standards of living. In Manchuria, the new land of "living space", there were in 1931-8 only 30,000 emigrants proper, apart from officials and soldiers. Japan's problem of an increasing population has been aggravated still more by another fact—that there has not been lately any corresponding increase in the production of consumption goods. The indices of output of consumers' and of producers' goods in 1940 were 82 and 111, compared with 100 for each in 1938. This, of course, has meant increased privations for the bulk of the people. Yet a campaign has been launched recently to increase still more the ever-growing population. An urgent need is felt of large reserves of man-power for the all-devouring wars, for the war-feeding industries and for the purpose of building and sustaining the new Greater Empire of this super-breed of men.

As long ago as 1902 the movement of birth-control was introduced in Japan. But it was discountenanced officially, and when Mrs. Sanger, the well-known birth-control leader, visited Japan later, the Japanese policemen called her "*sangai-sen*" ("destructive to production"). Under the Peace Preservation Act of 1922 prosecutions have taken place for selling contra-

ceptives and birth-control literature. Yet it is significant to note the reactions of the people. The official taboo did not completely stop the increasing practice of birth-control; nevertheless, it has resulted in the steady increase of the high birth-rate. Thereupon, the Government have introduced a bolder and more precise scheme as one of the items in their latest policy of the total mobilisation of the country's resources. A Ten-year Population Plan was launched in March 1941, advocating five-children families, in order that the total population would be raised to 100 millions by 1960. "If the Japanese are to be leaders of Asia", the official statement runs, "they must expand greatly in numbers," and "the practice of birth-control must be driven out, the importance of family and race inculcated, and early marriages and plenteous child-bearing encouraged".

"A woman's duty is to be beautiful and to bring children into the world," says Dr. Goebbels too.

In addition to the foregoing pressing problems of population, which are, after all, general issues affecting many other countries, there are problems peculiar to Japan alone arising from her unique social structure. The present socio-economic basis of Japanese society was laid in the restoration of 1868; and has largely conditioned the subsequent development of her economic, industrial and political life. And it is this belated "bourgeois revolution" of Japan, taking place as it did two centuries after the British revolution (Cromwellian), and a century after the French Revolution (1789), that has produced the unevenness, high tension and great antagonisms between the various social forces that emerged from it.

The beginning of the Christian era had found Japan ruled by the heads of several clans, who called

themselves Highpriests, Chieftains or Elders. It is claimed that the first Emperor, Jimmu Tenno, ascended the throne in 660 B.C., but the earliest period is shrouded in myths and legends. It was only after five centuries marked by clan wars, when most of the country was conquered, that the most powerful of the clan chieftains, the head of the Yamato clan, emerged more definitely as the "Emperor", while the other chieftains constituted themselves as the Ministers of the Imperial Court at Kyoto. The Emperor claimed a descent from the Sun-goddess, Amaterasu, while many other clan heads claimed descent from deities next in rank only to Amaterasu in the heavenly hierarchy; and Shinto, "the way of the Gods", was their way of life too. By the end of the fifth century A.D. the Japanese had learnt the rudiments of Chinese writing. Buddhism was introduced from Korea in A.D. 552. In the seventh and eighth centuries, which constituted Japan's classical Age of Culture, many goodwill missions were sent to China, which, too, under the T'ang dynasty, had then its Golden Age. And many were the cultural influences of China on Japan. The system of examinations for Civil Service was copied from China. The land was "nationalised" and a kind of local self-government introduced, but under the ultimate control of the Emperor. Such Chinese influences notwithstanding, the clan chieftains of Japan, like the feudal lords who were to follow them later, retained their own belief in aristocracy of blood, hereditary principles and their preference for government by supermen to government by law, and their doctrine of subordination of individuals to clans. It is to such age-long traditions and practices of an early age that fascistic-minded leaders of contemporary Japan very often refer with pride.

"The tide has turned," writes Mr. Shiratori, a

former Japanese Ambassador to Italy, "against that liberalism and democracy that once swept over the nation. The once widely accepted theory of government, which sees in a parliament the real centre of power, now has been completely rejected, and the country is fast reverting to totalitarianism, which has been the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past thirty centuries. For oriental nations the question is not one of making a new choice, but of rediscovering themselves and returning to their ancient faith. It makes our hearts warm to see ideas that have influenced our races for centuries in the past embodied in the systems of modern States of Europe."

In the twelfth century the Emperor's power waned, large private estates grew and a feudal society emerged. The most powerful of the clan chieftains assumed the title of "Shogun" or Generalissimo, and dominated the whole country. Civil wars among the various feudal lords marked this period until the country was unified towards the end of the sixteenth century and the Tokugawa Shogunate established in 1603, to last until it was overthrown by the Restoration of 1868.

Under the rule of the Tokugawa Dynasty most of the land was owned by the Tokugawa family itself and the great feudal lords, Daimyo; and about three-eighths owned by the "outer lords" like the Choshu and Satsuma clan chieftains. The Emperor was the nominal ruler, with his Court at Kyoto, while the real rulers were the Shoguns, assisted by their Ministers. In contrast to the four social classes in China, of scholars, farmers, labourers and traders, the social basis of the feudal Japan was the hierarchy of the Shoguns (Generalissimo), the Daimyo (the great feudal lords), Samurai (their military retainers) and Heimin (the

common people). The poet Paul Valery says that the Chinese were "the only people in the world who have for untold centuries put up with being governed by subtle scholars". Many are the contrasts between the Chinese and Japanese cultures. In Chinese literature the hero is the penniless scholar sought by a Mandarin as a son-in-law. The Chinese view of violence and welfare is expressed in the old saying, "As the nails are made only from iron of the poorest quality, soldiers are chosen from men of the least account." The feudal view of Japan, on the other hand, glorified the courtiers and warriors. The case of the Ronin illustrates the point. This band of roving soldiers, Samurai, retainers, avenged the murder of their master by a wholesale butchery of an entire clan, and then committed a mass *hara-kiri*. Such fidelity and self-immolation are being commemorated by annual pilgrimages to their ancient shrine. Even today the highest store is set by the Samurai code of Bushido, with its fanatic patriotism and reckless bravery, as evinced by the public sentiments towards the political assassins.

The end of the Tokugawa dynasty, and simultaneously of feudalism in Japan, was brought about by the new social forces and technical methods not altogether dissimilar to those that ushered in the bourgeois system of society in Europe. In Japan money replaced rice as a medium of exchange. Internal and foreign trade developed. A new mercantile class arose challenging the wealth and the power of the feudal lords. Exchange marts were set up in Osaka and elsewhere. Price fluctuations reduced the rice incomes of the Diamyo and Samurai, who soon became heavily indebted to rice-brokers and money-lenders. The farmers were impoverished, and there were many peasant uprisings similar to those in Western Europe. The

ruling Shogunate itself went bankrupt, and gradually came under the control of the newly rising ruling class of the merchant-bankers.

Corresponding to the Renaissance in the West, there was, in Japan at this period, a great revival of interest in the study of her classics, history and literature. Early in the eighteenth century a few scholars had studied the Dutch language, and considerable progress had been made in the study of medicine, geography, map-making and military science.

Speaking generally, a great resemblance is to be observed between the historical processes of Japan and those of the West. There is no suggestion of their being identical. *Per contra*, it is a mistake to describe as "Oriental" and "Asiatic" what is unfamiliar to us, and what we, through our own lack of sociological knowledge or of a sympathetic understanding, cannot comprehend in the Japanese. A creature of similar social forces, the new society of Japan, slowly emerging from the womb of feudalism, went through similar pre-natal processes, and was born endowed with broadly similar anatomical structure, and, as we shall see in the later chapters, experienced similar growth and maturity. That is not to say, however, that it has no peculiarities of its own. Even twins have.

Two of the most important peculiar attributes of the Japanese consciousness, observable towards the end of the Yedo Era (1603-1868) and at the beginning of the Meiji Era (1868-1912), were an intense hatred of all foreigners (Westerners) and the revival of allegiance to the Emperor. Two aspects of the same movement of "*Sonno-joii*", they were expressed in the contemporary slogan: "Honour the Emperor, expel the barbarians."

During this period arose, for the first time, Japan's

hatred and rivalry against the Imperialist Powers of the West, which today forms such a large part of their campaign, but which is very little written about or understood in the West. In 1542 Japan had been discovered by the Portuguese, and seven years after, Francis Xavier (later canonised) had introduced Christianity. Within half a century the Christian Missions were persecuted, and later completely stamped out. This was partly because of the conflicts between the rival Jesuit and Franciscan orders, like those between the Dutch and Portuguese traders, and partly because of the real or suspected connexions between such religious mission and the trade and imperialist missions. China had the same headache, as the Boxer "Rebellion" was to reveal much later. A proclamation of that time said: "These foreigners, under the pretext of trading and teaching Christianity, are in reality taking away the land, food and clothing of the people; besides overturning the teaching of the sages, they are poisoning us with opium and ruining us with debauchery." Other peoples, elsewhere, have had similar experiences. A Zulu saying goes: "You had the Bible, we had the land. Now we have the Bible, you have the land." This aspect of the impact of Imperialism is not always sufficiently understood. At any rate, Japan's rulers have contended so, and, like the Religious Organisation Law of April 1940, adopted appropriate measures against any eventuality three centuries ago.

There was also the fear in the minds of the Shoguns that any such outside influences might ultimately endanger the closed citadel of the social structure, Shintoism and the Shogunate. A complete "seclusion" policy was therefore adopted by the middle of the seventeenth century. Foreign traders and priests were expelled from the country, and the Japanese nationals were

forbidden to go abroad.

The end of the period as a "hermit-nation" came two centuries later, when the U. S. Commodore Perry and his squadron of "black ships" arrived. Immediately after, Trade Treaties, with extra-territorial rights, fixed low tariffs and treaty ports, followed, first with the U.S. and later with Britain, France, Russia and Holland. These concessions had been forced from the Shogun, who was assassinated, in the now accepted manner, for this act of national humiliation, and only after an Allied naval demonstration off Osaka did the Emperor affix his signature. The experience of the neighbouring empire of China was not very assuring either. The coming of the "goodwill" mission, "peaceful" Christian missions and trade missions had been followed by imperialist wars like the Anglo-Chinese wars of 1839-42 and the Opium Wars of 1857-60, and led to extra-territoriality and low tariffs. So the expulsion of the foreigners became a main task of the Japanese rulers. A few more progressive and enterprising of the Diamyo independently fought the Western nationals and attacked their trading vessels. In 1862, when two English traders broke through a solemn procession of the lord Satsuma in order to show "how to treat these dogs", one was slain in the resultant affray; consequently the British Navy bombarded the city of Kagoshima. In 1864 the Chcshu chieftain's fort at Shimonoseki was destroyed by the combined forces of the Allies, which rankled long in the proud Japanese heart. But the harquebus, musket and cannon had asserted the superiority of culture.

Whatever the immediate result may be, it is important to stress here a few cardinal features which first appeared at this time, and which have characterised and conditioned the subsequent unfoldment of Nipponism. The overthrow of feudalism in Japan was demanded

and done primarily by the new social and technical forces that broke open the narrow feudalistic bonds. But the same anti-feudal revolt, because of its own belatedness, had at the same time to fight the imperialists from abroad, who had long ago broken their own feudal shackles and then set upon the new ventures. That movement also arrived against the ruling Tukuyawa Shogunate, which, becoming bankrupt and powerless, had yielded humiliating concessions to the foreigners. The Emperor and the Court at Kyoto became the symbol of the nation's resistance and the rallying centre of this multiple movement. The great social issues were mixed up and stirred in the crucible. The overthrow of the feudal institution of the Shogunate was accomplished in the name of the Emperor by various socially dissimilar classes of the serfs and the impoverished peasantry, the Chonin or merchant-bankers, the poorer Samurai and the "outer lords" of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Western fiefs, supported by Ronin (lordless roving soldiers), as well as a few nobles closely connected with the Court. Thus the anti-feudal movement came to be, as elsewhere, first supported, later controlled, and ultimately monopolised by other and socially alien elements. The result was that the "bourgeois revolution" of Japan was compromised, and the social differentiation of classes remained incomplete. And today, on the historical road that modern Japan, like other nations, has been treading, we often see the footprints of the gouty feudalism.

A few of the more important socio-economic reforms of the Meiji Restoration of 1868 are worth noting. First the four Western clans, and later others, "voluntarily" returned their fiefs to the Emperor. The operative word "voluntarily", which recurs often in Nippon's politics, is to be stressed, because when, in 1940,

all the political parties were dissolved in favour of one Imperial Rule Assistance Association, they too did that "voluntarily". The great Daimyo were first paid very huge pensions for the surrender of their lands, but as the State could not afford them any longer, it replaced them by lump-sum payments in cash or short-term bonds which amounted to 211 million yen. The Daimyo invested these grants in stocks, banks and industries. They had been relieved from all their old debts, and, being deprived of their private armies, had no longer any need to support their military retainers. As they had been still left with large private estates, they were none the worse for the new changes; for them, at any rate, the Presbyter was only the Priest writ large.

The more powerful of the Samurai managed to monopolise the leading posts in the administration. The new Emperor, only sixteen years old, had succeeded Emperor Komei, who, stricken with small-pox, died in 1868. The Satsuma Samurai controlled the Navy, while the rival Choshu Samurai controlled the Army. Other clan leaders, and many of the old Court nobility, fill today the Government bureaucracy, with its staff of half a million. But the remaining Samurai were left stranded with perhaps small pensions. Forbidden to wear their two swords, the use of traditional honorifics and their peculiar hairdressing, and their once-important social position as the military caste having now lost value by the new creation of a conscript army, many of these Samurai yearn for the comfortable feudal times of Spartan life and Bushido cult, and curse the capitalist system, while a few of them even gibber inchoately of state-socialism.

On the other hand, the new and important class of the Chonin, or merchant bankers, obtained the lion's

share, and emerged with greater power and social laurels. Once snubbed by the nobility, their new wealth soon altered matters and made *parvenu* nobles of themselves. It was again this go-getting section of the bourgeoisie that founded the Zaibatsu, or the "wealth cliques", which today own or control three-fourths of the finance and industries, and therefore the major political parties of Japan.

Lastly, the largest class of the peasantry who were interested in getting rid of the incubus of feudalism, and who by their previous rebellions and by their mass support made its overthrow possible, got, as elsewhere, the least benefit from the new changes in the social system. True, serfdom was abolished and they became landholders. But the small sizes of the holdings, the heavy taxes, starved agriculture and over-population soon made them heavy debtors to high finance.

This was the social system that modern Japan inherited from its belated "bourgeois revolution", known as the Meiji Restoration of 1868. With this social equipment the Nipponists faced the world towards the end of the nineteenth century, a world where the great Imperialist Powers of the West had already developed a high technique and had already carved for themselves decent-sized slices of land all over the globe. The Nipponists lost no time in beginning their double task of introducing at home the most modern industrial technique borrowed straight from the West, and of securing for themselves "a place in the sun", in the teeth of opposition from every quarter. How they, too, played one rival Power off against another in achieving their own ends will be seen in later chapters. Here we will first point out the chief results, in a backward country, of the, after all, understandable policy of skipping through the intermediate stages of economic

development by borrowing the latest technique from elsewhere. "Japan in her industrial development is a mixture of eighteenth- and twentieth-century England, having missed the nineteenth-century phase", says Freda Utley in her book *Japan's Feet of Clay*. (The "skipping" is only a part of the biogenetic process of the infant industry of Japan living in its briefest time the long race-history of the world industrial technique). We will note the deep class antagonisms and the peculiar social contradictions arising out of such historical conditions produced by the functioning of the Law of Combined Development.

## CHAPTER III

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC REALITIES

Belying the greater productivity of her industries, wherefore it is a mistake to call Japan an agricultural country, as high as 48 per cent. of her population is engaged in agriculture and fisheries, producing just enough food for the requirements of the country. Only 21 per cent. are in industry, compared with 40 per cent. and 7 per cent. in British industries and agriculture respectively, and about 17 per cent. in commerce, and 10 per cent. in transport, public utilities, etc.

Most of the land is concentrated in the hands of a few rich landholders, while the majority of the peasants own none at all. This discrepancy ensures a social revolt. Over one and a half million hectares of the land are owned by the Emperor and his family. One per cent. of all landholders own one-fourth of all the land. Another 6 per cent. of them own another fourth, while the remaining half of the total land is left to the 93 per cent. of the landholders. While the average size of the farm is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hectares, nearly two and a half million peasant farmers own holdings of less than half this size.

Besides the smallness of the size, the main reasons for the destitution of peasants are over-population and under-mechanisation. The rich landowners do not farm their own land. During the last fifty years nearly 40 per cent. of the total cultivated area has been leased by tenants who pay the owners half the produce as rent in kind. The exorbitant ground rent, taxation, and rate

of interest on loans crush down the peasantry, most of whom cannot afford to eat rice and fish, the principal food, but live on the cheap salt-water eel, and are even known to eat the bark of trees. The total indebtedness of all the peasant lease-holders whose average annual income, like that of a poor farmer, never exceeds Y.250, amounts to Y.10 milliard. In this state of affairs they cannot afford to buy agricultural machinery. No help comes from the rich owner, who, indeed, prefers to invest his money in trade, usually sericulture or other small industries. Thus the tenants, as well as the small farmers, are left with their own resources. Unable to afford hired labour, they produce larger families, which mean more hands available for work in the rice-fields.

The much-boosted intensive agriculture of Japan only means that a large amount of human labour goes into it. But the marketable surplus is small. Even the yield per acre of rice-land is not high; the figures (*League of Nations Statistical Year Book*) in quintals are 58·2 for Spain, 45·5 for Italy and only 31·0 for Japan.

Among the other resources of a large family to increase the meagre budget is cheap and child labour spared for the urban industries; the half-peasant and half-worker type, of whom there are tens of thousands, is an important link between the city proletariat and the vast peasantry, without whose collaboration no great social changes could take place today.

Driven away from the over-manned and under-productive rural occupations, and finding no gainful employment in urban industries, which, though benefiting largely, cannot absorb all the surplus, especially unskilled, labour, thousands of poorer farmers, tenants and their sons look to the army as their last source of livelihood. Ninety per cent. of the Japanese troops

are recruited from the peasantry. It is mainly from the ranks of these impoverished farmers that anti-land-owner, anti-capitalist and fascistic groups, like the "Young Officers" of the Army, arise.

During the last ten years of intense industrial activity the urban population has increased from 18 to 30 per cent. of the total population. By 1936, with her predominance of light industries, Japan became the world's greatest exporter of cotton piece-goods. Since then the decreased facilities for export and the special war demands have brought about a shift in favour of heavy industries. This is reflected clearly in the migration of population. A great centre of metal and other heavy industries, Tokio has over 6 million population, and Osaka over 3 million. There were in 1935 only thirty-four cities with populations of more than 100,000—containing an aggregate of 25 per cent. of the total population. In 1940 there were forty-five such cities with an aggregate population of 21.3 millions—that is, a little less than 30 per cent. of the total population. During the last decade there has been an increase of more than 9 million in the population of these cities, which is also more than the total increase in the entire country's population, showing thereby the migration from the countryside and smaller cities. Also it is highly significant to note that whereas the Kwanto (the Tokio-Yokohama area, comprising all centres of heavy industries) has absorbed more than 70 per cent. of the increase in urban population during the war years of 1938-40, the corresponding increase in the population of the Kinki (Osaka-Kyoto area, the centre of light industries) has actually declined since the pre-war period.

Most of the big industries have been owned or controlled by the Government and the great Zabaitsu—the wealth-cliques—whose control is becoming wider

and deeper today. Since the Restoration of 1868, the Government has taken direct interest in developing new industries. Railway, telegraph and telephone have been run by the Government, which also, by advancing capital and providing subsidies, aided the great Banking houses to undertake extensive enterprises like mining, metallurgy, arsenals and shipbuilding. This partnership of the Government bureaucrats (Samurai and the old clan chieftains) and the Zaibatsu often ended in the sale of the well-established industries to the latter. It is this "State control" from the earliest days of industrial Japan that is often referred to by the Fascist leaders of today, who justify their deeds by declaring with pride that totalitarianism has always been the feature of Japan's life.

It is not easy to ascertain accurately how much of the total national wealth, income and producing and distributing enterprises are in the hands of these few wealthy families. The "Big Eight" are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Suzuki, Shibusawa, Asano and Okura. They together are reckoned to control about half of the Bank deposits, three-fourths of Trust properties and one-fourth of the liability reserves of insurance companies. The Mitsui specialises in mining and foreign trade, and has affiliated undertakings in China and elsewhere. Whereas Yasuda interests lie particularly in banking and Colonial enterprises, shipping, engineering and real estate are the special province of Mitsubishi. The Mitsui and Mitsubishi together control more than three-fourths of the mines, factories and oil, gold and aluminium resources of North China. The Mitsubishi, or "Three Diamonds", produce 99 per cent. of the copper output of Japan, and together with Mitsui have complete monopoly of silk production, sugar, chemicals and transport. Cotton-spinning is the only

large industry that is not owned by the Zabaitsu.

A typical example showing the social discrepancies of the present times is the House of Mitsui, founded 300 years ago by the Chonin or merchant bankers during the period of decline of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Every member of this dynasty swears to respect the traditions and not to alter the time-honoured order of the House, and takes the dynastic oath: "Prostrate before the shrine of my ancestors, and in the interests of the consolidation of the age-old foundations of our House, and to the furtherance of the undertakings we have inherited from our ancestors." Baron Mitsui, the present head of the House, has a family fortune amounting to over Y.1·5 milliard. The House owns over 200 companies and 1,300 enterprises with a total capital of Y.6 milliard, and has a total family income of Y.30 millions per annum. We have already seen the other side of the picture. A colossal sum of Y.250, half of which goes in ground rent, fertilisers, etc., is the annual income of poor farmers and the tenants, while the official figures of the total debts of the peasantry are Y.5 milliard. It is calculated that 84·6 per cent. of the population own less than \$1,800 worth of property, or have incomes of less than \$1,500, but contribute 57 per cent. of the national revenue in excise duties and direct taxes. Yet, as man does not live by bread alone, all-round sacrifices are demanded by the owning class in the interests of the "New Order". Such are the glaring examples of capitalist accumulations, and of the uneven development of society made possible, under a particular system, by the social processes of a backward country trying to overtake the most highly industrialised nations.

It is sometimes stated that the absence of a large ruined middle class of rentiers and investors, and of a large militant industrial proletariat, as in Germany,

would render unlikely the emergence of Fascism in Japan. In a later chapter we will deal with this point in greater detail. Here it is necessary to point out that the progressive concentration of large-scale industries begun before the war, and continued under the present totalitarian system, is throwing up large elements of class-conscious proletariat, and is throwing out large sections of erstwhile owners of small factories and other small-scale industrial enterprises. In certain circumstances these elements, together with the impoverished peasants already referred to, might constitute an easy prey for lynx-eyed Fascism.

Even before the war the big trusts had ousted the small industries, and the heavy industries had been usurping the dominant place in the economy of Japan. The total industrial production of Japan has risen at a colossal rate, from Y.5,000 million in value in 1931 to nearly Y.20,000 million in 1938. (Here the inflatory fluctuations of the yen have to be borne in mind). In this vast industrial expansion the heavy industries, acting and reacted upon by the expansionist wars, occupy increasingly wider spaces, and there is a progressive decrease in the goods for civilian consumption. In 1935 textiles accounted for 31 per cent. of the total production of Y.10,846 millions; metallic industries 17·3 per cent.; engineering 13·5 per cent.; chemicals 16·7 per cent. But already in 1938 the shift "from cotton to iron" shows 22·6 per cent. as the share of metallurgy, 18·6 per cent. each for textiles and chemicals, and 18·2 per cent. for machinery.

In 1936 the industrial undertakings with 200 or more employees numbered 1·7 per cent. of all the concerns, and employed 41·2 per cent. of all industrial workers. Over 50 per cent. of all industrial workers are employed in small industries employing on the

average five or less persons. Here thousands of workers and artisans who used to make guns and swords in the olden times, now produce with their deft hands electric lamps, rubber goods, bicycles, enamelled iron ware, cotton and woollen goods of various patterns and women's kimonos. Sixty per cent. of Japan's export of manufactured food is turned out here. Such products of these small-scale industries constituted, together with textiles, the bulk of Japan's exports. Now the reduction of such exports in wartime and the exigencies of the war economy superseding that of the small-scale industries have brought great distress to hundreds of thousands of these workers. Social tension has increased with the deepening of antagonism between this slowly dispossessed petty bourgeoisie and the progressively enriching big bourgeoisie.

The needs of the idolators of private enterprise are irreconcilable with the iconoclastic demands of the industrial proletariat. While the Zabaitsu were making increasing profits with the advancement of the war, the conditions of the workers reached an alarming point. The index of industrial production has steadily increased from 100 in 1929 to 149·8 in 1936. The value of the total output of goods rose by more than 37 per cent.; there was a decline in the volume of output other than war materials, and a decrease by 33 per cent. in the main goods for civilian purchases. Though little change was registered in the period of 1938-40, there was an increase of producers' goods from 100 in 1938 to 111 in 1940 (June), while the output of consumers' goods declined from 100 to 82 in the same period. The Army and Navy have become greater purchasers of the products of heavy industries, which in their own turn support the expansionist policy of the militarists. Indeed, it will be seen that every move made in recent

years by the expansionists, whether they are extreme militarists or moderate imperialists, whether they advocate "continental policy" or the "South Sea policy", and whether they are "North China" ideologists or "Yangtze Valley" ideologists, is demanded by the pressing needs of this lop-sided industrial structure.

Competitive industry demands a regular and assured supply of cheap raw materials, expansive markets for manufactured goods and, at a later stage, vast fields for investments of surplus capital. They demand expansion, they shout out for *lebensraum*. They set the militarists on the road that leads to fresh woods and pastures new, and—to war. Saint Hildebrand (Gregory VII) had said, "Cursed be the man that keepeth back his sword from blood." War is ennobling, preach likewise the Apostles of Nipponism, like many others elsewhere. Also, war undoubtedly brings temporary palliatives to a system torn by antagonisms. The "Manchurian Incident", said the present Prime Minister of Japan, General Tojo, broadcasting on its tenth anniversary, was a heaven-set signal for the down of an era in East Asia. Heaven is always on the side of big business. Manchuria was conquered in 1931-2. We have noted before the huge investments of the Zabaitsu in the new fields of conquest. Added to that, Japanese exports to Manchuria jumped from Y.340 millions in 1933 to Y.1,541 millions in 1939. But the same war reduced Japan's exports in China proper from over Y.500 million in 1931 to Y.130 million in 1933. So more wars followed. During 1933-6 Jehol, Charar, Hopeh and Suiyuan were seized. The exports rose to Y.150 millions in 1937. But this was not enough for the insatiable system. So heaven sent another "incident"—the "Lukouchio Incident" in 1937. During the first two years of this war the exports rose to Y.350

million, and were still rising. Just as amidst all the demagogic din of anti-capitalism and "New Order", the programme of Hitler's Party chanted canticles of "the truly great creators of our great industry, such as Carl Bosch, Krupp, Kirdorf, Thyssen, Abbe, Mannesmann, Siemens", so also we see inscribed on the banner of Nipponism and of the "New Order in the East", the names of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, *et al.* It is at the behest of these magnates that the ordinary standards of life and freedom of the people are assailed. Since the war the civilian consumption has declined by 40 per cent. While the profiteers are prosecuting more and more wars, the general public will have to be content with the sermon on the Kokutai (national policy), Bushido and Spartan habits.

Child labour and cheap labour, both abundant, are two specific features of Japanese industry. According to an official admission, 1 million children under the age of 14 work under harrowing conditions. Though the old Factory Law had fixed the maximum number of working hours for women and children under 16 years of age at eleven, many had to work from twelve to fourteen hours a day. The low daily average wages of 1.96 yen for men and .73 yen for women have not risen proportionately either with the cost of living, or the owners' profits, or the prices of commodities, or the labour output. The indices of degree of employment and of labour output are 115.5 and 129.7 for 1936, against 100 for 1929. They clearly show the amount of new wealth created by the productive capacity and the increase in the number of workers. The profits jumped from 15 per cent. in 1932 to 20 per cent. in 1936 for cotton industries. The *average* profit of Japanese industry as a whole was as high as 14.7 per cent. in 1936. The only people who did not benefit

by the new wealth were the workers who created it. While the bosses feasted at banquets, the masses had only bread of tears and waters of strife.

What are, then, the social realities of Nipponism today? How do they shape and determine the political and irredentist movements of the Island Empire?

The "bourgeois revolution" of Japan—the Meiji restoration—led by the popular front of the radical Daimyo, poorer Samurai, vast peasantry, and the anti-Shogunate Emperor and the Court—became compromised and remained incomplete. Though there were any number of peasant outbursts in the preceding decades, they had lacked concreteness, an organisation and a theory. Japan had no Winstanley or Robespierre to lead the revolt nearer to its goal. No movement corresponding to that of the Diggers or of Sanscullotes lasted long enough to effect a greater social differentiation. Consequently many feudal and semi-feudal encumbrances remained as fibroid tumours affecting the physical and mental characteristics of the new-born society during its delayed birth. Bearing such birthmarks, Nippon was born clubfooted and paranoidal.

The environment that the new Japan found herself in towards the end of the last century was marked by two features which have left their lasting impressions on the nature and the course of Nipponism. The high industrial technique, developed in the West during the earlier centuries, was already there waiting to be seized and carried home. Also, the world had been fully carved up by then and shared by the Western imperialist Powers; hardly any space that was not some one's province, some one's sphere of influence. In such historical circumstances the Japanese ruling class at once discarded *in toto* the theories and practices of the now-outmoded system of *laissez faire* and *laissez aller*.

These Shoguns of big trusts, aided by the State, seized the modern technique and grafted it on to the semi-feudal social organism that had evolved from the Restoration. The resultant uneven development shows itself in many ways. An abundance of surplus labour was needed for the rapidly growing new industries; a high rate of population increase was conceived to supply it. But the absence of skilled labour and of what is called "economic mentality", as well as a much lower productive capacity, impeded the rapid development. Small scale industries flourished to provide cheap goods for export to countries where markets had already been controlled or dominated by the Western Powers. Child labour, cheap labour, and a lower economic level were essential in producing cheap goods that alone could compete with the Western Powers. That meant, in its turn, a low purchasing power of the people and a narrow home market. Hence the greater dependence on foreign trade, and still further attacks on the standards of life of the people, their smaller shares of the new wealth and the national income. Over-population, a result of this vicious circle, only worsened the situation. Neglect of the land, over-manned and under-capitalised, meant hunger and rice riots, and men decayed while wealth accumulated. This internal social tension, the vulnerability regarding foreign trade, the dependence on raw materials from abroad and the pressing demands of the perpetually expanding industry in the competitive system drove the Nipponists to adopt totalitarian methods at home and imperialist excursions abroad. Moreover, the internal and international contradictions interacted and aggravated the social tension. Wars like that with China and the larger World War meant loss of man-power, markets and supplies of raw materials. They have already upset the balance of the national

economy. Light industries and small enterprises, once the mainstay of the export trade, have given way to heavy industries which are now collaborating with the militarists, venturers and expansionists. These very conditions are precipitating a social crisis by deepening the existing antagonisms between the factory-workers and shopkeepers, tradesmen and owners of small undertakings on the one hand, and the owners of the mammoth trusts on the other, between the farm labourers, poor tenants and impoverished farmers, and the big landowners and their banker allies. All this tension, at the breaking-point, does not prevent these wise men of the East from meditating on new worlds and "new orders", but only goads them on to further and faster deeds.

"Imagination is the goad", says Bertrand Russell in his book *Power*, "that forces human beings into restless exertion after their primary needs have been satisfied." But behind the dreams and aspirations of the Nipponists there are social realities of which they are but reflections.

## CHAPTER IV .

### POLITICAL PARTIES AND FIGHTING FORCES

Nowhere have the varied results of the broad anti-feudal revolt of Japan been more clearly recorded than in the present Imperial Diet, which was established two decades later, in 1890. The revolt, as we have seen, had been led by several socially heterogeneous forces whose common objective was, as often in such cases, just what was acceptable to the most conservative amongst them. There was the peasantry, who had their chains to lose and who were no strangers to rebellions. There were the merchant-bankers, the poorer Samurai and the radical lords like those of the Choshu and the Satsuma clans. And there were, too, the Court at Kyoto and a section of the old nobility. This was the social composition of the Revolt. Its object, at any rate, the immediate object, was to overthrow the ruling Shogunate and to restore the Emperor; and the movement, especially at the top, was characterised by deep loyalty to the Emperor, and by ultra-patriotism expressed in the anti-Foreign (Western) agitation. This "bourgeois revolution" of Japan becoming compromised in the end, most of its socio-economic conquests went to the conservative and reactionary groups of the old feudal lords, the business Houses and the bureaucrats. The new Constitution reflects, both in the manner of its introduction and in matter, these social changes of the Meiji Restoration.

Those who had usurped the power were in no hurry

or mood to share the new gains with their erstwhile allies. They established a dictatorship at home and were itching to send abroad "chastising" expeditions—to Korea and to Formosa. The new Era of Enlightenment, as the Meiji Era (1868-1912) is called, commenced with a civil war that ravaged the country for over two decades. The peasants, who had everything to gain, gained the least. The swindled Samurai revolted, and were suppressed by the new conscript armies. The more liberal of the clan chieftains demanded a representative government of their own pattern, resigned from office, split and had their organisations suppressed under martial law.

From this period we clearly see emerging the two great political trends in Japan which are, for want of apter terminology, often described as "moderates" and "extremists". What big difference there actually is between their organised parties will be best revealed by their own deeds. Similarities of essential interests and differences regarding the best methods to promote them usually result in connivance, condonement or equivocation, according to the circumstances. And these have throughout characterised the two trends of Nippon's politics.

During this period a diplomatic mission was sent to the West to negotiate a revision of the unequal trade treaties of the earlier era. A chastising expedition was sent to Formosa. Two years later, in 1876, the Bonin Islands were occupied and a naval demonstration secured special rights of a trade treaty with Korea. Three years later the Liuchiu Islands were seized. All this within a decade of the new assumption of power. Nipponism starts with a bang.

A democratic Constitution itself, marking the new era, was to come at last. And when it did come, it took

a least democratic road. The procedure adopted in this historical event should be particularly noted, as it had set a precedent for the other important events, like the Tanaka Memorial, in the future history of Nipponism. In 1882 the choice of being officially sent abroad to study the Constitutions of the West fell on no other man than Prince Ito, who was later to found the reactionary Seiyukai Party. Though there was bitterness against the Western barbarians, it was then, as now, obviously not against all Westerners. Besides, Emperor Meiji's Charter Oath had given the lead that "knowledge and learning shall be sought throughout the world in order to establish the foundations of the Empire". There was, too, a general desire among the people, who were soon to adopt the industrial technique, to "learn of foreigners where they are strong and remedy our defects".

The only strong man who impressed this Japanese Prince, Ito, during his tour of the West seems to have been the Prussian Prince, Bismarck. So the Prussian Constitution was taken as the model, and Ito rushed back from the Western world to lay the foundations of the Eastern Empire. On his return he became the President of the Privy Council, was authorised to revise his own draft Constitution, did it "in absolute secrecy", and after a private consultation with a small clique of officials presented it to the Emperor. On November 2, 1899—the anniversary of the foundation of the Emperor—Emperor Meiji, Tenno (Heaven-born), promulgated the Constitution of the Great Empire of Japan.

If such was the mode of presenting the democratic Constitution, what are its form and its social contents? Distinguishing itself from the Constitution of the U.S.A., the Japanese Constitution is a "gift" by the

Emperor, who was the direct descendant of the Sun-goddess, and who "inherited" the right to rule from his ancestors, and is ruling "in linear succession unbroken for ages eternal". When a professor of constitutional law interpreted this Constitution in a democratic manner, that the monarchy was an organ of the State, he was forced to resign from the University for *scandalum magnatum*, and from the House of Peers, of which he was a member. The Emperor is the head of the Constitution, which has invested in him all absolute powers of making peace and war, convening or dissolving parliaments, appointing or dismissing Cabinets, ratifying laws and issuing Ordinances. The Imperial Rescripts have a sanctity about them denied to the Papal Encyclicals. One Rescript commands the people to "always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should an emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne, coeval with Heaven and Earth".

Such fundamental tenets of Nippon's Constitution may be compared with the "natural, inalienable, sacred" Rights of Man of the French Revolution, which were first enunciated in the Declaration of 1789, later extended by Robespierre and adopted by the Jacobins in 1793, and finally voted by the National Convention. Again, the American Declaration of Independence reads in contradistinction from Tenno's Rescripts: "That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the

people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundations on such principles and organising its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

The Emperor is the head of the Army and the Navy and the Arch-Priest of the Shinto cult. With his divine origin and the family fortune exceeding over a billion yen, he is the head of the social hierarchy too. The inordinate deification of the Emperor serves very necessary and useful purposes. It is in his name that everything is done and justified—aggressions and wars, and autocratic measures. Big trusts and bureaucrats, the Chiefs of the Army and the Navy, leading politicians and *parvenu* Fascists, all use the Tenno's name to crush popular movements and advance their own causes.

The Emperor was advised by Genro, or the Council of the Elder Statesmen, which is now, since the death of Prince Saionji, the last of the Genro, replaced by an *ad hoc* committee of ex-Premiers, Army and Navy Chiefs, the Lord Privy Seal and the President of the Privy Council. There are the Privy Council and the Ministry of the Imperial Household, where the various cliques vie with one another and wire-pull for power. The Imperial Diet consists of the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. The House of Peers has about 400 members; provides for sixty-seven hereditary seats for the Princes of the Blood Royal, ordinary Princes and Marquises, and 150 elected seats for the representatives of Counts, Viscounts and Barons; includes the Emperor's nominees of four representatives of the Academy of Science and over 100 members of the bureaucracy, ex-officials of the Government, and finally about seventy members elected by the highest tax-payers. Thus the aristocracy of

Japan, of about 900 families with their 217 representatives, the bureaucracy and the high finance fill the Upper Chamber, which has, with a few exceptions, equal rights with the Lower Chamber. The House of Representatives, elected for four years, consists of 450 elected representatives of the people. The Cabinet is not responsible to the House. When, in answer to the popular outbursts against the Government both in the House and in the country, General Hayashi's Cabinet dissolved the whole Diet in 1937, less than fifty supporters of the Government, out of 466, were returned in the ensuing General Elections. A large part of the expenditure is non-votable, and if a budget is not passed one year, the preceding year's budget is appropriated.

A general Manhood Suffrage was introduced in 1925, over half a century after the anti-feudal revolution. And when a delegation of the Alliance of Suffragettes approached this Seiyukai Cabinet of 1927, the worthy Home Minister told them: "Go back to your homes and wash your babies' clothes. That is the job given to you and there is the place in which you are entitled to sit." There is the Nipponist version of the Nazi doctrine of the three Ks.

Even such an atrophied democratic apparatus is sat upon by the heavy weights of the Fighting Forces and the Big Trusts. There has always been a direct or indirect, constitutional or extra-constitutional, but steadily increasing control through the Cabinet, political parties and the Patriotic Societies. There was in 1882 an Imperial Rescript forbidding the active military and naval servicemen to dabble in politics. But the Emperor needs advice on military and naval affairs, and a Supreme War Council was set up five years later. Since 1895 the Ministers of War and of the Navy must

be appointed from the Generals and the Admirals. These and the Chiefs of the General Staff have direct access to the Emperor. Wielding this enormous power, the Supreme War Council plays a decisive role in making and dismissing Cabinets and in shaping the Government policies. After the bloody "February 26 Affair" of 1936, with the popular indignation running high and the Emperor reprimanding the militarists, the extremists resigned from the Supreme Command. The result was that the Okada Cabinet fell.

The control of the big trusts was exercised directly through the two great political parties, the Seiyukai and the Minseito, until 1940, when all political parties were "voluntarily" dissolved. As in the pre-Soviet Russia, Spain or China, so in Japan today, the interests of the semi-feudal and landowning class are mingled with those of the industrialists and bankers as a result of the "combined development". The great landowners, either through having large investments in the banks, or through owning blocks of shares, as the Diamyo did with their colossal grants from the Government, or (some of them) through mortgages, become allies to the high finance and big trusts in the joint struggle against the workers and the peasants. So that it is not always easy to say what exclusive interests the two parties always stood for. The Seiyukai Party ("A Society of Political Friends") represented the Mitsui concerns and the landowners who are interested in foreign trade and the colonies. It finds favour with the Army and heavy industry. The Minseito Party was the mouthpiece of the Mitsubishi concern. It was more representative of light industry, and finds favour with the Navy. The Minseito was the more "liberal" of the two, and in 1929, during the period of prosperity, practised such liberal policies as return to the Gold Standard, retrenchment

and the ratification of the London Naval Treaty.

The Seiyukai Party, on the other hand, was second only to the Supreme War Council in itching for perpetual expeditions. Its Hara Government despatched the Siberian expedition in 1918-22, and Saghalien was occupied during 1920-5. The Seiyukai Government of Baron Tanaka in 1927, in pursuance of its "positive policy", sent an expeditionary force to Tsinanfu (capital of Shantung) in order to block the northward march of the Nationalist forces of China under Chiang Kai-shek. When, at the outbreak of the Manchurian War of 1931, the Kwantung Army H.Q., unable yet to have an exclusively militarist-ridden Government of their own, pressed for a more positive policy, it was a Seiyukai Government that replaced the Minseito Government.

Mr. Adachi, the Home Minister in the Minseito Cabinet, then demanded a more resolute and "national" government, and pressed his demands by refusing both to attend the Cabinet meetings and to resign. The Cabinet thereupon resigned. This instance illustrates not only how the Japanese Cabinet system works, but how, on essential policies demanded by an expanding system, more and more agreement is to be found among the family of the "moderates", "extremists" and the militarists. Just as the Court nobility condescends to keep company with big business, like the late Prince Saionji, the last of the Genro, with the Sumimoto Trust, so big business rubs shoulders with militarists. General Araki, the Supreme War Councillor, writes a book on *Japan's Mission in Showa* between his own missions to the Okura Trust and the Bank. Of the most reactionary, and now defunct, "Japanese Imperialist Alliance" (the Kokuhonsha Party), Baron Hiranuma, later the Seiyukai Prime Minister, was the chairman, and two of the directors were General Araki himself and

Mr. Ikeda, the Manager of the Mitsui Trusts, a former Finance Minister and the Governor of the Bank of Japan. General Mazaki, who is Araki's friend and close associate, and who was involved, reprimanded and forced to resign in the "February 26 Affair", is supported by Kuchara, the munitions magnate. The present Premier, General Tojo, is an advocate of "perfect unity under Imperial virtue", but not just today. In 1938 this stickler for unity was busy inviting the big industrial magnates to the exclusive Tokyo Army Club in order to discover a common mode of action. Such negotiations between the Japanese industrialists and Militarists evoke a parallel with the visit of Hitler in 1932 to the Dusseldorf Industrialists' Club.

The Zaibatsu control the two political parties, just as they own and control the chief national Press, mainly through finance. The election expenses of each candidate are as high as 50,000 yen (£5,000), and it is known that votes are purchased for 1-2 yen per a rural vote and for 8-10 yen per an urban vote. Failure to get elected involves a forfeit of 2,000 yen. In the 1928 elections—the first held under the manhood franchise—nearly 1 million yen was lost in this way. The Mitsui and Mitsubishi trusts are reported to have subscribed 19 million yen to party funds during the same elections. Most of the great national newspapers that now shout so much about the "iron necessity", "immutable policy" and "Imperial virtue" are owned by these trusts: *Osaka Mainichi*, *Tokyo Mainichi*, *Chugai-Shogio Shimbun*, etc., by the Mitsui; and *Osaka Asahi*, *Tokyo Asahi*, *Tokyo Nichi-Nicki*, etc., by the Mitsubishi.

The Parliamentary regime, such as it is, has already been attacked from various quarters. Here, as in everything else, it is the militarists who set the tone and the pace to the new agitation. It is argued that the

present Constitution, originally introduced as a soporific to the surging mood of the public, has served its purpose, and now the new conditions call for new institutions. Of course, there was corruption, though never yet on the scale of the Panama, Utric and Stavisky scandals of the Third Republic of France. But the corruption was mostly among the bureaucrats, big trusts and the two political parties. It was in 1928, under the Seiyukai Government of Baron Tanaka, barely three years after the Party Governments were instituted, that wide recriminations of bribery and corruption began. A scandal about a Cabinet Minister brought down Admiral Okada's Government in 1934. Aiding the rice speculators with governmental measures led to the fall of General Abe's Cabinet in 1939. If there was corruption, the culprits must be dealt with. But no, these incorruptibles of Nipponism would deal with the whole democratic regime. Election law must be changed, and the Constitution must be modified. Democracy, they argued, is not suited to Nippon.

The spokesman of the Navy, Admiral Suetsugu, demands in 1939 a Constitution to be "drawn up clearly in the light of Japan's new role in the Far East, and with strict reference to the country's mission of extending its influence over the Asiatic continent".

The spokesman of the Army, the War Minister, General Terauchi, informs the Diet in 1936: "The Army is opposed to the operation of the Parliamentary institution along democratic ideas of the Western type. It is hoped that the Diet and the Election laws will be so amended that fair popular opinion and national intellectual faculties shall be given full opportunity for their demonstrations. It is keenly desired that a constitutional Government based on a Constitution which is all our own be allowed to develop." What we should

particularly note in this asseveration of General Terauchi, who is a most militaristic of the militarists in Japan, is the baseless iteration, made also by all Eastern as well as Western reactionaries, that the forms of "Western democracy" do not suit the Eastern countries.

There were other lines of attack against the Japanese Constitution. And even the Radicals and the right-wing Labour of Japan made similar mistakes as the Radicals and right-wing Labour have so grievously done elsewhere. Here, as in many other things, Nippon illustrates, as we have said before, very clearly the dialectic of the socio-economic and political forces of the Western world too. If the existing democratic institutions did not work under the new conditions, or have never worked really satisfactorily, "democracy" itself is the least to be blamed. The remedy should be sought rather in extending the democratic bases of such institutions, and not in limiting it by concentration of power into fewer hands.

Again, it was the moderates and constitutionalists of Japan who clamoured, quite justifiably at first, for a modification of the Constitution. Gradually, however, the agitation ran along the line of strengthening the powers of the Cabinet. In 1935 a Cabinet Inquiry Bureau was studying the ways and means of increasing the Prime Minister's powers, and later, such methods as forming an Inner Cabinet of nine, and Five-Ministers' Conference and appointments of Ministers without Portfolio, all tending to increase the powers of the Executive *vis-a-vis* the Diet, were proposed. In January 1939, Prince Konoye, the then President of the Privy Council, was appointed the first Minister without Portfolio by the Government of the reactionary Seiyukai leader, Baron Hiranuma. In 1940 a Five-Minister Council, consisting of the Premier, and Ministers for

Foreign Affairs, Army, Navy, and Finance, was instituted. And during the reorganisation of his Cabinet in July 1941, Premier Konoye appointed Baron Hiranuma to the newly created post of Vice-Minister. In 1938 a Labour (Social Mass Party) member of the Diet requested the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, to "act with the boldness of a Mussolini, a Hitler, and a Stalin". This only shows that myopic laudation of "men of action" is not exclusive to Mr. Bernard Shaw alone. All this, from radical and labour circles, was grist to the mill of reaction. The Japanese reactionaries took up the cry against the whole Constitution itself.

What are the aims of Nipponism, ultimate and immediate, domestic and foreign? By what methods is it contemplated to achieve these aims? Such of the ideology of Nipponism as finds close correspondence with the ideology of Nazism or Fascism will be dealt with in Chapter VIII. Here we will examine the general aims of the militarists and the leaders of Nipponism, together with some of their resultant actions.

General Sadao Araki, the idol of the Japanese Army and a devotee of the Imperial Way (Kodo), describes clearly the aim, the motive and the methods of Nipponism: "Japan is the chief Asiatic Power, and she must place herself at the head of Asia and prepare for a desperate war. The white races have made of the Asiatics pure and simple objects of oppression. Imperial Japan cannot and must not leave any longer unpunished this impudence. The principle of our Empire is the incarnation of Justice and Right. All Japanese must be ready spiritually and materially to aid in establishing this Empire, and even if necessary to have recourse to arms." This proselytiser of the "incarnation of Justice and Right" later was the Minister of War when Manchuria and North Chinese provinces were ravaged, and

was only forced to resign after the bloody massacre of February 26, 1936.

The racial bitterness and arrogant claims of superiority of the most reactionary elements in the Orient are surpassed only by the infantile racial notions about "lesser breed without the law" and jingoistic claims of the Western reactionaries; the former being partly a reaction to the latter. A spokesman of these self-styled leaders of Asia, who had been at that very moment raining bombs indiscriminately on women and children of China in an unprovoked war, says all this in a New Year's message of 1939. General Uyeda, the commander of the Kwantung Army (Manchuria), sighs for a world where there is justice and righteousness; and not for him is this "materialistic world, dominated by unfair struggles". "I firmly believe", the General avows, "that our power, which is the stabilising factor in East Asia, must be further strengthened, that a new original Oriental civilisation all our own must be created to replace Western civilisation and bring about a great spiritual change to be propagated among mankind throughout the world."

The distinction that is always made in certain quarters between "moderates" and "extremists" is not accidental. As long as a particular group in Japan or elsewhere directs its blows on its own people, or even on other weaker nationals, these Pilates will wash their hands of it. But when the threatening fists come nearer home, as they are bound to sooner or later, then, of course, that group is dubbed "extremist" and what not, and appropriate counter-actions are contemplated. The Japanese Army only encroaches on the other Powers' preserves in China, and is therefore "extremist" compared with the Japanese industrial capitalists, who, though equally ruthless at home, advocate but a pro-

gramme of "peaceful" penetration abroad. Fatal policies issue from such an evaluation. The Japanese Navy, which had not yet been a material threat in the South Seas and the Pacific, was reckoned as "moderate". Japanese sailors are more prudent, an observation runs, than Japanese soldiers. But how does the Japanese Navy substantiate this? How does the Navy expound the aims of Nipponism?

"The establishment of the ultimate goal of our holy war", writes the Press Bureau of Japan's Navy Office in a pamphlet issued on New Year's Day 1939, "must be achieved in the face of the gravest national difficulty. In the light of our glorious history of the past 3,000 years, this is a moment in which we must enter upon an epochal struggle for the radiant future of our national fortunes."

The Japanese Navy strikes those critics amidships when it goes on to say: "Should she interpret the phrase continental expansion or continental construction in its narrow literal sense, and forget the existence of the seas and the ocean, it would be a most serious blunder, by which the people would lose the very basis of their living. The construction of the new order in East Asia would then be reduced to nothing but a dream."

Among the leading elements of the Fighting Forces, as among the civilian expansionists, there are varying degrees of militarism. Generals Araki, Mazaki and Muto are more militaristic than Generals Hayashi, Ugaki and Nagata. Admiral Yonai, Prime Minister in 1940, is a liberal capitalist compared with Admiral Suetsugu, who presses for action in the South Seas and says: "This is a life or death issue for Greater East Asia, and it is but natural that Japan could not acquiesce in its present status." Incidentally, this does not confirm the view that the Japanese Navy, as against the Army, stands

for a political *status quo*. Among the "continentalists" there have been, at different stages, divergent views, depending both upon domestic and more upon international conditions. There were the "North China" ideologists and the "Yangtze Valley" ideologists. General Sugiyama, the present Chief of the General Staff, and his adherent, Major-General Muto, consider Britain to be the chief enemy. On the other hand, a war with Russia is pressed by General Toshizo Nishio, a most powerful Army leader, a member of the Supreme War Council, who was in 1939-41 the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Armies in China. In this, General Nishio is supported by Lieut.-General Itagaki, one of the "Young Officers," who was once Nishio's Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and who later became a Minister of War. The present Prime Minister, General Tojo, has been, since his early days in the Kwantung Army H.Q., a closest associate of General Nishio and Itagaki, who together were responsible for the Russo-Japanese skirmishes in the spring of 1937 on the Amur River, for the minor war at Changkufeng in the summer of 1938, and for the clashes in Outer Mongolia a year later.

The leaders of the Fighting Forces and of the two old political parties wield enormous power for shaping public opinion through their control of the various Patriotic Societies. The Ex-Service Men's Association (*Zaigo Gunjinkai*), founded in 1895, is one of the most powerful of such societies. Its membership of over 3 millions includes more than 53,000 officers and 80,000 N.C.O.s, the remainder being privates. It is organised along strict military lines, and drills and disciplines its members by continuous agitation, sport and other activities. Outside Japan, it works through many Buddhist sects in Manchuria, Korea and Mon-

golia, and it has, through the Tenro sect, contacts with the millions of Moslems in the North-West Chinese provinces of Chinghia and Kansu and the Inner Mongolian provinces of Ninghsia, Suiyuan and Chahar. In Japan proper it controls another influential society, the Young Men's Association (Nippon Seinendan). Organising the Japanese youth between the ages of thirteen and twenty-five, the latter had in 1934 2,400,000 members in its men's group and another 1,500,000 in the women's group. No aspect of their young life is neglected. In the religious field, the innumerable pilgrimages, the State-controlled shrines and practices of the Shinto cult lead to the glorification of the State and of the Tenno (heavenly born Emperor), who is the High-Priest of Shinto. For cultural edification the young adherents are carefully indoctrinated into the ideals of Nipponism. They work in the towns and villages through the 16,000 local units, wear khaki uniform of a semi-military type and are given special training in the old Japanese sports like *sumo* (heavy wrestling), *kendo*, *jiu-jitsu*, and two-handed sword-fencing. The organisation and activities of the Nippon Seinendan, though itself older, may be compared to the Nazi Youth Movement and to the Italian Fascist organisations of the Sons of the Wolf, Balillo, Avanguardisti and Fascist Militias. The powerful Ex-Service Men's Association itself is today controlled by the older officers like General Araki, Mazaki and Minami, and Admirals Nomura, Kato and Toeda.

The Imperial League of Young Officers (Kokoku Seinen Shoko Domei) is a separate organisation of the extremists among the "Young Officers". Whereas the older generation of officers came mostly from the Samurai clans (the Army from Choshu, the Navy from Satsuma) and graduated from the Military Staff College,

the "Young Officers" have been recruited from the farming districts in open competition. It is said that since 1927 such recruits comprise over 20 per cent. of the officers, and the majority of the junior officers; and as a result of the universal conscription introduced in 1873, nearly 85 per cent. of the privates today are peasants: This is the social composition of the Japanese Fighting Forces.

Like many another patriotic society, the Imperial League of Young Officers advocates and practises crass terrorism and "direct action." Its tenant-farmer origin betrays its bitter social antipathy towards the big trusts and the political parties. Innocent of a clear social diagnosis and of thorough-going remedies, it believes in a few vague and demagogic ideas of "Imperial Socialism." This may be "bureaucratic" or "managerial" or "State" capitalism, or anything else, but it is not Socialism, and to describe it as Marxian, as some do, is to mistake the formalistic for the factual. The "Young Officers" are, needless to say, ultra-patriotic, and, like the liberals and reactionaries, civilian politicians and the militarists, display intense loyalty to the Emperor. "The Japanese Army and Navy," says one of their leaflets issued in 1932, "bound body and soul to the people, to the tradition of Bushido, see with indignation the influence of commercial speculative circles growing to the detriment of national patriotism. The political parties, a common enemy of the nation, should be destroyed. The capitalists, with their arbitrary authority, should be killed. Under the leadership of the Emperor, we must restore the true soul of our Empire, and institute the principle of self-government."

The method of practising this "principle of self-government" has been rather exemplary. The world depression had reached Japan towards the end of 1930.

Her total foreign trade fell by more than half since 1929; the wage-earners and the middle classes suffered huge wage cuts; and there were 3 million unemployed in the country. The Minseito Government had signed the London Naval Treaty, which had been opposed by Blimps of the Army and the Navy who were just then preparing the "Manchurian Incidents." But on November 1, 1930, the Privy Council ratified the Treaty. A few days later, the Prime Minister, Hamaguchi, was attacked, and died of the injuries in August 1931. The assassin was sentenced to death, but the sentence was later commuted, thus, incidentally, showing the extraordinary sentiment of the leading public towards perpetrators of such devilish deeds, provided they are actuated by "patriotic" motives.

On September 18, 1931, occurred the "Manchurian Incident," whose "significance lies in the crystallisation of an inseparable relationship between the new Empire and Japan," which was hailed by General Tojo as the heaven-sent signal and whose arrival was known in advance to the Japanese militarists like General Nishio, who was then in charge of the Army Press Bureau in Tokyo. The militarists thereupon demanded a more positive policy.

The autumn brought the red maple leaves to the sentimental Nipponists, while the sentimental Nipponists brought the nation two ruddy *coups d'état*—one on October 17, and the other on November 3. The latter was engineered by the Ex-Service Men's Association, the Japan State Socialist Party founded in 1932 by Mr. Akamatsu, who had seceded from the Social Democratic Party, and by the Society for the Foundation of the State (Kokuousha), referred to in the preceding chapter. Its aim was to arrest the Minseito Government of Baron Wakatsuki and to establish a

military dictatorship. It involved high Government officials like Prince Kanin, Chief of the General Staff, General Araki, the War Minister, and Mr. Suzuki, the Minister of Justice. The Wakatsuki Government gave place to the more die-hard Seiyukai Government of Mr. Inukai. In February and March 1932, when the hostilities were started at Shanghai, two further assassinations took place in Tokyo, demonstrating the "Young Officers'" anti-capitalist and anti-parliamentary ideology. Mr. Inouye, a former Finance Minister, the campaign manager of the Minseito and the son-in-law of Baron Iwasaki, the head of the Mitsubishi, was murdered on February 9.

In Japan the intrigues of the corrupt political leaders and the machinations of the big trusts mingle with the terrorist deeds of the Patriotic Societies. In December 1931 the Seiyukai politicians and their pay-master, the Mitsui Trust, had succeeded in overthrowing the Minseito-Mitsubishi Government. One of the first tasks of the new Seiyukai Government was to reimpose the gold embargo, which had been lifted by the previous Minseito Government, the mouthpiece of heavy industry and industrial capital, and the exponent of deflation and "sound finance." The new measure led to the great depreciation of the yen—65 per cent., compared with 35 per cent. in the case of the pound and 41 per cent. in the case of the dollar—and to a spurt in the export trade, the special interest of the Mitsui, which, in addition, made millions from the sale of foreign exchange judiciously bought earlier. On March 5 Baron Dan, Chief Director of the Mitsui concern, was done to death in the streets of Tokyo; the Mitsubishi men were not entirely innocent of this deed. Previously there had been a plan to kill Baron Shidehara, the "liberal" Foreign Minister of the Minseito Govern-

ments, and Count Makino, a close adviser of the Emperor and the keeper of the Imperial Seal, who was involved in a scandal regarding the sale of Royal interests. Count Makino, who is a Mitsubishi man and a Satsuma clansman, and the late Prince Saionji, the last of the Genro, influential in the Imperial Household and the Sumitomo Bank House alike, as well as several officials of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi concerns, were the object of another plot in December 1934. The leader of the would-be assassins was a young lad who had once worked for 12 yen a month. He had been inured to the ultra-patriotic ways of Nipponism sponsored by the national leaders and the wealth-cliques themselves. Now, like many others of his kidney who practised the Nietzschean cult of weeding out the "bungled and the botched," he had resolved to liquidate the Court circles and the plutocrats. A "second Restoration" is deemed imperative, as, in the words of Mr. Tachibana, the leader of Aikyo Juku, "the fruits of the Imperial Restoration have been lost, because Satsuma and Choshu rule handed the land of the gods over to capitalists who exploit the people and politicians who deceive them."

There have been several unsuccessful attempts to kill individual leaders who, though themselves in the front line of reaction, could not keep the pace. So Araki's young myrmidons, growing impatient, had a pot shot at the old General of Bushido himself. In August of that year an attempt was made to kill Baron Hiranuma, the Seiyukai leader, an ex-President of the Privy Council and the founder of the Society of Fellow-thinkers for Defence of the Homeland (Kokoku Dosikai). In the summer of 1940, when, according to *Asahi*, the organ of the army clique, "a renovation of the internal structure had become necessary in order to cope with the world situation," Admiral Yonai's

Cabinet was forced to resign; an attempt to kill the poor Admiral himself had been made a few days before. Well might a modern Candide say regarding Japan: "In this country it is thought well to kill an Admiral from time to time to encourage others."

A few days after the Agreement signed in Shanghai, as the result of the mediation of Britain and other Powers, put a (temporary) stop to further excursions of the Japanese Navy, a bold *coup d'état*, now known as the "May 15 Affair," to seize the Seiyukai Government of Mr. Inukai was organised by the "Blood Brotherhood League," "The School of Love for the Native Soil" (Aikyo Juku) and the "Farmers' Death Band." The assassins, who were supported by high Army officers, included eleven military cadets and six naval officers, and succeeded in killing the Seiyukai, Prime Minister Inukai. They attacked other officials, threw bombs on Count Makino's house, the Mitsubishi Bank, the Bank of Japan and the H.Q. of the two political parties, and tried to blow up the electric power-station in Tokyo and the Metropolitan Police H.Q. For all this four of the culprits were given four years' imprisonment each and became "heroes," and the others got fifteen years, but were released in 1936.

There was another and, so far, the bloodiest *coup d'état* on February 26, 1936, which, with its vast scope and designs, exemplifies how the militarists oppose an adverse trend of public opinion and events with "direct action" aimed against the political leaders as well as against the more moderate among themselves, and, what is more, can get away with it. During the past four years the "moderates" were in the saddle in Japan, and that meant there had been a boom in trade; they held high posts in the Privy Council and the Ministry of the Imperial Household. In the Foreign

Office there was Mr. Koki Hirota, a bureaucrat and a disciple of Mr. Toyama of the Black Dragon Society. In March 1933 the knights-errant of Nipponism gave notice of withdrawing from the League of Nations; in April 1934 laid down the "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine"; in December notified the U. S. Government to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty, and in January 1936 withdrew from the London Naval Conference. In the War Office, General Hayashi, a "moderate," had succeeded General Araki in early 1934. Japan subdued Jehol in 1933, and Chahar and Hopei by 1935. What was, then, the so-called "moderation" of such men that was bitterly resented by the "extremists" as being the clog in the wheel of Nipponism?

At home, Mr. Takahashi, the Finance Minister, was allowing but grudging increases to war budgets, though even by then the expenditure on Army and Navy, making half the total expenditure, had increased by 225 per cent. since 1931. In Manchukuo, which was hoped to be the New Jerusalem, where the long-cherished ideals of Imperial Socialism were to be realised, everything had been gradually monopolised by the super-capitalists; though earlier, Baron Okura, a financier who went to Manchuria with the dreams of investments, had been chased away by threats of the "Young Officer" caste.

In North China perpetual "forward" hostilities had been temporarily terminated by an *ad hoc* agreement with China resulting in the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The "moderates" had previously tried and failed to bolster up an independent "East Hopei Autonomous Council." They had also thought it unwise to extend hostilities further either to the Soviet border in the north, or against the interests of the Western Powers in the south. But the adven-

turers of the Kwantung Army had their own far-reaching designs, and told the "moderates" that the attempt, and not the deed, confounded them.

It was the friction between the moderate and the extreme elements among the militarists themselves that immediately led to the "February 26 Affair," which, however, in its great momentum struck against the service-men and the civilians alike. The War Minister, General Hayashi, the leader of the moderate clique, had been busy removing, retiring and transferring various officers, high and low, suspected of extremist tendencies. General Mazaki, the close associate of General Araki, and Inspector-General of Military Education, for example, was dismissed. One of Mazaki's followers, Lieut.-Colonel Aizawa, demanded of his new superior officer, Major-General Nagata, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, to resign. On hearing this, General Hayashi ordered Aizawa to be transferred to Formosa. Lieut.-Colonel Aizawa thereupon went and murdered Major-General Nagata.

At the same time, in the General Election of February 20, the Fascist parties had lost, so too the Seiyukai Party, while the Labour (Social Mass) Party and the Minseito had gained. Such a small thing would not worry the blimpish militarist of Japan. They, like their kith and kin elsewhere, would scrap the parliamentary institutions if and when they did not suit their interests. The situation had become serious. The War Minister, Hayashi, had to warn the senior officers against mixing with current politics, and the Supreme War Council, with the Emperor's authority, adopted a resolution to a similar effect.

On February 25, General Mazaki had been summoned to the court-martial of Lieut.-Colonel Aizawa, but would not speak. The proceedings had been ad-

journed; the atmosphere was tense. The next day about 1,400 junior officers and men of the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the First Division, mostly members of the "Imperial League of Young Officers", marched out in several groups and killed Admiral Saito, Lord Privy Seal and an ex-Premier, Mr. Takahashi, the Finance Minister and General Watanabe, Mazaki's successor as the I.G. of Military Education. Admiral Suzuki, Lord Chamberlain, was wounded. Count Makino, a former Lord Privy Seal, and Prince Saionji escaped. The Prime Minister, Admiral Okada, owed his life to the fact that the rebels killed by mistake his brother-in-law, Colonel Matsuo, who resembled him. Like the leader of the Western gang, these butchers may have said with levity, "Madam, your husband sure got the laugh on us. We've just lynched him and he's the wrong guy."

How much should one forgive the perpetrators of such villainies because they know not what they do? If, on the other hand, more than mere retributive punishment were to be meted out, to whom—these fanatic young hot-heads, or the old and sober "sweet psalmists" of Nipponism, who catch them young, and through the various Patriotic Societies preach them the mixed gospel of extreme chauvinism, State-worship, ultra-patriotism and Tenno-idolatry?

There are, besides those already referred to, innumerable societies with all sorts of innocent names and ostensible purposes, a few of them with mutually contradictory aims, most of them preaching fanaticism, but none of them pointing out the social remedies to the great social ills. There is the Society of Fellow-thinkers for the Defence of the Homeland (Kokoku Dosikai) founded by Baron Kiranuma, the Seiyukai leader, an ex-Prime Minister and a former head of Tokyo University, who was, as we have already seen,

also the Chairman of the most reactionary "Society for the Foundation of the State", of which General Araki and Mr. Ikeda, a former Finance Minister, and the Mitsui Manager, were Directors. The League of Fidelity to the Emperor (Kinno Remmei), f. 1924, and the Sacrificial Society of Great Japan specialise in spreading the virtues of absolute monarchy. The Society of Militant Valour, f. 1897, and the League for the Restoration of Personality concentrate on jingoistic education and discipline in the Army and the Navy. The Spirit of Great Japan, f. 1919, fights all "dangerous thoughts". The Brigade for Combating Bolshevisation of Great Japan is supported by the police and the Home Office. There is the League of State Reconstruction, which, though founded in 1926, specifically to popularise the Empire Day, specialises in attacking the Soviet Union. General Tanaka's Meirinkai, or the Society of Higher Ethics, is supported by the capitalist Isichara, and spreads anti-Soviet propaganda among reserve officers. General Tanaka believes that "it is for the military to lead the nation, so as to overcome the national difficulties, as the political parties can no longer be trusted".

There are a Women's Patriotic Society, with one and a half million membership, and a Women's Defence Society. The Seiyukai members of the Diet founded in 1918 the Society of the Royal Road, while Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, besides leading the Imperial League of Young Officers, finds time to preach the doctrine of Imperial Way through the Dai Nippon Youth Party. Above all, there is the oldest and most reactionary Black Ocean Society (Genyosha), led by the doyen among terrorists, the eighty-six-year-old Mr. Mititsu Toyama. This is a secret organisation open to the military and civilians alike. It instigates imperial wars of expansion and has through its thousands of secret

agents everywhere practised terrorism since the Sino-Japanese War. It has good contacts with the leading politicians and militarists. Mr. Hirota, an ex-Premier and an ex-Foreign Minister, was, as pointed out before, a disciple of Mr. Toyama, who has been pressing Prince Konoye and others to form a single party, and has been responsible for the gradual fascination of Japan. In 1901, one of Mr. Toyama's disciples, Mr. Uchida, organised the Black Dragon Society (*Kokuryukai*), which literally means the "Society of the Amur River", the river along the Russian border. This most reactionary and terrorist Society specialises in anti-Russian propaganda.

A comprehensive statement such as this regarding these numerous Patriotic Societies, their wide-flung activities, aims, patronage and high connections, has been necessary in order to make a few observations relevant to a social study of Nipponism. If in recent years terrorism has grown great and stalked abroad taking a heavy toll of lives of the high and the mighty, who is more responsible than the leaders of Nipponism themselves? Over fifty years ago, after the Meiji Restoration, when they brought over the feudal stalagmites and stalactites for building the modern social structure, they retained too the ideology and piratical practices of which they have since tried to make national virtues.

Ultra-patriotism, idolatry of the heaven-born Emperor, the worst features of the old Shinto cult, all of which are hallowed by the practice of *seppuku* (*harakiri*) and of terrorism, serve the general interests of Nipponism today. They are needed, firstly, for the advancement, *inter se*, of the rival group interests; every leader, civilian or military, moderate or extremist, invariably precedes a declaration of his own sectional or

party policy by glorification of the Imperial Virtue and of Great Japan. There is a second and far greater use for these manufactured virtues. It is imperative to keep the youth and the masses uncontaminated by "dangerous thoughts" and "subversive ideas", produced in increasing abundance by the ever-widening social antagonisms. In this urgent task all are *en famille*—the big trusts pour out large sums of money into the various Patriotic Societies, and the political leaders, the Government bureaucrats and the high officers of the Army and the Navy help with patronage, para-Fascism and propaganda. Anti-foreign, anti-Russian and lately anti-Jewish agitation are fostered in order to wean the minds of the people from the surging discontent at home.

Deplorable as it is, terrorism in Japan is, however, far from being patriotic. On the contrary, it is significant to note that all the victims of the *coups d'état* are to be found among the very gentlemen who patronised terrorist societies. Japanese terrorism may be all madness, but there is a method in it. It is, of all the people, the leaders themselves who pervert the minds of the youth and vitiate the public morals, and raise the genie of terrorism, which they now cannot exorcise, and which recoils on their own heads. They now feverishly try everything—everything but the change of the in-human social system. It is the *sanctum sanctorum* of Nipponism.

However, terrorism has never been a mass movement either in Japan or, for that matter, anywhere else. In spite of their claims, the combined Patriotic Societies, with their overlapping membership, do not represent more than 6-7 per cent. of the total population. Even here the percentage of the active terrorists is bound to

be smaller still, though it is adequate as an embryonic corps of storm troopers for a future out-and-out Fascist movement of Nippon. But it is important to remember that there is no mass support for this para-Fascist terrorism of today or for a probable Nipponist-Fascism of tomorrow. Terrorism is a conditional reflex of a society where the mounting social and political discontent of the people is still more aggravated by a complete denial of their free development. It is most often a reaction to the organised terrorism of the State. In Japan its conspicuous prevalence is partly due to the fact that the Nipponists have never really permitted any radical or socialist opinion which alone, by canalising the discontent into an organised and disciplined movement, could wean away the young erstwhile terrorists.

It is edifying to note the attitudes of Nippon's Governments towards the labour movement, as distinguished from their touching concern for other political parties. As long ago as 1890, the year of the first Japanese elections, Sen Katayama, the veteran of Japanese labour, and his associates, began the Labour Movement. Next year the Social Democratic Party was formed, but the Government immediately dissolved it. However, the activities continued with greater vigour throughout the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. In 1897, two years after the Nipponists zealously secured the "independence" of Korea, a Railway Labour Union was formed and successful strikes were organised; the Government met them in 1900 with a police law forbidding all trade unions. This did not abate the increased trade union activities among the masses in 1904-5, when the militarists were occupied with their Russo-Japanese war. The Japanese Socialist Party was formed in 1906, but permitted only for a year. In 1911, when the era of

Enlightenment (Meiji Era) was closing, the Government graciously tolerated the formation of a "Friendship Society" (Yusikai) by Mr. Bunzi Suzuki, modelled on the American Federation of Labour. The war of 1914-18, which brought a fortune to the Nipponists, brought starvation and rice riots to the masses. The veteran Sen Katayama fled to America, and later in 1933 died in Moscow.

In the post-war period, Marxism became popular among the Professors and intellectuals, and therefore became reformed. In 1920 the first May Day demonstration was allowed, but in the next year celebrations about 200 arrests were made and one of the leaders killed. After the manhood suffrage was introduced in 1925, the Japanese Farmers' Union gave a lead to the creation of a united party. This new party was suspected of subversive tendencies, and therefore strangled on the very day of its birth, by the "moderate" and much-boosted Minseito Government. In the same year (1926), during the boom period of Japanese capitalism, three reformist Labour parties were permitted to be formed. The most leftist of them was, however, suppressed in 1928 by the Tanaka Government. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925, which ordained ten years' imprisonment for attempts to change the national policy or a system of private property, was now amended to substitute the death penalty. Under this law over 60,000 people have been arrested during the subsequent ten years for harbouring "dangerous thoughts."

Of the two remaining political parties of the Labour movement of that period one was the Social Democratic Party, Saki Minsiuto, an amalgamation of the group led by Mr. Suzuki with the organisation of Prof. Isov Abe and his intellectual associates. The other was the

more leftist "All-Japan Workers' and Peasants' Party," which included varied elements, from social patriots to ex-Communists, and others. The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the heaven-sent signal for "national unity" and further prosecution of Nipponism, purged the Labour ranks of the out-and-out Chauvinists who masqueraded as Socialists. The former leader of the Social Democratic Party left it, together with a small following, and founded the Japan State Socialist Party, which advocated the abolition of Parliament and Capitalism, and demanded absolute power for the Emperor. The two Labour Parties, however, united under the pressure of events to form the Social Mass (Shakai Taishuto) Party. Most of the leaders had drifted into the Labour movement because they were either radical or liberal or humanitarian; many were Free-thinkers, devout Christians, Buddhists or Shintoists—anything but Revolutionaries believing in the theory and practice of Socialism. So the unity, which no doubt brought immediate numerical strength to the movement, actually made it ideologically and politically weaker. However, during the ensuing elections held on the eve of the *coup d'état* of February 1936, twenty-three Labour candidates (eighteen alone of the Social Mass Party) were returned to the Diet, as against eight in 1928 and three in 1932. In the general elections of 1937 the number was increased to thirty-seven.

The rapid deepening of the national crisis revealed more clearly the social patriotic tendencies of the Labour leaders. They opposed all along a united front with other small working-class organisations. On the other hand, a prominent leader, Mr. B. Suzuki, advocated in the Diet the introduction of measures similar to the Nazi Labour Law, because that was the way planning

of national life should be done. Another Labour representative, as we have seen, demanded that the Prime Minister (always the representative of the big Trusts) should be vested with powers of a Hitler, a Mussolini or a Stalin, because that alone would safeguard the Parliamentary regime from the attacks of the militarists. On the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, the leader of the National Farmers' Union invited an Army General to address the Union meeting in the cause of the national crusade.

At a time when all liberties were being taken away, further attacks were being made on the standards of living of the workers, and the militarists were gradually gaining the upper hand, the leadership of the Social Mass Party had nothing to offer the people, except that in their congress (November 1936) they changed the party programme from "the aim of emancipating the proletariat by the destruction of capitalism" into the aim of "the introduction of industrial and economic planning, and [at] the stabilisation of national life on the basis of the reorganisation of capitalism." And when the Sino-Japanese War was launched, the official leadership of Japanese Labour supported the Jingoists of Nipponism.

If it is true that the lamentable lack of correct political leadership greatly contributed to the rise of Fascism in the old countries of the West, it is much more so in the case of the new Empire of the Nipponists.

Indeed the analogy is more extensive than that: the radical and socialist movements of Nippon, despite her obvious historical differences and particularities of traditions, epitomise and show in essentials, a great resemblance to the corresponding older movements of the western countries. And this is as we should expect;

in the history of modern Japan, there have been in the past and are still today many writers of social Utopias aiming to found, *a la* St. Simon, Fourier and Owen, isolated phalasteries. There are others, corresponding to the ancient school of sismondi in France, who advocate corporate guide for manufacture and patriarchal system in agriculture. There are, too, any number of Japanese literati variously advocating Feudal Socialism, Military Socialism, State Socialism and Clerical Socialism, which Marx-Engels described as "the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat." Above all, there is a legion in Japan, even as elsewhere, of "economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind."

Among the champions of the working-class movement itself, there are some who abjure in *toto* the theory of class struggle, while others, like the exponents of the theory of "economism" eschew political action altogether as digressive or redundant or even harmful. Above all, there are those politicians, totally blind because they will not see, who firmly believe that Japan is an "exception." What might have, even justifiably, happened in the history of the Western countries cannot happen in Japan, say these "exceptionalists". Here at last there is a country where class antagonisms do not exist and where high and the low, treated equally in the eyes of the law, pull together the work for the common good under the benign rule of His Majesty the Tenno who administers law and justice impartially.

What would be the obvious apt answer of the people themselves, that is, if they were allowed to talk freely, to

such original and profound arguments of some of their leaders? Anatole France supplied an epigrammatic retort when he wrote: "The Law, in its majestic impartiality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."

## CHAPTER V

### TOTALITARIANISM

THE period commencing from the *coup d'etat* of February 1936 may be called the *kampfzeit*, or the period of struggle for power, of Nipponism. Though the militarists and their civilian fellow-travellers had always had a hand in shaping the Government policies, it is since 1936 that they have dominated the Cabinets and pressed their policies step by step. The immediate objects and aims of the Nipponists during this period of struggle for power have been only too clear. They were a further extension and consolidation of their hold in all spheres of the national life, strangulation of all radical and labour opposition and building up of a totalitarian party out of the major political parties from which all moderate and vacillating elements have first been carefully weeded out. All such encumbrances as the present Constitution and the parliamentary regime to be swept out and the decks cleared for the impending struggle. Already General Sadao Araki, in giving the clarion call of "the great ideal of Dai Nippon", had declared, "that the Manchurian incident has arisen just at this moment is indeed most fortunate, for it is God who, wishing to rouse the Japanese people from their slumber, has been striking the bell of warning." To paraphrase Plato, God, of course, is a Nipponist.

Still, in this period of gestation they are not sure of their own strength. They are calculating and weighing the great social issues, and forging ahead for a new

alignment of forces. Themselves lacking popular support in the country, they are skilfully using the moderate elements who have still the confidence of large sections of people, and who, moreover, in these explosive and uncertain times, are accepted as safe and sane men by the Western Powers. The assassination of the Seiyukai Premier, Mr. Inukai, in May 1932 had ended, once and for all, the rule by purely party Governments. Since then coalition and "national" Governments have been formed from which the party men as such have been gradually excluded in favour of the front benchers of reaction. It is instructive to study the role of the "liberal" leaders of Nippon, as elsewhere, who, consciously or unconsciously and with whatever explanations of their own actions, brought all their own prestige and popularity ultimately to the service of incipient Fascism.

The *coup d'etat* of February 1936 which had taken such a heavy toll and horrified the whole nation, and which had involved high officers and led to the one-year detention of General Mazaki, did not put off the militarists a bit. On the contrary, it spurred them on to a speedier action; they had little time to lose. The extremist officers resigned from the Supreme Command, and the Okada Cabinet fell, being succeeded by a more reactionary Cabinet under Mr. Koki Hirota, a bureaucrat and supporter of the Black Dragon Society, and dominated by the militarists. Pressure was brought for amending the Election Law with a view to centralising State power. The Cabinet appointed two committees to recommend necessary changes to be made in the central and local administration. As the fuglemen of Fascism proceed to scrap the whole parliamentary regime, which no longer serves their needs, the Liberals and the Labour and the leftists rally to defend it *per se*. Instead of opposing the retrogressive attempts with progressive

and far-reaching measures of their own, they merely become the new defenders of the old traditions and champions of the *status quo*. Excepting a small group of individuals, hardly anyone realised that in this epoch of wars and revolutions, even the defence of the existing rights and liberties can only be done by boldly forging ahead. But this has happened everywhere, and Japan has been no exception.

The Army and Navy produced their own plan of combining several Ministries into one "super-Ministry" under an Army Chief, and of State-controlling all capital. The President of Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry said that the economic control was unavoidable, but the class conflict must be outlawed to enable the nation to survive. With the increased military expenditure of the Government, its support of heavy industries in preference to those producing consumers' goods, with speculation being rife and with the commodity prices reaching the highest point since 1929 and labour disputes doubling within a year, the social crisis was deepening. The police secretly made hundreds of arrests for holding radical and leftist opinions. Signor Virginio Gayda, Mussolini's mouthpiece, wrote at that time that the Japanese views of Communism were similar to the Fascist Italian. In November 1936 the Nipponists and the Nazis signed the anti-Comintern Pact, as Mr. Sato, the next Foreign Minister, said, "in view of the destructive nature of the Comintern, which runs counter to Japan's national structure".

The next Premier, General Hayashi, a moderate, to boot, continued during his short term of three and a half months the economic plan of the Hirota Cabinet. His own service to the cause of totalitarianism was the Cabinets Planning Board, which he instituted before he was forced to resign. The parliamentarians and consti-

tutional sticklers were struggling in vain to impeach the Government. What degree of public mandate these rulers have for their totalitarian measures is indicated by the fact that the Government supporters returned in the General Election formed only 10 per cent. in the new House. Thus Japan too showed that those who shout loudest against the unworkability and corruption of democratic institutions are the very people who corrupt and refuse to work them.

The new Prime Minister, who is destined to play a historic role in the *kampfzeit* of Nipponism, easy parallels for which can be drawn from elsewhere in the West, was Prince Fumimoro Konoye. This fifty-year-old nobleman, a descendant of the ancient Fujiwara clan of "Murasaki" fame, is regarded by most people in the West as moderate and dependable. In Japan, too, his reputation for insight, statesmanship and ability to navigate in difficult waters extends far beyond the limited circles of the Court and the bureaucracy. A protege of the late Prince Saionji, who himself had, as a young man, returned from Paris with his head filled with the ideas of General Will and Social Contract of Rousseau, Prince Konoye began his political life as a Tolstoyan, went through a "Marxist" stage and is now a keen admirer of Mussolini's Corporate State. He is a founder of the Great Asia Society, and was for four years the President of the House of Peers, before he was entrusted with the task of forming a Cabinet. Thrice during this historical period he has been the Premier, for a total period of nearly three years, a record time in Nippon's politics. No one is more responsible than this liberal Prince for the kind of politics that helped gradually to transform Nippon into the totalitarian State it is today.

His "national union" Cabinet included the bureau-

crat of the Black Dragon Society, Mr. Hirota, as the Foreign Minister, and General Sugiyama, the extremist Army Chief, but had no use for the radical and labour representatives whose Social Mass Party, despite the Tammany Hall tactics of the Nipponist, had doubled its parliamentary strength in the General Election. On the contrary, a few months later the Konoye Cabinet was to order the dissolution of the Japanese Proletarian Party and the National Council of Labour Union, and the arrest of a first batch of 371 people for holding radical views, including two members of the new Diet. Prince Konoye's own views on *pax japonica* were soon to be unfolded. When the Kwantung (China) Shrine was founded by the Emperor's Proclamation, Premier Konoye, in a dedicatory statement, described it as "sacred to the spirits of the Sun Goddess, the foundress of the Imperial line and the Emperor Meiji, who opened the way for the development of Japanese nationals in the Asiatic continent, so as to perpetuate the divine virtues of these distinguished rulers". This was good enough to start with; also it ingratiated the Prince with the bureaucrats and a large section of the militarists who had always been impatient of politicians lagging behind. For new things were soon to come. The Nipponists knew in part and prophesied in part.

On September 7, heaven sent, to use General Tojo's phrase, another signal, the "China Incident", and the Supreme Command sent Katsuki, the Commander of the garrison in North China (to quote his own words), "to lead the Japanese Army in justice and righteousness to chastise the outrageous Chinese". At home the expenditure on the Army and the Navy alone jumped up to Y.4,000 million that year. But the noble Prince, during the national mobilisation campaign, preached to the people the gospel of Bushido and asked them to eat

simpler food and to realise the spirit of thrift by giving up to the nation one article per family. Large-scale arrests were made of students and of people harbouring anti-war and "dangerous" thoughts. Which of you, asked the Apostles of Nipponism, shall by taking thought add one cubit unto his stature?

History in the main, academic and romantic theories notwithstanding, is the development of rival forces in society, which alone endows it with sense and meaning. It is specially instructive to watch the march of various social forces in a country which is entering a highly critical period. Not only is the whole tempo quickened, but the relative positions and strengths of the forces are continually changing. Nippon proves as excellent an example as any other. The extremist militarists, unable yet, because of lack of mass support, to forge ahead alone or too fast, prod the slackers along. They bluff, bludgeon and badger, manufacture frequent "incidents," and coerce the latter to their own course by *faits accomplis*. The moderate elements, leading their larger following, at first try sincerely to travel by their own road and at their own pace; but later find, to their own sudden surprise, the high road and the low road converging in the new terrain. But, having once taken one step aside, they are constrained, by the new situation, to justify their next step aside; and so on *ad nauseam*. They dare not turn back now unless they were to renounce their own goal; for their destination too is the same—Nipponism. Prince Konoye and his group were once stout champions of a parliamentary regime and freedom at home, and of a policy of live and let live abroad; and this was precisely the basis for the degree of popular support they commanded. But such popular illusions were to disappear in time.

A few weeks after the Sino-Japanese War began,

a Cabinet Advisory Council of nine was established, and later on the power was still more concentrated in the hands of a smaller Inner Cabinet of five (the Premier, Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Ministers). On November 20, 1937, the militarists succeeded in wresting the Cabinet's power of conducting the war into their own hands by the creation of the Imperial General H.Q., consisting of the Emperor advised by the Chiefs of the General Staffs. In September 1938 the China Affair Boards was established under the control of the Supreme Command.

All along the insatiable militarists had kept pressing their basic demands, firstly, that all socio-economic, industrial, political and cultural life should be reorganised under the State control, and secondly, that the State itself should be controlled by one new party. "Unless egoistic and individualistic institutions and liberal politics and administration are overhauled," said, as long ago as 1936, an official Army pamphlet entitled *Replenishment of Army Armaments and the Spirit in which it is to be Effected*, "and the political orientation of the nation fundamentally changed, there can be no hope for advance of national fortunes, prosperity and the happiness of the people." What, then, should be done? The Army answers: "From the standpoint of defence administration, renovation is needed to rebuild the State on the basis of Japanese spirit and in accordance with the requirements of modern armaments, permitting establishment and rational operation of a totalitarian system."

No less important were the views of the Young Officers of the Army and Navy, and of the terrorist Patriotic Societies. A conglomeration of messianism, anarchism, jingoism and terrorism, their views reflected the social, political and ideological chaos in

which they lived, moved and had their being. Mr. Tachibana, the leader of Aikyo Juku ("the School of Love for the Native Soil"), spoke for them when he wrote long ago: "Japan must sweep away this individualist, industrial civilisation with its plutocracy and corrupt politicians and return to her Oriental civilisation of independent, self-supporting farmers. Foreign expansion and domestic reformation must go hand in hand." This son of a dyer was once, like the descendant of the Fujiwara clan, Prince Konoye, a Tolstoyan too. "Industries and banks are to be nationalised; farmer co-operatives developed into a great organisation of mutual aid. The nation is to be liberated from a corrupt Parliament, the tool of plutocrats, but neither Communist nor Fascist dictatorships will be admitted; we need representative organisations based on self-government, co-operative municipalities; de-centralisation is all important."

Prince Konoye, of course, would share none of the anarchistic parts of such a policy. The two main tasks to which he applied himself as soon as he took over the premiership precisely demanded by the militarists and the super-capitalists: the establishment of comprehensive State control and the creation of a monolithic party to control that State. Prince Konoye, who is an adept in the political game of *kendo*, and who had surrounded himself with a "Ministry of all Talents", played one group against another, resisted and wavered at first, but later began, stroke by stroke, changing his style. The institution of one party regime, with the uncertainty as to which one of the rival groups might control it, was a ticklish affair, and so was put off. As far as the problem of State control was concerned, Konoye and his colleagues had neither ideological nor material difficulties. All that the new conditions demanded was a further

extension of the form of State control which, after all, had already been there; so argued the whole chorus of plutocrats, militarists, moderates and social democrats. In a broadcast speech which reminded the nation of "the exalted responsibility with which our present generation is entrusted", Prince Konoye said in November 1938: "It is therefore imperative to carry out all necessary internal reforms and, with the full development of our aggregate national strength, material as well as moral, to fulfil at all costs this duty incumbent upon our nation."

The Government of General Hayashi, the "moderate" predecessor of the "moderate" Premier Konoye, had already, as we have noted, established a Cabinet Planning Board, in addition to the two Commissions for controlling prices and for directing the teaching of *kokutai* (national polity). Now Premier Konoye began introducing step by step the State control and centralisation of power. In July 1937 a Central Economic Council was formed with the Premier as the President, and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board as the Vice-President. A four-year Plan was adopted to develop the industries everywhere, to regulate labour, to "rationalise" the standard of living and to re-examine "science and culture in their application to expanding productive activity." (The Planning Board and the Economic Council were later amalgamated into the Planning Council in February 1938). In September another law, called "the Munitions Industry Mobilisation Law", passed as long ago as 1918, became operative in order to meet the China emergency. Restrictions on imports of certain goods were imposed in order to support the yen exchange.

All this piecemeal legislation was, however, found inadequate. The crisis was deepening at home and the China war was nowhere near its end. Thanks to Italy

joining Japan and Germany in the anti-Comintern Pact in November, and to the Kwantung Army triumphantly entering Nanking and marching still further, the militarists were feeling stronger and more confident. So the demands for the "stabilisation of the national livelihood" (*kokumin seikatsuentei*) were pressed still more forcibly. Consequently the Diet, in a historical session lasting for over two months, passed eighty-six Government measures, and in doing so gave totalitarian powers to Governments who neither are responsible to the Diet itself nor can in any conceivable way be said to represent the majority of the people. On March 24, 1938, the National Mobilisation Act, drafted earlier by the Cabinet Planning Board, was passed giving an imprimatur to National Socialism of Nippon.

Thanks to the safe and sane statesmen like Prince Konoye, totalitarianism was foisted on Nippon through similar channels as in Italy and Germany—that is, by perfectly "constitutional" means. Prince Konoye played the usual cards. He appealed for a patriotic rally in the grave "national emergency" caused by the China Incident, which, of course, had been, at the outset, supported by all the parties in the Diet, including the Social Democrats. However, protests which were still allowed came from the helpless members of the Diet, but were of no avail. One member said: "I believe that people were more patriotic in the Russo-Japanese War than at present, because the Government did not try to manufacture patriotic interests in the crisis." Another member denounced the Government for "attempting to enact patriotism by authority as in Germany and in Italy". Prince Konoye said he was sorry, and promised that the provisions of the new law would not apply during the China Incident or, in any case, not without the sanction of the National Mobilisa-

tion Council, which consisted of thirty Diet members and twenty Government officials and bureaucrats. With such figment of control the Diet was still dandled.

The National Mobilisation Law of Nippon is rightly compared to the Nazi Enabling Act of 1933. "National mobilisation as termed in this law", says Article 1, "means the control and operation of human and material resources in such a way as to enable the State to give full scope to the efficient use of its strength for the realisation of the purposes of national defence in time of war, including the occasions of incidents or affairs which differ little from war in results, which may not be called a war as a matter of policy, but one which is virtually the same as war."

The War Department, dotting the i's and crossing the t's of the law, explained in a pamphlet that by this law "Japan aims to control and operate her entire personal and national resources to the fullest possible extent, in order to enable her to demonstrate her national power most effectively for her national defence in time of emergency . . . to supply her Army and Navy with a vast amount of war materials they require in time of war, to secure smooth economic co-operation for the stability of national life, and at the same time to demoralise the enemy on the battlefield as well as on the economic and propaganda fronts".

No time was lost in invoking the drastic provisions of the new law. In the beginning of May, as soon as the new mechanism was set operating, the first provisions became operative. Art. 8 empowered the Government to control production and consumption, export and import, and transport services. In June a general mobilisation programme introduced the rigid control of prices, simpler standards of living and the use of substitute materials. In July a Foreign Exchange Revolving Fund

was created. In October 1938 restrictions were put on taking money out of Japan or buying foreign exchange. Art. 13 enables the expropriation of private enterprises. Some business circles fought hard against the nationalisation of electric-power industry. But, as an Army Plan had suggested as early as 1936, the Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company now took over the industry under the new Electric Power State Control Act. This, however, did not stop the serious electric power "famine" of 1940. Later, the foreign and domestic situation called for more additional Imperial Ordinances.

The declaration of the World War, and the new friction with Great Britain (Tientsin, etc.) and the U.S. ("moral embargo," etc.), produced the need for further totalitarian control. In December 1940 an Ordinance provided a penalty of two years' imprisonment or a fine of Y.2,000 for spreading, among other things, news which might impede the financial and economic policies of the Government. The death penalty for disclosure of important news regarding the national defence was provided by the Official Secrets Act of March 1941. Stricter rations of all kinds of articles, like condensed or powdered milk, gauze, absorbent cotton, medicines and towels (one per year), are enforced. In April 1941 the rationing of rice began, and a fortnight later it was announced that four meatless days a month would be introduced. In October 1940 and January 1941 Ordinances for control of Corporation Accounts and of dividends exceeding 8 per cent., and banking and other funds were issued. Finally, after over three long years, when the invocation of every provision of the law was fought against at every stage by the people, to the great chagrin of the militarists, the "national emergency" and the gravity of the world

situation once again came to the aid of the leaders. After the Nazi attack on Russia, the Government of Prince Konoye and General Tojo invoked the full provisions of the National Mobilisation Act.

Regarding, however, the more fundamental problems of production and that trifling thing, the co-operation of the producers, the Nipponists were hard put to it. Various plans were sought, tried, and rejected as unsatisfactory. In December 1938 the Cabinet discussed a three-year Plan drawn by the Planning Board, and in November 1940 they adopted a ten-year Economic Plan under which, in the manner of the Nazi "New Order", the Nipponists intend to make Japan proper the metropolis of flourishing heavy industries, while the Asiatic mainland and Chinese unskilled labour were to be used for producing food, raw materials and light industries. In 1938 began the work of industrial registration and mobilisation. Under the work-record Pass-book Registration Law about 6 million industrial workers are required to record their age, occupation, school career, technical skill, period of employment, wages and other details. An Ordinance of September 1940 prohibits the workers from shifting from one factory to another or from stopping work without good reason. The pass-book is kept with the employers, and "unless and until the work-record pass-book is presented to the prospective employer, no legal relation between employer and employed shall become established".

Under the old factory laws, the maximum number of working hours for those under 16 years of age had been eleven, though in practice twelve to fourteen was not unusual. Now the labour shortage, owing to mobilisation, necessitated the relaxation of all such restrictions. The minimum number of working hours for adult male employees of Government-sponsored factories

was extended to thirteen. Age limit was abolished, and in this, as in deciding overtime, physical and mental ability of the workers, the employers were vested with discretionary powers. The figures given by the Bank of Japan and the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics showed the degree of male employment in factories as 156·0 for April 1941 and for the cost of living 147·4 for June 1941, against 100 in 1937 in both cases; while even in the pre-war period of 1931-5 factory accidents had risen by 98 per cent. But a trifle like that must not impede the advent of the "New Order." "We expect you to answer to the spirits of our Imperial Ancestors," thus the Tenno himself issues a call to his subjects on the 2600th anniversary of the foundation of the Empire and the Dynasty. Not man but Nipponism is the measure of all things.

Simultaneously with the spiritual mobilisation movement begun on the outbreak of the "China Incident", a "Service to the Nation through Industry" movement had been started. A heavily subsidised propaganda was carried out in the country to the effect that capital and labour are two aspects of the same thing, that class struggle is only a bee in the Bolshevik bonnet and that "national unity" and "equality of sacrifice" should be the watchwords of every son of the soil. By September 1940 over 30,000 associations had been formed in important factories, with the heads of the concerns as Presidents. In July 1940 all the labour unions had been suppressed, because, as the *Oriental Economist* August 1941 says, these were based on class consciousness, and "the conception of class struggle does not come home to the Japanese, with whom the social unit is the family, and not the individual, as in the West". It does not occur to these people that similar arguments have been used in all

countries, Eastern and Western, to advance similar ends. In October 1940 what first started as a "national" movement sponsored by plutocrats was absorbed, in the recognised manner, by the Government as an organ of the Ministry of Labour. "Thus ended in Japan", comments the same journal approvingly of Nipponist totalitarianism, "that product of liberalistic ideology, trade-unionism. That the trade union went out of existence of its own accord(!!), and not by pressure from the Government, speaks eloquently of the distinctive character of the Japanese spirit which the Occidental mind has difficulty in comprehending." *Ex oriente lux.*

Of the two major demands of the militarists, one, of the entire State control, "permitting establishment and rational operation of a totalitarian system", was thus materialised, thanks to Prince Konoye and his moderate colleagues, despite their hesitancy and reluctance. The second historical task of this group during the *kampfzeit* of Nipponism concerned the other demand: that of creating a monolithic party to control the State. Here, too, hesitancy and reluctance to go all the way marked the earlier stages, but led gradually and inevitably towards the fulfilment of that task. Here, too, is a similar crescendo of considerations: Japan's "bloc economy", "Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc", "Japan-China-Manchukuo bloc", "East Asia", the "New Order", the "Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere"; need for national unity, end of class divisions and political parties, one national organisation.

Not only the Nipponists took such a serious view of the situation, but their partners in the anti-Comintern Pact did likewise. "In this difficult situation", General Haushofer, a former military attache in Japan, had written in *Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik* in 1935, "Japan

is without political leadership. The Japanese Government represents a new mixture of military, bureaucratic, capitalistic and party tendencies without any cohesion and capacity to make decisions. Those elements which might be suited to take over the leadership are instead wasting their time and energies in medieval romantic enterprises. Any one who closely follows development in Japan must be aware that this situation of contradictory tendencies cannot last much longer; that internal decisions must finally be made; that the present situation of drift cannot continue and something must be done about the deadlock in domestic politics."

The institution of one "national" party had been demanded, as long ago as 1931, by Mr. Adachi, a wealthy capitalist leader of a semi-Fascist organisation. Mr. Matsuoaka, the then President of the South Manchurian Railway and the potential admirer of the Nazi virtues, also advocated a single party. General Hayashi, the "moderate" Army spokesman, had, as the Prime Minister, nearly organised one single organisation, like the only official party allowed in Manchukuo. Soon after the outbreak of the "China Incident" the same cry was taken up by right-wing labour too, like the Social Mass Party leadership. The veteran reactionary, Mr. Mitsuru Toyama, of the Black Dragon Society, has been insisting on the same, especially since 1938, and is reported to have personally influenced Prince Konoye in a *tete-a-tete*. So the ground had been well prepared.

On November 3, 1938, Premier Konoye introduced, with all the flair of a debutante, the "New Order" into the world, which "has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and consideration between Japan, Manchukuo, and China in the political, economic, and cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect joint defence against Com-

munism, to create a new culture and to realise close economic cohesion throughout East Asia." The national life had to be reorganised in the light of this "New Order", and the National Mobilisation Law had already been conceived to that effect. But Prince Konoye could not then see eye to eye with the out-and-out militarists, who further demanded the suppression of all political parties and creation of one national organisation instead. So the first Konoye Cabinet had resigned.

But the problem of creating a single organisation was neither given up by the militarists nor stopped worrying Prince Konoye. Urged by the pressure of events, and wisely desirous of meeting in his own way the demands of the militarists with whom he was in continuous consultation, and possibly of taking the wind out of their sail, Prince Konoye, then President of the Privy Council, persuaded the political parties, in the summer of 1940, to dissolve themselves "voluntarily." There is not going to be any other political "party" either, was the Prince's assurance. During these weeks a series of international events happened only to serve the cause of Nipponism, bringing more strength to the elbows of its champions. Evacuation from Dunkirk took place on June 3-4, and from Norway on June 10, Marshal Petain sued for terms on June 17, and Japan had forced France to stop the transit of war material through Indo-China and was asking Britain to close the Burma Road. In these circumstances, on June 24, the day when Petain's France signed an Armistice with Il Duce, Prince Konoye resigned from the Presidency of the Privy Council, announcing that he would form a new national "organisation" strong enough to cope with the new unparalleled gravity. Within less than a month Admiral Yonai's Cabinet fell because, as *Asabi*,

the Army's mouthpiece, wrote then, the War Minister (the spokesman of the militarists) resigned for the simple reason that "a renovation of internal structure had become necessary in order to cope with the world situation." The great minds of Prince Konoye and his "moderate" group and of the out-and-out militarists seem to leap together.

The new Cabinet, the second one of Prince Konoye, formed on July 17, included for the first time two important figures: General Tojo, the present Premier, as the War Minister, and Mr. Matsuoka as the Foreign Minister, the great spokesman and the humble servant respectively of the Supreme Command. Within a week of assuming the responsible power, Premier Konoye makes a most important broadcast to the nation: "There was a great unrest in the world, and this called for national unity and concentration of the whole strength." But—and this was the burden of his broadcast—party politics and party rivalry were in the way. The evil of party politics, continued the Prince, consisted in "the prevalence of liberalism, democracy and socialism, which are not agreeable to Japan's national cause." This would be put right now he had reached an agreement with the Army. A new political organisation is categorically imperative because "the enunciation of divergent views may mislead the people and the nation may miss an opportunity." And as for the people, the Premier warns that they should expect a continuance of scarcity and lowering of living standards. On August 1 the Cabinet issued a declaration: "The world stands at a turning-point and is about to witness the growth of a new form of government economy and culture, based on the development of sundry groups of States. Japan too is confronted by a great trial such as she has never experienced in her history." Therefore a strong State

should be created, education to be reformed and Parliament to be reshaped. For the people, a promise is given for "such a standard of living as will enable the nation to lead a plain, solid, and vigorous life, and to surmount the national crisis by preserving through the years of hardship."

How did Premier Konoye set about organising such a National Structure that would once and for all put an end to party politics and party rivalry that reeked of "liberalism, democracy and socialism?" What was its composition and who were the men selected to organise and direct this "non-party" movement? The Organising Committee of the "New Structure" consisted of twenty-six members selected by Premier Konoye himself, making a significant assortment of "non-party" celebrities. There were five members of the House of Peers and seven members of the House of Representatives. The four representatives of the Press included Mr. Inosuke Furuno, the President of the Domei News Agency, and one representative each of the journals owned by the big trusts: *Asahi*, *Nichi-Nichi* and *Yomiuri* of Tokyo. The five representatives of the Patriotic Societies were: Admiral Suetsugu, who is the exponent of the "South Sea Policy;" Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, the leader of the Imperial League of Young Officers and the exponent of the "doctrine of the Imperial Way" in Dai-Nippon Youth Party that he founded in 1936. In December 1937, while on active service in China, he personally issued orders to shell "by mistake" the British gun-boats and trading vessels, to sink the U.S. *Panay* and to machine-gun the survivors. For such adventurism Prince Konoye's Cabinet itself had recalled him home in 1938. Others were Mr. Y. Kuzu, the Secretary-General of the Black Dragon Society; Seigo Nakano, the leader of the Fascist Party (Tohokai),

and Mr. Koyo Ohta, President of the Kokuousha Organisation founded by Baron Hiranuma. These were the men (all spokesmen of the Court, bureaucrats, big trusts and militarists) who composed, under the chairmanship of Prince Konoye himself, the Organising Committee, where, however, one would search in vain for representatives of radical, labour and leftist opinion and of the vast millions of people who too presumably formed the nation.

On August 28, 1940, Chairman Konoye, addressing the Committee, expounds the totalitarian principles and aims of the Movement: "The New National Structure Movement now supersedes that of party politics postulated upon liberalism. It is essentially national, all-embracing and public-spirited in character. It aims at the concentration and unification of the nation's entire powers. Its activities extend to the whole life of the nation." The Prince still fights hard against the extreme militarists and fights shy of describing the new organisation as a party. He protests that he and his country are not "like others." That, of course, is a main characteristic of the definite position—pre—"Der Tag"—occupied by such analogous groups in the social history of every nation, which in Nippon Prince Konoye so well represents. That is his source of strength and of weakness. The New National Structure Movement, he said, "cannot be allowed to take the form of a single-party system. This political system considers the State and Party as one and the same thing; it views any opposition to the party as revolt against the State; it renders permanent the ruling position of one party, with the head of that party as the permanent wielder of power to govern. No matter what brilliant results such a system may have reaped in other lands, it is not acceptable in Japan, because it is contrary to the basic prin-

ciples of national policy of 'one Sovereign over all.' "

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor is a most essential element, and is, of course, included in the national scheme. He has shown how to face the present situation and, "in obedience to the Imperial World," continued the Premier, "the subjects are taking the lead in this national movement to assist . . . and guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne." Besides, it serves a great purpose, for, as Mr. Akiyama, Premier Konoye's "one-man-brain trust," said: "Our ideal Hitler is one who in all obedience and docility resembles the model wife of old Japan, a featureless doll."

The Organising Committee issued its report within three weeks, recommending a new State structure on the Italian model and the creation of two Supreme Councils to control industry, agriculture and labour, and education, religion, Press and sports. Thus was born the Imperial (later called National) Rule Assistance Association (the Taisei Yokusaukei), which consists of the Executive Council, which is to "convey the will and ideas of those who govern to those who are governed," and the Central Co-operative Council, which is to "convey the will and ideas of those governed to those who govern," and which has branches in every prefecture, city and village. The Premier nominates the Executive Council and selects presidents and members of the branches of the Central Co-operative Council, half of the members to be chosen from names submitted by the prefectoral co-operative councils. This New Structure of Nippon resembles the ten-year-old Fascist Grand Council of Italy, with its life members, functional members and extraordinary members, "who have deserved well of the nation and of the cause of the Fascist Revolution," all of whom are nominated by Il Duce.

Premier Konoye was the first President, and the Vice-President was Lieut.-General Yanagawa, an Ex-Director General of the China Affairs Board and later Minister of Justice in the second Konoye Cabinet. Mr. Inosuke Furuno, President of the Domei News Agency, was the Executive Director. Its secretariat was manned by the powerful bureaucrats whose various cliques are led by such liberal men as General Araki, Admiral Yomai, Mr. Matsuoka, Koki Hirota and Toshio Shiratori. Admiral Suetsugu was until recently the Chairman of its Central People's Co-operative Council.

Such was the nature and such the personnel of the "non-party" New Structure of Nippon, which was Prince Konoye's compromise and designed as a "counter-part or complement" of the Diet that could not be easily exorcised. It is the great inspiration and the prime achievement of Konoye the man and the spokesman of the "moderate" section of Nipponism, and thus bears its unmistakable stamp of hesitancy and half-measures, which, however, would not prevent it becoming the conduit system to full-fledged Fascism.

Despite the claims of its apologists, the Taisei Yokusaukai has no mass basis or support. The broad masses have no voice in it, far less control it. Mr. Matao Nagashima, the Deputy Chief of the Political and Economic Section of the Domei News Agency, tries to explain (*Contemporary Japan*, June 1941), that it was not meant to be made an instrument of the Government, but of the people's unanimous will. But "there was no time to be lost in waiting for such an initiation. Moreover, the impetus of a campaign of this kind, if launched by the people, he instructs us, is liable to be dissipated in sectional strife. Government leadership and tutelage appeared necessary, and the movement for national organisation thus became a joint under-

taking by the Government and the people." While reading the line of arguments it becomes difficult at times to remember who is putting them, Mr. Nagashima or a Nazi spokesman. Under the former system the vast majority "had no enthusiasm for politics, for national policies and the future of the country," because only once in three or four years did they participate in politics through franchise. But all that is changed now, because under the new system "each member of the community in every walk of life might be enabled to shoulder his share of the task in the cause of the nation through (as Konoye said) the free inter-communication of the will and ideas of the governor and the governed." Such a great political *volte-face* has been accomplished with the overwhelming support and approval of the entire people." In Japan, the Domei News Agency boosts up its popular slogan Domei Tsushin Sha, or "according to Domei," as a hallmark of the veracity of its news and views. But its Chief, Mr. Nagashima, seems to fall far off that mark here.

A few observations can now be made from our analytical study of the development of social forces in Nippon in this historic epoch. Firstly we note that the new totalitarian structure of Nippon, the "great political *volte-face*," is the second of the two historical tasks that Prince Konoye and his particular class have performed paving the way to proper Fascism (the first being the State Control under General Mobilisation Law). It is, no doubt, a product of the internal antagonism of the various groups of Nipponists, but it is in the main conceived by them and for them as against the interests of the large masses of people. The gradual emergence of totalitarianism illustrates perhaps more clearly in Japan than elsewhere the correlation of class forces —militarists, militarist-fascists, extremists, big

trusts, bureaucrats, moderates, liberals and the right-wing labour—how one step justified the other and led to the next, and how gradually but surely the new machinery of enslavement was foisted on the people. The stock-in-trade of the Nipponists was like that of Grecian usurpers, which Grote describes as the "machinery of fraud whereby the people were to be cheated into a temporary submission, as a prelude to the machinery of force whereby such submission was to be perpetuated against their consent."

The second observation on the emergence of totalitarianism in Nippon is that it has no mass basis and no mass support, for the simple reason that it does not conduce to its material and cultural interests. Our observation is not belied by the existence of that small percentage of the farmer-tenant class which, through the terrorist Patriotic Societies like the Imperial League of Young Officers, is willy-nilly playing into the hands of Nipponists. Nor by the fact that the Chauvinist section of the right-wing labour leadership supported the early machinations of Nipponists. No, the New National Structure does not represent the nation. Even a large number of the Diet members, controlled as they are through the political caucuses, have protested against the new incursions from time to time. But the irresponsible and irresponsive Governments have carried on. Even when the Cabinets, during this *kampfzeit*, included one or two party men, they were there in their individual capacity, and not as party representatives. The third Konoye Cabinet, formed after the German attack on Russia, excluded even such individuals, and consisted of Generals and Admirals who, incidentally, hold hundreds of directorships of the big trusts of Japan. Again, before the New Structure was organised by a few hand-picked people who had no mandate from the people,

the political parties had been first disbanded. When in February 1941 the estimates for the Taisei Yokusau-kei were brought before the Diet—a Diet elected in April 1937, since when the class relations had undergone a complete modification—it refused to vote them, until the Government promised that the National Service Association would be strictly controlled and be later turned into a spiritual organisation, as Premier Konoye was supposed to be doing. No, this mammoth machinery of the militarists does not rest on popular support. Whomever does it represent, then? To answer that question is to answer another: *cui bono?*

Neither was it the antithetical outcome of a society menaced by the communist danger. In Japan there have been for some time all the objective conditions for a social revolution, but, as the small group of militant workers of that country state, a correct political leadership of the masses has been conspicuous by its absence. No, there was no danger of a communist attempt to overthrow the regime, which might have accounted for the introduction of a totalitarian system of the Nipponists. But the same objective conditions which produce, but did not in Japan, revolutionary organisations also produced excessive cogitation among the possessing classes and corruption among their leading politicians. "The exercise of government by the bureaucracy has failed to an increasing extent; for its contact with the people is weak, its methods of administration leave much to be desired and its political responsibility is not clear. It is infected with careerism and job-hunting, and quarrels between various Ministries and authorities are rooted in the system." Thus wrote *Asahi*, an influential paper, in December 1939, pleading for the abolition of the parliamentary regime. So, whatever may be the justification for introducing totali-

tarianism in Nippon, the fear of Communism at home is not one. Nipponism, on its wings, twitted in its black mantle, and seeking fresh woods and pastures new, meets its foes, and totalitarianism is the armoury needed for the ensuing combat.

Finally, Japan is an excellent example of how a small number of anti-democratic measures were gradually introduced into a democratic system until that system ceased to be democratic any longer. The Meiji Constitution has been slowly transformed into the militarists' Totalitarian State; even as the Weimar Constitution of Germany was not abrogated when the Nazi regime was introduced. It is a historical demonstration of the Hegelian law of quantity changing into quality. Of course, this is not the final stage. Indeed, the vanguard of Nipponism has been shouting in the style of Archimedes: "Give me a party strong enough, a State totalitarian enough, and single-handed I will move the world."

The militarists have often in the past tried to "reform" the Diet by means of a new electoral law. Prince Konoye, however, assured the Diet last January to withdraw the electoral law provided the other policies of the Government were not attacked. The life of the Diet was prolonged for another year. The militarists were dissatisfied. Those of them who openly call themselves Fascists have started a few near-Fascist organisations, and talk of the night of the long knives and of heads rolling in blood. However, the Army pledged its formal support to the New Structure, and ordered the reservists to join it and become its "propelling force". Their view is that the New Structure, in spite of all its organisational drawbacks, can still be worked to serve their ultimate purpose. It is, of course, not excluded that this caste of *coup d'étatists* have still a few more in

store for the nation, by which they could seize the entire State power and then lead her from where Prince Konoye has now left her to further stages of building the "New Ordér" of Nipponism.

Is Japan a Fascist country, and, if so, since when has it become one? Put thus formalistically, no question dealing with the evolution of things in a continuous flux can be answered with a categorical yes or no, any more than drops of thawing snow on window-panes can be described positively as either snow or water. Similar other questions will bring equally inadequate answers. In what year did Italy become Fascist? In October 1922, when the Fascisti marched on Rome and assumed office, or in 1926, when a part of the Corporative State was first introduced and labour was organised into syndicates, or in 1936, when the National Assembly of Corporation replaced the old Chamber of Deputies? In what year did Germany go Nazi? In January 1933, when Hitler became the Chancellor, or in the summer of 1934, when the Republic was established after Hindenburg's death and Hitler became the Supreme Fuehrer? Again, what simple answers could be given to a similar question about Vichy France or about several Governments in pre-war Europe? So, to the query if Japan is a Fascist State today, some might say: Essentially, yes; while others might prefer to paraphrase Mr. Churchill and say: It cannot in their opinion be classified as Fascist in the extreme acceptance of the word without some risk of terminological inexactitude.

## CHAPTER VI

### CHINA "INCIDENTS"

What the Apostles of the "New Order" in the East have christened as "incidents" are the Sino-Japanese Wars that began in 1931, and have so far taken toll of 6 million people killed and 16 millions turned homeless and destitute. In a sense, they are only incidents in the long, historic struggle of Nipponism, and, as such, they provide a vivid camera view of its real aims and technique with which alone, and not their detailed study, we shall be specially concerned in our study.

The H.Q. of the Kwantung Army controlling today a million and a quarter garrisoned troops in China is not only an Academy from which the higher ranks from the Military Staff College, as well as the "Young Officers", eventually graduate, but is also a factory for manufacturing timely incidents. The "Manchurian Incident" of September 18, 1931, was, as we have stated, known beforehand to Army Chiefs like General Nishio, one of whose devoted colleagues is the present Premier, General Tojo. The resultant war raged in fury while leisurely deliberations as to who fired the first shot dragged on inside and outside the League of Nations. Ten years later General Tojo (as the War Minister) commemorated the incident as the heaven-sent signal for the dawn of the new era in the East. On September 7, 1937, another incident occurred near the Marco Polo Bridge in Peiping, spurring the existing war situation. A new and greater war was continued mercilessly while

the legalists of the League of Nations were conferring with the apologists of Nipponism. The "extremists" and the "moderates" alike of Japan knew what was to be done. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* wrote on September 18: "This is our chance to solve the North China deadlock once for all in order to realise the clarification of the situation which we have been expecting for years. If we lack the determination of crushing the double obstacles of the Hopei-Chahar Council and the Chinese Central Government, and lost this 'God-sent' chance, there would be grave consequences." Premier Konoye, rejecting Chiang Kai-shek's proposals for a truce as "too late," told the Diet on September 28, "I think that not only must problems with China be settled locally but also we must go a step farther and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations." The Japanese militarists have from the beginning advocated a speedy conquest by force, as against the industrial capitalists, who espoused their "liberal" policy of gradual penetration by means of trade and financial investments. The gospel of the militarists—the Tanaka Memorial—says, "If we rely on the development of our trade we shall in the end be defeated by Britain and America, who have overwhelming economic forces. Thus we shall gain nothing. And what is even more dangerous, China may one day wake up."

It would be a cardinal mistake to think that God and the Kwantung Army are alone responsible for the various "incidents", and on such an assumption to base a foreign policy of ingratiating the innocents at home. It is true that the "men on the spot" believing, like Marshal Lyautey, that faint hearts never won an Empire, have often forged ahead on their own initiative and by a series of *faits accompli* involving national prestige and material stakes have forced the slower hands of some

Governments at Tokyo. But the role of the moderates who hide behind the skirts, rather kimonos, of the militarists should not be forgotten. As the moderate Premier Konoye himself quite rightly told the Diet last January: "The fighting services are not responsible. It is nobody's responsibility but mine. I feel unpardonable before the Throne and the entire nation that already millions of yen have been spent and thousands of soldiers sacrificed."

What is the driving motive force behind these incidents thus caused and thus entailing the loss of the lives of thousands of soldiers and millions of yen? All wars during the long struggle of Japan have been motivated by the greed and need of her expanding system, which has invariably benefited them. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, was caused by the need of markets for the cotton textiles of the newly-set-up mills, and brought Formosa, Pescadores and "Independence" of Korea, as well as filling the pockets of the Nipponists with an indemnity of £180 millions lent to the Manchu Dynasty for that purpose by the bankers of Britain, which had become Japan's new ally. In the Boxer Trouble of 1899, Japan, now on an equal footing with the Western Powers, got its share of the huge indemnity of 450 million tael from China. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, though costing her 120,000 men and 2 billion yen, secured for Japan the protectorate over Korea, the lease of Liaotung Peninsula, South Manchurian Railway and the mining rights in the southern half of Saghalien. Her foreign trade jumped from Y.265 million in 1895 to Y.810 million in 1905; and the steam shipping from 15,000 tons to 1,552,000 tons during the same period. The 1914-18 war was one of those god-sent chances that Japanese leaders always point out. In addition to the German leasehold of Tsingtao and

the League Mandate over the Pacific Island north of the equator, Japan's foreign trade rocketed up from Y.1,187 millions in 1914 to Y.4,285 millions in 1920; the excess for the first time of exports over imports, amounting to nearly Y.2,000 million, enabled her to accumulate vast gold reserves.

The end of 1930 caught Japan in the depth of depression. The earlier depression in the U.S.A. and Europe had reduced Japan's exports to these countries, and the total foreign trade was halved between 1929 and 1931. The farm income was reduced by a third, and the total indebtedness of the country amounted to more than the national income. With the 3 million unemployed, wages cut, tenancy struggles and strikes soon to reach a new level in 1932, and with actual famine in the country, Nipponism had arrived at the cross-roads of a great social crisis. From there, one road led to social changes, the other to temporary palliatives via war and expansion. Always hard-pressed for time, the leaders, once before foiled in a similar attempt by Baron Tanaka to block the northward march of Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, decided to strike harder this time before he had further consolidated his power over the various interneccine factions.

Manchuria was now declared to be the "life-line" of Japan. No wonder, either. It contained 85 per cent. of China's unsettled waste lands, 80 per cent. of her iron, 55 per cent. of her finest forest lands and one-third of her total railways. In 1931-2 Manchuria was seized, and with it (as another estimate puts it) 80 million acres of arable land, 6 million tons of coal, 400 million tons of iron ore, 150 billion cubic feet of standing timber, and 2 billion gold dollars. "The time has passed", Mr. Koki Hirota, the Foreign Minister, told the Diet in 1934, "when other Powers of the League

of Nations can prosecute their policies for the exploitation of China."

Having once taken the road to war and expansion as their way of easing the intolerable social tension at home, the leaders of Nipponism drove on on the high gear with no halts in the middle. Jehol in 1933, Chahar in 1935, and Suiyuan in 1936, were invaded. Then the remaining provinces of North China, Central China and South China became objects of their attack. The steadily mounting Japanese exports to these conquered regions are a good barometer of her new gains (see Chapter X), and of the methods by which the Western Powers were, one after another, gradually but firmly ousted from their old spheres of activity. "The nations of the world should also recognise the new situation in the Orient," said Premier Konoye in November 1938, in his first broadcast on the New Order. "In the past China has been an area sacrificed to the Imperialistic ambition of other Powers. Japan recognises the need of making a fundamental change in this situation and wishes to establish a new peace and order in East Asia based on justice."

In attempting to foist the New Order on the Chinese people the Nipponists have tried all sorts of fancy regimes and all manner of devices to split the none-too-uniform structure of the Kuomintang Government. It is one thing to seize by military force the coastal towns and railway zones, but the different problem of holding down the bulk of the people living in the hinterland can only be solved, however unsatisfactorily, with the help of *gauleiters* and puppet regimes. At one time the militarists had sponsored a North China State called Huapeikuo, and the Inner Mongolian Federation. In November 1935 the anti-Communist Government of "East Hopei Autonomous Council" was

set up in the demilitarised zone (according to the Tangku Truce of March 1933) in North China, which was partly superseded a few weeks later by the Hopei-Chahar Political Council agreed to by the Chinese Government. During the second phase of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan set up, in December 1937, a "Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic" at Peiping, which was affiliated with Manchukuo. This puppet regime consisted of the aged members of the Anflu Clique, which had been Japanophile during and after the 1914-18 war. They had also managed to secure the services of one Kuomintang Party leader, Mr. Miao Ping, who now organised a party called the Hsiu Min Hui, based on the "Principles of the Renewed People" (Hsiu Min Chu I), corresponding to Sun Yat-sen's principles of San Min Chu I. Another puppet regime with equally solemn heading and austere basis was to come in March 1938, called "Reformed Government of the Republic of China", resting on the "Principles of the Great People" (Ta Min Chu I).

In December 1938 Mr. Wang Ching-wei, a Kuomintang leader, in prestige next only to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, left China by a sudden flight to Indo-China and thence to Japan. He was joined by a handful of well-known Kuomintang leaders, like Chou Fu-hai, the most popular commentator of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, and Chien Kung-po, the present Mayor of Shanghai. A new "Orthodox Kuomintang" Party was organised. The "Provisional Government" of 1937 and the "Reformed Government" of 1938 were now amalgamated into the "National Government of the Republic of China", under the presidency of Wang Ching-wei and the suzerainty of the Kwantung Army.

All these dissident leaders, known and obscure, claimed in their own way to follow the original prin-

ciples of Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood, and of the Kuomintang Party, as conceived by Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Chinese Republic, which, they allege, are now violated by the dictatorial regime of Chiang Kai-shek and the various intra-Kuomintang groups that support him. Their criticism is not without substance, even when they themselves, by their unpardonable tactics, are playing into the hands of China's enemies. In the anti-Japanese National Front of China there are many important elements representing the semi-feudal, land-owning and big industrial sections, whose reactionary interests *vis-a-vis* the people's livelihood are not dissimilar to those of the invader; one of the points of contact is the crusade against Communism and any democratic people's movement. The dominant presence, therefore, of such groups in the anti-Imperialist struggle might help to secure foreign loans in order to buttress the Chinese banks and currency, and even to secure grudging supplies of military equipment, but has not added considerably to its strength; on the contrary, it has weakened it by conditioning its scope and nature, and by restricting the choice of its weapons. The answer to Fascism, wrote Mme. Sun Yat-sen recently, "must be found in a different temper, a different dynamic, a different social philosophy . . . armaments are not enough, just as patriotism is not enough. China needs what the Democratic Front needs throughout the world: more Democracy, more confidence, and trust in the common people, more consciousness of a world cause shared with free peoples everywhere. The road to victory is the democratic road."

The Imperialist invaders have been exploiting very cleverly the weak spots in China's regime, which, the Foreign Minister Matsuoka said, is "riddled with internal disruptions and frictions which are steadily growing

acute". Incidentally, these do not constitute the original sin of China alone. However, this important socio-economic aspect of the Far Eastern problem is little understood or allowed for. Even far less so is another aspect, the anti-Powers (Western) agitation of Japan, which has a great propaganda value, if nothing more. One of the most notorious features of the foreign exploitation of China that began early in the last century is the existence of extra-territoriality, which constitutes *imperium in imperio*. Since the Montreux Convention of 1937 abolished capitulations in Egypt, China remains the only country which has this kind of imperial burden and humiliation imposed on her from outside. However, Soviet Russia gave up all her special rights after her Revolution, and other Powers have expressed their intentions to do the same gradually. Since the Sino-Japanese treaty of Nanking which terminated the "Opium War" gave the first Concessions to Britain, as many as twenty Western countries, great and small, have enjoyed these special rights. The last to join the *melee* were the Japanese, who were even at that very time fighting hard to get rid of them in their own country and succeeded three years later, in 1899. What was deemed derogatory to their own national prestige was, obviously not so in the case of China.

After the Manchukuo regime was installed, Japan surrendered its former Concessions to it. As a further demonstrative proof of her "sole desire to help China to regain her status", the Japanese Army Commander at Shanghai proclaimed, immediately after Wang's regime was established, that all Chinese property in the custody of the Japanese Army would be handed over to the new Government to be returned to owners who supported it. "Japan not only respects China's sovereignty", said Premier Konoye in December 1938, "but

is prepared to give positive consideration to the questions of abolition of extra-territoriality and the rendition of foreign Concessions and Settlements—matters which are necessary for the full independence of China." When the treaty of November 1940 was signed between Japan and the puppet "Government of the Republic of China" of Wang Ching-wei, her *gauleiter*, Japan surrendered all her special rights and Concessions. Demagogic challenges were hurled at the Powers that they too should do so at once. When the Central Government of Chiang Kai-shek extended for another ten years the lease of Liukung Island (off Wei-Chei-wei) to Britain, Mr. Wang issued a warning of disapproval, and one of his first acts on seceding from the Central Government of China was to publish a Note protesting that "we cannot do otherwise than declare a silent war on the International Concessions in Shanghai". Such anti-Powers (Western) tactics on the part of the Nipponists and their *gauleiters* certainly cut ice for the people whose country has long been the happy hunting-ground for all and sundry. To the extent the Chung king Government fails to press the all-round anti-Imperialist demands, to that extent it fails even in the immediate anti-Japanese struggle. The struggles of every people—Spain, Russia and the Colonies—have made this lesson too obvious to remain content with an attitude expressed in one of Generalissimo Chiang's favourite proverbs: "To act is easy, to know is difficult".

We have already seen how and why the wars of Nipponism were fought and extended at each stage. The facts and figures speak for themselves. The theories and principles expounded by its spokesmen, though at times couched in highly idealistic terminology, closely correspond to the realities. There is the eternal

changelessness in the ever-changing forms throughout a long period. The "Twenty-one Demands" presented to China in 1915 stressed: (a) "the special position enjoyed by Japan" in Southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and the joint police administration elsewhere, demanded that "influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs" should be employed in some regions; (b) that China should not "cede or lease to a third Power any harbour, bay or island along the coast of China", nor raise loans without Japan's consent; (c) pointed out that in all this Japan is concerned only "with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China".

On April 18, 1934, the famous Amau (Foreign Office spokesman) Statement enunciating the "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" was made: (a) Japan, which has "the special position" in China, is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia"; (b) "we oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan", including any "joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers, even in the name of technical or financial assistance"; (c) the aims of "unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan". The statement concluded by pointing out that this should be clear from Japan's past actions. When the Foreign Minister, Hirota, was asked if this was Japan's Monroe Doctrine, he replied, "Japan never had a man named Monroe."

Mr. Koki Hirota's own "Three Points", enunciated in the Diet on January 21, 1936, are: (a) China should recognise Manchukuo, otherwise "no stability can ever be attained without the adjustment of the relations bet-

ween Japan, Manchukuo and China"; (*b*) China should give up resorting "to unfriendly actions or to her habitual policy of playing off a third Power against this country, thus undermining the stability of East Asia"; (*c*) a common front against Communism should be established.

The same points were reiterated, two years later, by Prince Konoye, who, in addition, said that Japan did not intend to monopolise China and would raise no objections to the presence of third Powers, provided these "grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing to act accordingly". "The Japanese Government are resolved", said the Premier, "to carry on military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang regime, and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a New Order in East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share our ideas and aspirations."

Despite these prolonged military operations of Nipponism, resulting in the destruction of millions of lives and of the economic and cultural life of the people, the end seems nowhere near; China still carries on under the same leadership. All the attempts of the Nipponists, subtle and crude, have so far failed to ingratiate themselves to the Chinese—idealistic calls of a crusade against Communism, of the Eastern races against "Western oppression," of the exploited Orient against the Imperialist Occident and of the "New Order" in the East; tactics of driving a wedge between the divergent elements in the Chinese body politic, of setting up puppet regimes and making conciliatory gestures by surrendering the extra-territorial rights. "Japan's last course", said the desperate Premier Konoye, "is to beat China to her knees, so that she will no longer have any spirit to fight." The Prince knows as well as anyone else that this is easier

said than done.

In the meanwhile, the main part of the "New Order" is being established in the conquered territories. Like the Nazis, the Nipponists are nothing if not wholly thorough and efficient; and they, too, do not believe in letting the grass grow under their feet. They have their theorists, even like the Nazi Dr. Alfred Rosenberg of *The Myths of the Twentieth Century* fame, and Professor Haushofer of the Geopolitik theories, as well as their own elaborate "Todt" machinery following the trial of their Wehrmecht. "This New Order has for its foundation", had said Premier Konoye, "a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchukuo and China in the political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect joint defence against Communism, to create a new culture and to realise close economic cohesion throughout East Asia."

The path to this culture was first paved by the Kwantung Army, and the lords of the Zaibatsu walked jauntily over it. In 1934 the Manchurian Affairs Board, with the War Minister as the President, was created to direct the activities of about forty National Policy Companies ("Special Companies") which had been operating in Manchuria. To the great chagrin of those foreign Imperialists who, in the beginning, supported Japan's action in Manchuria for obvious reasons, foreign investments are now debarred and a complete monopoly is retained for Japanese interests, especially in oil (under the "Oil Monopoly Law of 1934"), electric power, iron and steel. In 1937 the Manchurian Industrial Development Company was formed. In all these enterprises half the capital is held by the "money market" and the South Manchurian Railway (itself half owned by the Government), i.e., practically the Zaibatsu, and the

other half by the Government, that is, indirectly the bureaucrats and the big trusts. The investments in Manchukuo alone rose from Y.1,617 millions in 1931 to Y.4,500 millions in 1939. Under the Five-Year Plan, adopted in 1936, it was hoped to invest Y.6,000 millions in all. During the second phase of the Sino-Japanese War similar organisations were created. In 1938 (September) the China Affairs Board, characteristically called "Uplift Asia Board" (the "Ko-a-in"), was set up with the Prime Minister as President and the Foreign, Finance, Army, and Navy Ministers as Vice-Presidents. This Board controls the North China Development Company (formed in November with authorised capital of Y.300 millions) and Central China Promotion Company (capital of Y.100 million), and a similar company for South China is contemplated. There are several other industrial and commercial corporate associations, like the North China Motor Bus Company, an affiliate of the South Manchurian Railway, and the China Airways Company, which are controlled by the Government. After the Russo-German hostilities broke out in June 1941, the Triple Economic Council was formed to co-ordinate all the activities of the Far Eastern bloc.

In accordance with the "New Order," in which Japan is to be the metropolitan centre of economic, industrial, financial, political and cultural activities, while the countries in the periphery are to subserve her various needs by providing the raw material and the light industrial products, these various corporations and "special companies" concentrate on catering for the strategic needs of the island Empire. The iron ore in Manchuria, and especially at Tayeh and Anshewi in Central China and on the Chahar-Hopei border, will supply a large part of Japan's sore needs on this score. Coal deposits in North China, with far better coking

qualities than the Japanese coal, are estimated at 140,000 millions tons, mainly in the large coal blocs of Chunghsing, Paoshen, Tsinghing, Tahing, Taiyuan, Tawenkou and Tzuhsien. Manchuria sent 12½ million tons to Japan in 1937, and North China 2 millions in 1939; now the Japanese are exploiting the Tatung deposits in North Shansi. Salt deposits, another dire need of Japan, are expected to yield about 3 million tons a year from Manchuria and North China, while cultivation of cotton and wool is also undertaken with a view to reduce her dependability on India, U.S.A. and Australia. Though here, as in the case of the liquid fuel, imports from abroad would be found to be cheaper, the Nipponists take a long view of the commitments of the "New Order". They are going through the successive stages of regional self-sufficiency: autarchy at home, Japan-Manchukuo controlled economy, Japan-Manchukuo-China bloc economy, and Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. All this corresponds with (and incidentally precedes) Nazi autarchy, and after the subjugation of Czechoslovakia, the *Grossraumwirtschaft* (Greater Sphere Economy).

The "New Order" in the East already in its short existence permits two observations that we may make about its practical nature and about its cost, inadequacy and instability. Fundamentally it is the extension of the domain of monopoly capitalism—from the Metropolis of the "New Order" to its suburbs. If parts of the enterprises are owned or controlled by the State, what essential difference does that make, since the State itself is controlled by the big interest? Besides, the State had always, during the history of modern Japan, subsidised and controlled big business and banking corporations.

What a far cry all this is from the theories of "Imperial Socialism" and "Feudal Socialism" and such other incoherent slogans of the "Young Officers"! What

a great disillusionment this must be to those junior partners of the "New Order," the Radical and Labour leaders, who supported its deceitful demagogues, even as the Right-Wing Social Democratic leaders of Germany had supported the "Royal Blue Socialism" of Bismarck. As long ago as December 1932 Mr. Akamatsu, who had just seceded from the Social Democratic Party and founded the Fascistic Japan State Socialist Party, said, "If Japanese influence in Manchuria is going merely to be the substitution of capitalist exploitation for bandit domination, the present Manchurian problem has no meaning for us." But little does this ex-Social Democrat leader realise that it is the culpable action of such men as he who, at one stage or the other, and for one reason or the other, harness the confidence that workers have placed in them to the continuation of "capitalist exploitation."

The second of our observations regarding the cost, inadequacy and instability of the "New Order" is equally obvious. In 1934 the percentages of military expenditure in the total national budgets were: Britain 16·4, Germany 17·7, U.S.A. 17·9, Italy 20·8, France 22·3, while Japan had 43·7. Since then over Y.26,000 millions have been expropriated by the Japanese Army and Navy alone. For 1940-1 the military expenditure, added to most of the new capital issues which went to finance war industries, amounted to 37 per cent. of the total national income of Japan! Now, whatever may be the ultimate dividends of these colossal investments in war—that is, if Nippon gets away with its "New Order"—it seemed then, in view of the indefinite prolongation of the "incident" and of the actions of other Powers, that she could not avert a major catastrophe. The leaders themselves were aware of it, and on every conceivable occasion declared solemnly for the

completion of the immutable policy regarding the "China Incident." Some of them were prepared to call it a day, if, of course, they could "save face"—and retain a substantial part of the new conquests. For, such are the immediate repercussions on the national economy of these much-boosted victories that the Nipponist Pyrrhus cries: "One more such victory over the Chinese and we are lost."

Moreover, the "New Order" cannot be confined to the narrow bounds of Japan, Manchukuo and China alone. These regions too are not self-sufficient. In 1939 Japan's exports to the "yen bloc" countries (Manchuria, Kwantung and China) formed 48·8 per cent. and to other countries 51·2 per cent., while the imports were 23·4 per cent. and 76·6 per cent. respectively. So demands are made for a larger East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which again, as we shall see later, is not completely self-sufficient. No expanding system like that of Nipponism can stay put. "Incidents" are only made excuses to start the excursions; one is as good as another. Nipponism runs parallel to Nazism in this respect. "It would be quite wrong," wrote Dr. Goebbels in October 1941, "to assume that the war would have been avoided had Poland agreed to the German demands of the summer of 1939, or even if England and France had accepted Germany's peace offer after the conclusion of the Polish campaign. A few years later a fresh war would have started, with the difference that Germany's opponents would have been so strongly armed that a defeat would have been probable."

All the same, the economic greed and need of the expanding systems must be covered up in 'high-falutin' idealism about the "Divine Trust" and disinterestedness of "world missions." Nipponists adjure any sordid motives. One of their spokesmen, Mr. Tatsuo Kawai,

in his book *The Goal of Japanese Expansion* (1938), writes, "Japan's advance on the continent is partly a racial movement brought about by the operation of Musubi, and only in the light of this fact can Japan's role in the China Affair be properly understood and appreciated." The Musubi, we must remind the 60 million Chinese rendered homeless and destitute, is the creative love that fosters life, and is expounded further by the English translator of Mr. Kawai's book: "Japanese expansion on the Asiatic Continent is an inevitable development of history. But Japan desires neither conquest nor territory. Musubi is not merely a biological force, but it is a spiritual power that chastens, and beautifies, admitting of no sordid elements of selfishness. The Japanese ideal of 'the world, one household,' as was enunciated by the (first) Emperor Jimmu, carried no thought of domination but envisages universal concord on the basis of freedom and equality. Japan's objective in her gigantic campaign in China today is to bring about through the elimination of the forces of destruction a new unity and solidarity for the family of Oriental nations—an Oriental system which is based on the philosophy of Musubi, and which will ensure peace and security for East Asia."

The Nipponists are never tired of reiterating that their aim in China is to establish peace and order, suppress lawless elements and, of course, rescue her from "Western oppression." With the attitude of Sheridan's vulture towards the lamb, Nipponism wants to "save the innocent victim from all talons but its own."

## CHAPTER VII

### BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND THE S.U.

"The political testament of the German nation for its foreign policy must always necessarily be," wrote Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, "never tolerate the rise of two Continental Powers in Europe." In accordance with this maxim, Hitler pursued a foreign policy that immediately aimed at the complete annihilation of France, "the inexorable arch enemy of the German nation." In his task he tried, and mainly succeeded, to play one Power off against another, in making alliances with a few and in neutralising the others.

Very similar have been Nippon's aims and tactics, no less her partial successes. Corresponding to the early Nazi campaign of "equality of treatment" (*Gleichberechtigung*), there is the Nipponist campaign, begun soon after the Restoration, to get the old (1858) treaties with Western Powers revised, which resulted first in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of "equality" of 1894 and later in similar treaties with other Powers. The Nazi demands for the union of all "Germanic" peoples and for *lebensraum* and a "New Order" have a parallel in the Nipponist struggle self-undertaken on behalf of all Asiatic peoples. The *Nazi Political A B. C.* says: "The Third Empire is to be a future Christian-German Empire, which will be the successor of the German Empire of the Middle Ages and of the Imperial Empire of Bismarck, and which is to bring about the unification of all Germans living in Central Europe." The Nazi

lamentations about the scattered and oppressed German minorities outside the Reich were not, as we know, an entirely futile propaganda in the earlier stages. "We will not renounce a single German," wrote Gottfried Feder, "in Sudeten, in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, in the League of Nations colony Austria, or in the succession States of Old Austria." Likewise, General Araki, in his book *Japan's Tasks in the Showa Era*, takes up the cudgels for all the oppressed Asiatic peoples. "It is said that Great Britain is a land of gentlemen. If that is true, why is the national liberation movement in India becoming more and more tense year after year? In America they flaunt the emblem of humanity and justice, but is that felt in the U.S.'s foreign policy towards Panama, Cuba, Mexico and a number of other countries in Central and South America? In looking at other States which operate in the international arena we find no imperial morality among any of them. Roused imperial Japan can no longer tolerate the tyranny of the white race. It is Japan's mission to fight against all actions which are incompatible with imperial morality, no matter which country commits them."

Neither the ultimate object of Nipponism nor its immediate undertakings have ever been left in doubt, thanks to the repeated statements of its official and unofficial leaders. Indeed, their frankness in declaring the aims has been too embarrassing, and their ensuing actions carried out unflinchingly have been too unkind for their foreign appeasers. "Japan's ideal since the foundation of the Empire has been that all nations should be enabled to find their proper places in the world," stated the Foreign Minister Arita in June 1940, in a broadcast that showed concern over the destiny of the Far East and the South Seas, and expounded once again Nippon's *geopolitik* schemes. "It is most natural that peoples

most closely related geographically, racially, culturally and economically, shall form a sphere of their own, and shall establish peace and order within it. It is in this spirit that Japan is now engaged on the task of establishing a new order in East Asia. Japan expects the Western Powers to do nothing to exercise an undesirable influence upon the stability of the Far East." As to who these Western Powers are, Mr. Kaya, the Minister of Finance, told the National Finance Committee (November 1941): Japan's aim is to "force Britain and the U.S. to retreat from East Asia."

All Japanese Governments have uniformly declared for the immediate and successful conclusion of the "China affair," and, like Premier Tojo, have warned third Powers against interference. Behind Chiang Kai-shek are Britain, the U.S., the S.U. and France, said a pamphlet issued by the Press Bureau of the Japanese Navy on the New Year Day of 1939: "Particularly, the conspiracies of Britain and the U.S. aimed at recovering and protecting their rights and interests are taking the form of political interference." Early in 1941, Prince Konoye, after shouldering the responsibilities of the Kwantung Army on himself, pledged to the Budget Committee of the Lower House that "I am determined to exert myself to the utmost in overcoming this [China] situation as my last service to the State." But historical forces are stronger even than Princes and Premiers, and we fear that the last words of the Nipponist leader, reminiscent of Napoleon's, will be: "*Mon Dieu, la nation Chinoise tete d'armee!*"

What have been the general reactions of the Western Powers to the various manœuvres of Nipponists during the decade of their *kampfzeit*? In July 1941 President Roosevelt gave the Committee of Civilian Defence Organisations his reasons for having kept on

the right side of Japan and kept unchecked for two years the flow of oil supplies to her. In the period before the fall of France, he said, the U.S.A. wanted to keep the line of supplies working from Australasia to "all those troops and supplies they [Britain] have maintained in Syria, North Africa and Palestine. So it was essential for Britain that we should try to keep peace there in the South Pacific." If the U.S. had cut off the oil, Japan "would probably have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war;" and therefore the President claimed that his Government policy had "what might be called a method in it."

But the general policy of appeasement towards the new aggressive Imperialisms, which included an endeavour to "localise" war, was, of course, older than two years; Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia bear this out. Such a policy was motivated chiefly by three considerations, combining in different degrees on different occasions: the great fear of Socialism (Communism) that would arise if the aspirations of incipient Fascism were thwarted, and itself were nipped in the bud; not all of one's own interests were immediately threatened, though, of course, the larger interests of peace and democracy were, by the immolation of other weaker nations; in addition to these two corollaries of the policy of the lesser of the two evils, there was the present lack of overwhelming military strength of the Western Powers, which, had sanctioned the "gunboat" policies of the previous decades against a thousand times smaller provocations.

This was the genesis of the policy of appeasement, made inevitable under a certain historical system. The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, himself, with all the halo of non-appeasement towards Mussolini (resign-

ed in February 1938), made the last point clear when he reproached, in December 1937, the impatient and unreasonable Members of the House of Commons thus: "If the honourable Members opposite are advocating sanctions I would remind them that there are two possible forms of sanctions—the ineffective, which are not worth putting on, and the effective, which means the risk, if not the certainty of war. I say deliberately that nobody could contemplate any action of that kind in the Far East unless they are convinced that they have overwhelming force to back their policy"; it does not exist. And as for our first point—the fear of Communism—we have a typical example of Mr. Lloyd George saying in September 1933: "If the Powers succeed in overthrowing Nazism in Germany, what would follow? Not a Conservative, Socialist or Liberal regime, but extreme Communist. Surely that could not be their objective." Later, in November 1934, the great Liberal statesman and the "father" of the House of Commons, counsels the Members of the House: "In a very short time, perhaps in a year or two, the Conservative elements in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe.

Only two or three years ago a very distinguished German statesman said to me: 'I am not afraid of Nazism, but of Communism'—and if Germany is seized by the Communists, Europe will follow: because the Germans could make a better job of it than any other country. Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend."

Well aware of such fears and hopes of the rival Western Powers, of their strength and weakness, and of the new social realities at the back of all, the leaders of Nipponism exploited the new situation in advancing

their own cause. The War Minister Hata vowed in the Diet to "destroy Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Japanese and pro-Communist regime, to restore peace in East Asia, to fulfill the ideas of universal brotherhood, to realise a joint defence against Communism, and to secure economic co-operation in China." That was in February 1940. In the following month the British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, told the Japan-British Society that Anglo-Japanese relations were overlaid by a mass of misunderstanding and misrepresentations fostered by interested third parties, but the truth would soon be out. The British Ambassador declared that "both are ultimately striving for the same objective—a lasting peace and the preservation of our institutions from extraneous and subversive influences."

The truth was out sooner than Sir Robert Craigie possibly expected. Within three months, on June 14, the Japanese began the blockade of Tientsin concessions, ignoring the British Government's readiness to meet them half-way. On the 19th an *ad hoc* agreement was reached, and only then was the blockade lifted. Four days later Japan asked for the closure of the Burma Road, and on July 17 Britain agreed to it for a period of three months under what the new Premier, Mr. Churchill, called "a temporary arrangement in the hope that the time so gained may lead to a solution just and equitable to both parties to the dispute and freely accepted by them both."

The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office immediately denounced this new concession as "unfriendly and unlawful." The head of the Chinese Government had hitherto submitted undemurringly to similar unkind measures with a strange quietude and patience that might be justified by the Confucian precept: "If you bow at all, bow low." Now that the closure of the

Burma Road would cut off 80 per cent. of China's supplies, the Generalissimo declared that Britain would be forfeiting China's friendship and also that the new concession would not hasten peace. "I am sure, on the contrary, that it will lengthen the duration and widen the scope of hostilities."

Moreover, this appeasement did not satisfy the implacable Nipponists earlier. Within a few days British subjects, including the representatives of Reuters, the Federation of British Industries, the Asiatic Petroleum Company, the President of the British Association, etc., were arrested in Japan and a new political group of the Diet denounced Britain as aiding Chiang Kai-shek and hindering the construction of a "New Order" in East Asia. There have been, besides, all sorts of petty incidents (deliberate insults, stripping of foreign nationals, etc.), which, incidentally, had been meted out to the Japanese by the Western Nationals in the past, and which therefore were deemed to have now a great psychological value in enhancing the "national prestige."

Simultaneously with the successful exaction of a policy of appeasement, the leaders of Japanese Imperialism have been utilising the rivalries *inter se* of the Western Powers, which in their turn reflected the degrees of their vested interests. In 1931 the total foreign investments in China amounted to \$ 3,300 millions, of which 70 per cent. were in business and trade enterprises and 22 per cent. in loans to Chinese Governments. Foreign (Government investments) capital controlled nearly half the Chinese railways, and had a mortgage of \$200 millions on the rest, making in all about \$650 millions. Over 81 per cent. of Chinese foreign and coastal trade was done by foreign shipping. In 1931 the total investment percentages of Britain, Japan and the U.S.A. were 36·7, 35·1 (plus 8·4 from the Chinese Eastern Railway

which Russia sold to Japan in 1935) and 6·1, compared to similar percentages in 1902 of 33·0, 0·1 and 2·5.

Powerful circles in the U.S. argued that the continent of China, the long-awaited El Dorado, will, if victorious in the present war, be fully occupied for fifty years in the work of internal organisation and of providing the necessities (consumer goods) of life to the teeming millions. In that case the capital goods and loans would be provided by American business. If, on the other hand, Japan were to emerge as the victor, provided there will be a Liberal regime, which is most probable, and neither Fascism nor social revolution, her economy would have been crippled by the long war and her heavy industries would face a great deflation; and again American finance would help in rebuilding her public works. But today the U.S. investments in China are 1 per cent. or 2 per cent. only of the total U.S. investments abroad; exports 2 per cent. or 3 per cent. and imports 3 per cent. The corresponding figures for Japan are 2 per cent. or 3 per cent., 8 per cent. and 7 per cent. So, argued these circles, as long as Japan refrained from invading the American zones of interest in the South Seas, it was not worth the candle to risk a possible war in the Pacific by excessive interference with the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Taking cognisance of such views, their opposite members in Japan stretched out their arms to welcome them and gave them a round robin of assurances. "Japan and East Asia would like to invite foreign investments," wrote *Osaka Mainichi* (December 12, 1939); "the sky is the limit, and the greater the amount that can be secured the better." At the same time, this mouthpiece of the Mitsui Trust did not want to be thought too eager. It added that the reconstruction of East Asia is not impossible without foreign capital.

Investing nations will "find it more advantageous and sagacious in most cases to make such investments to Japan—the nation that holds a clean record in international finance—or as an alternative to have Japan serve as a guarantor." In August 1940 (Special Japan Supplement of the *Statist*) Mr. Kodama, a member of the House of Peers and President of the Japan Foreign Trade Federation, wrote regarding the "East Asia Economic Bloc": "It doesn't mean that Japan will monopolise the commerce in those regions or pay less attention to the trading countries other than East Asia. As a matter of fact, the establishment of a new and better order in East Asia will result in an increase in the importation of a great variety of commodities from the West and other regions than East Asia. Moreover, the development of natural resources in China, as was the case with Manchuria in the past, will bring about a general improvement in the trade relations with Japan, Manchukuo and China, which in turn will lead to a definite increase in trade between these three countries and other countries in the world."

A similar bait had been used earlier in 1931, in catching the powerful Federation of British Industries, which came off worst in the end, as the Zaibatsu have refused to share the new spoils in Manchuria with anybody. On the contrary, they have driven out the trade of the Western nations in the conquered territories by all sorts of devices: by exchange control, and by fixing an arbitrary rate of exchange; by, as *de facto* rulers, imposing new export and import duties, and collecting these in the new currency like the Hua Hsing currency or its equivalent in the Lower Yangtse Valley; by closing the Yangtse and Pearl Rivers to foreign trading vessels, and elsewhere imposing restrictions on wharfage facilities and extra harbour and lighterage fees on foreign

ships; and above all by monopolistic enterprises everywhere. Such was the taste of its quality given to the foreign traders by the pedlars of the "East Asia Economic Bloc." Indeed, the Nipponists themselves have not tried to conceal at times their real designs. A Government statement issued in March 1940, after the establishment of the puppet Government of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, reminded the Powers that "renascent China has started on the road to progress" which ensured the primacy of Japan, but foreign activities would still be allowed if they "conform to the new situation." So, none need complain if the Nipponists have suited action to the word.

But such are the evergreen hopes and pressing needs of finance-capital that all this did not stop Mr. Thomas W. Lamond, the partner of J. P. Morgan & Co., from cohorting with the Zaibatsu. "There is every reason," he declared forebodingly in September 1940, "why China and Japan should use the propinquity for a close and lasting relationship."

The policy of appeasement towards aggressive Nipponism which was rampant for a long time, and which was based on such aforementioned considerations, had meant prolonged agonies to the Chinese people. "If, unhappily for the democracies as well as for China, we were defeated in the end," wrote Madame Chiang Kai-shek with most righteous indignation (*China, War or Peace*), "at least the world ought to know we were beaten not because of lack of courage—either moral or physical—but because, by the concerted action of the democracies, China was strangled to death by an economic noose fashioned by Japan out of British appeasement, American profiteering, and French fear."

However, the Government of the U.S. had always in the past taken a firmer attitude than the British Gov-

ernment towards Nippon's irredentist activities; that was partly to be expected from the American commitments in those areas of conflict. Soon after the conquest of Manchuria, which was the first clear violation of at once the League Covenant, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, the U.S. Government sent a Note to Japan (popularly known as the Stimson Note), similar to its Note of 1915, refusing to "admit the legality of any situation *de facto*," upholding "the sovereignty, the independence of the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China," and insisting on the Open Door policy and the Pact of Paris of 1928 (Kellogg Pact). But the British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, was so apologetic about Japan that her representative, the Fascist Matsuoka, declared that he himself could not put her case better. The British Government refrained from sending a similar Note reinforcing the U.S. Government protest, but in a *communiqué* asked the Japanese Ambassador for further assurances. "The contents of this *communiqué*," writes Mr. H. L. Stimson, the U.S.A. Secretary of State, in his book *The Far Eastern Crisis*, "were such as to be taken by most readers, including—what was most important—the Japanese Government, as a rebuff to the U.S."

Again, in contrast with what the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, had told the Japan-British Society, the American Ambassador, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, addressing the America-Japan Society in October 1939, said that "very nearly unanimous" opinion in America "strongly resents some of the things which Japan's armed forces are doing in China today, including actions against American rights and legitimate interests in China." The American Government and people understand very well what is meant by the "New Order" in China, which seems to "include, among other things,

depriving Americans of their long-established rights in China," and this is totally opposed by the American people.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the U.S. was singled out for attacks by certain sections of Nipponists. "The American people more than any other," writes Lieut.-General Sato (*The Imminence of a Japan-American War*), ventilating their important grievances, "have been hostile to our growth and progress since our country was opened. In Western America our emigrants are persecuted, their children are not permitted to attend schools, they are deprived of their land which they have cultivated by their toil, and they are prohibited from entering the country. This prohibition has been formulated in a law which touches the honour of our nation. They compelled us to restore Tsingtao to China, although it cost us the blood of our army to obtain it. They broke the Ishi-Lansing Agreement (1917), which clearly noted the special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia which we acquired as a result of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. They limited the battle-strength of our Navy. Resorting to threats, they limited the auxiliary forces of our Navy. In short, the Americans have heaped numerous insults upon our nation. Finally, America compelled Great Britain to break off the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We must say frankly that our enemy is America. Let us prepare for the impending Japan-American War; let us crush our enemy America."

Since the end of 1939, with rapidly changing circumstances, the material basis of the policy of appeasement slowly gave way. The excursions of the Kwantung Army farther and farther to the south, trampling down all the remaining special preserves of the Powers, in preference to an assault on the S.U. in the north,

as well as the Japanese Navy, until then regarded as more sober and moderate, enforcing a complete blockade of the coastal China, and threatening the South Seas positions of the Powers, compelled Britain and the U.S. to adopt a more concerted action. There was no longer a free choice of supporting or condoning one or the other Nipponist groups of advocates of "Continental policy," "North China ideology," "Yangtse ideology" or "Oceanic policy." Finally, the declaration of war against Nazi-Fascism left no doubt regarding the choice between Communism and Fascism. The new social realities at least did away with the *raison d'être* of appeasement itself.

The U.S. Government, which had already in 1939 denounced the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, abrogated it in January 1940. After Hitler's assault on the Low Countries, Japan sent out a feeler that she was "deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the *status quo* of the Dutch Indies." Thereupon, Mr. Hull lost no time in reminding Japan forcefully that any "intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration in their *status quo* by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies, but in the entire Pacific area." When the British Government closed the Burma Road, Mr. Hull criticised this as an "unwarranted interposition of obstacles to world trade." There were anti-American "popular" outbursts in the Japanese-controlled *Hongkew*; and American Press correspondents and business circles in China requested President Roosevelt to take immediate action. In July the U.S. Government placed an embargo on aviation petrol; and a month later sent an

adviser and a military mission to China. The growing collaboration of Britain and the U.S., which at this time resulted in the destroyers-for-bases agreement, the building of a two-ocean Navy for the U.S. and a defence pact with Canada also brought China financial aid from the two countries. The U.S. Government credit of \$50 millions for general purposes and another \$50 millions for currency adjustments (British Government credit of £5 millions in each case) made a total American credit of \$245 millions since 1932, all except \$16 millions being in the last two years. In addition, the Chinese National Resources Commission were allowed by the American Finance Corporation a credit of \$60 millions for purchasing tin, wolframite, antimony, etc. All this was not palatable to the exclusivists of Nipponism.

Because of the mad efforts of Britain and the U.S., thundered the *Kokumin* in April 1941, "the question of Japan's southward advance is tending to reach a stage when a settlement by peaceful means will become impossible, much against Japan's desire." The last World War "broke out as a result of 'the greed of the Anglo-Saxon race out of its claims to world hegemony,'" writes Mr. Uchara in his book *Will Japan and the U.S.S.R. Fight?*, warning that "the example of Germany serves as an important lesson for the Japanese people."

In pursuance of the policy, later practised by the Nazis too, of never permitting the rise of two Continental Powers, Japanese Imperialists had always strongly fought against Tsarist Russia, entrenching herself in the maritime provinces of the Far East. Vladivostok, which literally means "command the Far East," has strategic military importance; besides, there are 2 million acres of good rice-land in that province, which, together with the shale-oil supplies of Sakhalien, consti-

tuted a rich prize. After the Bolshevik revolution the Nipponists sent an expedition to Siberia and also occupied Sakhalien, their armies being withdrawn only in 1925, after the first Soviet-Japan Treaty was signed. However, the tension did not abate. Various Patriotic Societies specialising in anti-Bolshevik propaganda managed to keep it up at a high pitch. The Soviet Government, who, as successors of the Tsarist Government, had owned the Chinese Eastern Railway, sold it to Japan (Manchukuo) in 1935, at a nominal price, in order to remove, by this and other methods, any causes of friction in that quarter. But when Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936, the S.U. refused to ratify a long-term fisheries convention with Japan. In the spring of 1937 and in 1939 there were minor clashes on the Amur River and Outer Mongolia respectively; while in the summer of 1938 the Red Army dealt a serious blow to the units of the Kwantung Army in large-scale hostilities at Chang-kufeng which were prolonged for a fortnight.

In 1931, when what we have called the *kampfzeit* (period of struggle for power) of Nipponism commenced, the diplomatic relations between Russia and China were resumed after an interval of five years. The growing friendship and solidarity of these two nations resulted in the Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 (immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident), constant supplies of war materials and a credit of \$140 millions in 1939 to China. "Behind mutinous China," writes Major Toyama (*The Crisis of Isolated Japan*), "stand the bandit America, capitalist Great Britain and the Bolshevik Communist Soviet Russia." An official pamphlet of the Japanese Army said: "The objective of the S.U. in the East is Japan, in the West Germany . In pursuing these fundamental aims the S.U. has con-

cluded alliances with France and Czechoslovakia, and commercial and non-aggression Pacts with Britain and other European Powers, by means of which it seeks to deal with Germany. In the Far East it is plotting to obstruct the advance of Japan, on the Continent, by conspiring with Powers having influence in this area."

But Matsuoka was soon to allay such fears of his masters. While the Japanese Army were giving their blessing to the new Fascistic State structure (Imperial Rule Association) at home, their spokesman was conferring with Stalin at the Kremlin. On April 13, 1941, a Pact of Neutrality, valid for five years, was signed in Moscow. Article 1 said: "Both contracting parties agree to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and to respect each other's territorial integrity and inviolability." Article 2: "Should one of the contracting parties be the object of military action by one or more States, the other contracting party will observe a neutrality throughout the whole duration of the conflict." Further, in a joint statement both Governments declared to "respect on the part of the Japanese Empire the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia and on the part of the S.U. the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Empire of Manchukuo."

The Russo-Japanese Pact was hailed as a great stabilising force in the otherwise crumbling world. *Pravda*, the organ of the Russian Communist Party, stressed the fact that Russia and Japan had agreed under the Pact "not to hinder each other in the realisation of their historical task." The Japanese semi-official statement said that the Pact freed Japan's hands for the execution of her "immutable policy dedicated to a southward advance for the creation of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." The Pact was also hailed as a

great personal achievement of Stalin and Matsuoka. Killing five birds with one stone, said Foreign Minister Matsuoka, the Pact was "beyond Japan's fondest expectations." Such was the resultant mood of joyous certainty that when Matsuoka, who was publicised to be the first Japanese statesman to be received by Stalin since 1928, left Moscow station, Stalin and he chuckled over the fact that they were both Asiatics, after all. Modest doubt may be the beacon of the wise, but apparently not of these wise men of Asia.

## CHAPTER VIII

### ALLIANCE WITH THE AXIS

The general similarities of Nipponism and Nazi-Fascism of the West, in growth, nature and aims, which are becoming increasingly obvious to most people now, are far from being accidental, the result of the *force majeure* of the more or less similar historical-material conditions. The more recent the period, the more similar are the world conditions common to both, and the more similar the results. Most of such common traits are easily recognisable at various stages of our study. Here we point out a few particular ones.

Like the Nazi-Fascists of the West, all ranks of Nipponists, left, centre or right, despite their private griefs, are one in claiming that Liberalism, Democracy and Socialism are alien to the ancient spirit of Nippon. Totalitarianism, says Mr. Shiratori (already quoted), has been "the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past thirty centuries", and the modern States of Europe are only embodying what have been Japan's ideals for ages. These proud lovers of Nippon point out, and not without justification, that it is they who first paved the way to the "New Order", and gave the lead to their future Axis partners. Japan gave notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933, and Germany followed suit seven months later, and Italy long after. In 1934 Japan denounced the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 because, as her Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, said, it had "now become

incompatible with her basic policy". Japan claimed a "special position" for herself in China, abrogated, though not theoretically, the Nine-Power Treaty, and enunciated her "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine," Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and the "New Order." Hitler and Mussolini have followed with similar demands. So it is not for nothing that the Chief of the Army Press Section at the Imperial H.Q. boasted last September that the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations was the background of German withdrawal from the League and of the Italian campaign in Abyssinia; Japan had inspired the Axis to create a "New Order" in Europe.

The converging aims and policies of the Nipponists and the Nazis, arising, to be sure, independently from the working of their two separate systems, become more united, thanks to the unifying modern world conditions, in the anti-Comintern Pact signed on November 25, 1936. It is significant to note that it was Japan, and not Italy, that was the foundation partner of Nazi Germany; Italy joined it in 1937, and two years later Spain and other satellites followed. Needless to say, this Pact, though primarily aimed against Communism, also shook a finger of warning at the rival Powers of Britain, France and America. These birds of prey that flocked together have the same feather because they have similar feeding habits. The Japanese puppet State of Manchukuo was starving for foreign recognition; Hitler provided it in February 1938, and withdrew his military advisers from Hankow (the seat of the Chinese Government). In 1941 Japan recognised the Nazi puppet State of Croatia, and Germany recognised Nippon's puppet Government of Nanking (of Mr. Wang Ching-Wei). When, following upon the fall of France and the increased gravity of the internal situation, Prince Konoye's Cabinet was building the new totali-

tarian structure at home, a Ten-Year Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy was signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. Articles 1 and 2 of the Pact state: "Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe", and Germany and Italy recognise and respect Japan's leadership in Greater Asia. They all agreed to "assist one another with all political, economic, and military means, if one of the high contracting parties should be attacked by a Power not at present involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict".

Soon after, the German military and economic missions went over to Tokyo to work out the immediate practical parts of the scheme. But the Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, the son of a stonemason, and a former President of the S.M.R., was not interested merely in the immediate practical side of the Pact. This spokesman of the Militarists of Bushido Gospel said later: "But its actual use depends on the future . . . Japan's efforts to construct a 'new order' in Eastern Asia, and the German and Italian struggle to break down the Versailles system have something in common. They are all aiming at a new world order. The alliance goes beyond mere interest and expresses a spiritual unity founded on a common ideology."

This common ideology of Nipponism and Nazi-Fascism manifests itself in a multiple manner. "Anti-Communism" for all purposes has even been the plan of the Nipponists, like that of the Nazis, and long before the latter. It has been a recurrent battle-cry in all their expeditions in China; and the Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota said in 1935 that Chiang Kai-shek's long war against the Communists in China was not "a civil war", but a war against the international enemy.

Entirely dissociating ourselves from such meaning-

less and dangerous popular statements as that Japan is the Prussia of the Far East, that the Japanese are brutal and barbaric, etc., we will note several important features of Nipponist and Nazi movements. A Nazi journal said, "Justice and Hitler's will are one and the same thing." In Japan the Emperor Tenno is deified similarly and used for the same purposes. What particularly distinguishes the Nipponists and the Nazi-Fascists from any other totalitarian country is that the State and Private Property are the gods of their idolatry. Prince Konoye's theories of State are similar to Mussolini's; "Nothing against the State; nothing outside the State; everything in the State and for the State." General Araki's conception of the Samurai, the new ruling *elite*, corresponds to Hitler's "doctrine, which, rejecting the democratic ideal of the masses, shall give this land [Germany] to the best people, that is to say to superior individuals and must reserve command and influence to the best heads of the nation." The political activities pursued by the Nipponists under the slogans of "stabilisation of national livelihood" (*kokumin seikatsuentai*) and the "high degree defence of State" may have been inspired by *Mein Kampf*, which says, "Our political activity must pursue a double aim: new soil as the aim of our foreign policy, and a new ideologically firm [*weltanschaulich gefestigt*] and uniform foundation as the aim of our internal political activity."

The spokesmen of Nazism and of Nipponism make inspired and analogous statements regarding their self-imposed duties of leading their respective "races." "All people of German blood, whether they live under Danish, Polish, Czech, Italian or French rule, must be united in the German Reich," says Gottfried Feder in *Das Programm der NSDAP*. "Racial honour demands territory and enough of it," writes Dr. Alfred Rosenberg in *The*

*Myth of the Twentieth Century*; "in such a struggle there can be no consideration for worthless Poles, Czechs, etc. Ground must be cleared for German peasants."

The leaders of Nippon have taken up similar racial and national challenges. Mr. Yoshitomi of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in 1935: "The Japanese as a coloured race must take over the leadership of the coloured Asiatic races, the majority of whom are enslaved by Europeans, or in a state of semi-dependence. Nearly all the nations of Europe and America enjoy unrestricted liberty, whereas the majority of our brethren—the Asiatic nations—are in a state of semi-dependence. It is the bounden duty of Japan to guide them, to lead them and to help them to become independent at last. From the point of view of the individual and the race morals, of the coloured peoples, it is absolutely intolerable that the elder brother, having achieved independence for himself, should remain indifferent to the fate of his brothers and sisters. If Japan will merely be proud of the fact that she is co-operating with the bourgeois nations of the west (who are nothing more than overseers who keep Japan's kindred nations in subordination and hold them in contempt), Japan will be helping to enslave these nations instead of championing their independence. If Japan does that she will be a contemptible traitress."

To answer such a clear challenge effectively it is not enough to say inanely: Surely the subject peoples of our Empire are content, and will not prefer to be under Germany or Japan! Only those people whose past conduct could inspire confidence today should immediately, by declarations and deeds, expose such a challenge for the clever piece of demagogery that it is.

The leaders of Nipponism spare no pains in prosely-

tising the "purity of the Japanese race" and the superiority of the Yamato people. The first Emperor, Jimmu, was the direct descendant of the Sun-Goddess Amaterasu, and the Japanese, who are the descendants of the Emperor Jimmu, are therefore "children of the Gods". Unlike other countries, "Japan alone was created by the Gods", and the Japanese are "a people of a higher order". In addition to propagating such theories, kinship is established with other peoples elsewhere, thus enlarging the circle of the "New Order"—under Japan's hegemony. The Hungarians are claimed to be of the same stock (Turanians) as the Japanese. "Once upon a time Europe was almost conquered by Tamerlaine and Genghis Khan," writes with dark implications Mr. Murobishi, one of the chiefs of *Asahi*, in his book *Japan's Next Step*. "Genghis Khan was a brother of the famous ruler of Japan, Yoritomo Minamoto."

The basic programme of *Mein Kampf* regarding Russia consisted of a need, an action and an excuse. Idealising the need, Hitler wrote that "the right to the soil becomes a duty, if without expansion of territory a great people seems destined to destruction". Casting about to find a means to gratify the need, he discovered: "But when we speak today of new soil in Europe we can in the first instance only think of Russia and border states subordinated to her." His excuse or explanation now turns from being the Nazi "right to the soil" into the demagogic racial mission. The Jewish rule in Russia is ripe for collapse. "The fate itself seems to show us our aim," says the Naji panjandrum. "By leaving Russia to the mercy of the Bolsheviks it deprived the Russian people of its intelligentsia, which up till then had organised and guaranteed its existence as a State. For the organisation of the Russian State was not the result of the political capacity of the Slav race

in Russia. It was rather a wonderful example of the ability of the Germanic element to create a State within an inferior race."

The Nipponists, too, whose hatred of Soviet Russia is no whit less than the Nazi's, prepared the ground for a future assault under the camouflage of a racial mission. "In the U.S.S.R. east of the Urals there are many Asiatic nationalities: Buryats, Kalmyks, Tungus, Yakuts, Koryaks, Chukchi and others," wrote General Matsui, an ex-member of the Supreme Military Council (*Gekin Rossia*, September 1935). "All of them, like the Japanese, are Asiatic peoples linked with them by their psychology, skeleton structure, colour of skin, blood, morals, culture, etc. Blood ties exist between them which have been naturally created in the course of thousands of years. This is a fundamental question. . . . The Manchurians, Buryats, Mongols and the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. enumerated above have historical ties that go far back into antiquity. The influence of China spread via Manchuria, Mongolia, along the River Amur, right up to Yakutia and Okhotsk, not to speak of the maritime provinces. From Japan's point of view Sakhalien was also Japanese territory. The path of development of Japan and Manchukuo is the path of emancipation of the Asiatic nationalities . . . and the path of awakening them to the idea of 'Asia for Asiatics'".

Believing that the progress of humanity "lies exclusively in the existence of a race capable of culture," Hitler claims to have set out to build a State the highest purpose of which is to preserve the racial primal elements. Before his time, it is contended, Germany had not possessed racial unity, otherwise she would probably have been today "the mistress of this globe", bringing "a peace, supported not by the palm branches of tearful

pacifist professional female mourners, but founded by the victorious sword of a people of overlords which puts the world into the service of a higher culture".

The Nipponists, too, have a similar full-time job, and prescribe a similar training. General Araki, while still the War Minister, wrote in 1933 (*Japan Chronicle*): "What is the present state of the East? India with its population of 300 millions lives in dire misery under Britain's oppressive rule. There is no vestige of liberty left in the fertile plains of Central Asia and Siberia. The countries of the Far East are the object of pressure on the part of the white races. But awakened Japan can no longer tolerate further tyranny and oppression at their hands. It is the duty of the Emperor's country to oppose with determination the actions of any Power, however strong, if they are not in accordance with Kodo. . . . We Japanese are not afraid of blood nor do we fear to lay down our lives for justice." This apostle of Kodo and the spokesman of the Supreme War Council proceeds to lay down a new commandment. "As a divine country in the Eastern seas and the senior nation of Asia, Japan's aspirations are great and her responsibility is heavy. Each single shot must be impregnated with Kodo and the point of every bayonet tempered with the national virtue. . . . We have no hesitation in declaring that we are a military nation—in the cause of Kodo and the highest morality."

Of the joint efforts to establish the world "New Order" in their own sectors, we have already noted the various expositions by the leading Nipponists. When the present Prime Minister, General Tojo, assumed office, he flew to the ancient Shrines of the Yasukumi, Meiji and of Admiral Togo, offered prayers there and to the Sun-Goddess Amaterasu at the Grand Shrine of Ise, and then solemnly expounded the aim of Nipponism: "It

is the immovable policy of Japan to settle successfully the China Affair and to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and thereby contribute to world peace . . . and under the glory and grace of the Imperial Throne to add to the brilliance of Japan's 3,000 years history." Later we shall see another variant in the Tanaka Memorial, which is the most conspicuous, detailed and authoritative of all. But leading Nippontists like Araki, Nitobe, *et al* have said much the same thing, and Tanaka was by no means a Crusoe.

Chapter and verse could be easily quoted to prove the analogous practices and principles, already evident in the course of our study on the subjects of war and peace, of *geopolitik* and *zollverein* (custom union) schemes, of *lebensraum* and encirclement and others. We shall here only refer to a few. Baron Hiranuma, one of the most influential leaders, says: "Militarism is necessary for the realising of our highest morality." In one of the many pamphlets issued by the Japanese Fascist circles war is described as "the father of creation, and not to be denounced but encouraged, since rivalry for supremacy does for the State what struggling against adversity does for the individual." This compares well with what appears under Mussolini's name in the *Italian Encyclopedia*: "War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to face it". Again, Hitler, too, writes in *Mein Kampf*: "In eternal warfare mankind has become great—in eternal peace mankind would be ruined."

There is a familiar ring in the Nipponists' complaints of encirclement, and in their declaration of their love of peace and of a world where justice and righteousness prevail and material greed is not, both of which, they declare, are possible even now but for the "lewd

fellows of the baser sort". The Japanese Army spokesman in Shanghai complains in February 1941 that his country was victimised by Britain and the U.S.A., who abrogated the Japanese Alliance and Trade Treaty. "Japan has the heart of a dove; she is anxious to lay the egg of peace, but Britain and America have placed the snakes' eggs of Singapore and Guam in the nest." On his return from his visit to Berlin, Rome and Moscow, Mr. Matsuoka, the then Foreign Minister, broadcast: "Japan earnestly wishes to contribute to the welfare of mankind and the preservation of world peace. But if there are people or countries who purposely close their eyes to the real intentions of Japan, it is impossible to talk with them, after all." The present Premier, General Tojo, speaking then as the War Minister on the tenth anniversary of the heaven-sent "Manchurian Incident," fulminated against the measures of other countries directed at Japan, and declared: "But it was the character of Japan to break oppression by all means and keep the Yamato spirit burning in confidence of victory. Japan surpassed all other races in loving peace and in making moral principles her guide."

The religious life of Japan, as that of Nazi Germany, was reorganised in April 1940 under the new totalitarian regime by the Religious Organisation Law, which has a Bureau of Religions attached to the Ministry of Education. The Meiji Constitution had guaranteed freedom of worship, which is still nominally the case, and Shintoism, Buddhism and Christianity are recognised as the State religions. But the new law has eliminated all European influences in the Missionary Societies, the Salvation Army and Rotary Clubs. The idolatrous and scarcely dignified practices of making obeisance towards the Imperial Palace and ceremonious visits to the State Shrines are propagated through the National

Spiritual Mobilisation Campaign. The Tenno is *Hominum Salvator*.

Under the Peace Preservation Law, freedom in general is forbidden (*gleichgeschaltet*). Not only thousands of people holding Leftist views, but Liberal professors of national and international reputation have been arrested or dismissed: Prof. Minobe, who interpreted Monarchy as an organ of the State; Prof. Takikawa, the famous legal historian and criminologist, and Ikki, the Lord Privy Seal; the Chief of Cabinet Legislative Bureau, and scores of other well-known people. On the Index (*Librorum prohibitorum*) of Nipponism is placed all literature suspected of radical ideology or of anything that does not harmonise with its ideas. Recently (August 1941) the works of Guy de Maupassant were banned, because the stories of one of the few short-story writers in the world's literature have "individualism, jealousy, eroticism and whatnot, and no Japanese should indulge in such morals at this time."

These Machiavellian Princes of Nipponism cannot permit anyone the luxury of a conscience. "My aim," said Baron Hiranuma, the head of Tokio University, "is not to permit a single student entertaining Left tendencies to graduate from this Institution." Special books written on the "True Meaning of the Kokutai" (National Polity) are published by the Ministry of Education, and the new education imparting fanaticism and blind obedience is popularised through the various Patriotic Societies. Denying freewill to pupils, Fichte, the forerunner of Fascism, said in his *Addresses to the German Nation*: "The new education, on the contrary, would have to consist in a complete annihilation of the freedom of the will in the territory that it undertook to deal with." Nipponism nods assent to Nazism.

The all-too-prevalent idea that a totalitarian State is necessarily headed by one leader, a Fuehrer or an Il Duce, is both wrong and dangerous, like another view that a Fascist Dictator must necessarily be a "man of the people." Totalitarianism refers simply to the social-economic and political structure, and there can be, and are, Fascist and non-Fascist totalitarian States with or without single dictators. As for the latter theory, it is deduced from the assumption that Fascism has mass support, which just is not true, at any rate not true in the case of Nippon. So the absence in that country of one party and one Fuehrer—though these, too, are not excluded in the future—does not invalidate our thesis of the essential similarity of the theories and practices of Nipponism and Nazi-Fascism. Whence else comes the inspiration for Mr. Matsuoka's madrigal?

In his book *Who is the Enemy of Peace?* he writes: "Reproaches are hurled at Hitler from all sides; but Hitler has performed many services for contemporary Germany: he is purging the country of Communists and of Jews who are preaching pacifism and share the views of the League of Nations: and finally he is arousing the spirit of the German nation." Again, when he returned, in April 1941, from his Icarian journey to Moscow, Berlin and Rome, the bureaucrat Matsuoka was chock-a-block with totalitarian ideas of organisations and Fascist conceptions in general. "I would like to institute German-like control of her national life from tomorrow." Nippon's Foreign Minister then declared that Hitler and Mussolini were working to create a millennium on earth, and would not be side-tracked by cunning designs of Britain or any other Power. The peoples of Germany and Italy had spontaneously established domestic control; the workers were well treated, well paid and led bright and happy lives.

"Seeing such complete control, I could not but feel that Germany is certain to win the war."

The initiative and the lead for a common ideology and in planning a common line of action have not always come from one side. The Nazis have taught a few things to the Nipponists. Over 3,000 expert Nazi propagandists, under General Eugene Ott, the German Ambassador at Tokyo, have been busy in Japan, officially attached as advisers to many State Departments and unofficially coaching the potential Schnelle Truppen (speed troops) through several Patriotic Societies. These are Heinz and Colonel Meisinger, who organised the Gestapo work in Spain and Poland respectively. Hitler's former A.D.C., Wiedemann, who was expelled as Nazi Consul-General from San Francisco, is now the Consul-General at Tientsin.

The Nipponists are learning from the Nazis, just as their Italian, Spanish and other Fascist satellites did in their own time, the psychological and political expediencies of an anti-Jewish movement. Through the Anti-Espionage Federation they have set up Anti-Communist Committees all over the occupied area in China, and Russian emigrants are used to spread the anti-Jewish propaganda. The Jewish refugees who arrived recently in Japan have now been sent to Shanghai and other places, where attempts are being made to start agitation against the 25,000 refugees. The influential and irredentist Tokyo journal *Asahi* wrote recently, *a la Goebbels*, that the Jews had "re-elected Roosevelt for a third term; they had coaxed Churchill to wage war on Germany; the Jews also backed Stalin; the Jews are conspiring to overthrow the world's ruling powers." True, there are very few Jews in Japan, and those who came to Japan in the sixteenth century have been absorbed into all classes. But that does not pre-

vent the pro-Nazi journal *Hochi* from writing, in an article headed "The Japanese Sword": "The Jew must be recognised as the wielder of unlimited financial power; the innovator of the gold standard; the creator of Masonry as well as other social and recreational institutions which shed a demoralising influence such as cafes, dance-halls, and certain moving pictures of an undesirable nature. . . The presence of 3,000 Jews in any country is sufficient to carry out subversive activities."

Such a foregoing manifestations of a common ideology and action do not, however, mean that it is all one perfect Katoviolin duet between Nipponism and Nazi-Fascism. In the finale, the "New Order" of Nippon, with herself as the metropolis of the East Asiatic countries welded into one yen-bloc, all under her puppet rulers (*gauleiters*), feeding and subserving her super-breed of people, is bound, by its very nature, to clash with the "New Order" of the Herrenvolk. Speaking at Munich in January 1936, a few months before he signed the anti-Comintern ("white") Pact with (the "yellow" race) Japan, Hitler said, "The white race is destined to rule. It has the unconscious urge to rule.

When the white race abandons the foundations of its rule over the world it will lose that rule. It is a rule which is the basis of the European economic structure." Needless to add that this very enlightened habit of thinking and acting in terms of "white," "brown," "yellow" and "black" races is not the exclusive mania of the Fuehrer alone. However, such romantic ideals clash with those of their Axis partner. Admiral Suet-sugu, then Home Minister in Prince Konoye's Cabinet, said in 1938, regarding the object of Japan: "Whether this means the exclusion of the white race or not is an important question which should mark the turning point in the history of the world. The justice and

humanity, so earnestly professed by the white race, however, will remain only lip service unless the coloured races are emancipated so as to let them share equally in favour of heaven, and unless the world, now dominated by the white race, is reconstructed for that purpose. My personal conviction is that the lasting peace of the world cannot be realised unless the coloured race, now leading a miserable life with shackles of white men, is delivered."

Apart from such conflicts of racial aspirations of Nipponism and Nazism, there are greater and more real conflicts of economic power and domination. Not being "some insignificant little nigger tribe," says Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, "but the Germanic Mother of all that life which had given its culture to the world today Germany will either be a world power or nothing at all." A prominent leader of Japan's Kampf, General Sadao Araki, writes in his book dealing with the great ideal of Dai Nippon: "We Japanese people must have the spirit and power to convince the entire world of Europe and America of the true spirit of Asia, the civilisation of Asia, the benevolence of Asia, and going a step further, make manifest to them the mission of Japan."

It is not merely that even if these expansive ideals of Nipponism and Nazism were allowed free scope they would collide one day, but Herr Hitler does not recognise, notwithstanding Tanakas, Arakis and the Axis, that the Japanese are capable of a great World Mission, after all. They are no creators of a culture, because, as he says, neither the present culture nor their ancient culture was their own, but was borrowed from others, or else the Japanese must have lost the creative "racial cell." Here are in full Herr Hitler's scientific and historical arguments, such as they are, on Nippon. "If

we divide mankind into three categories—founders of culture, bearers of culture and destroyers of culture—the Aryan alone can be considered as representing the first category. Within a few decades the whole of Eastern Asia, for instance, appropriated a culture and called such a culture its own, whereas the basis of that culture was the Greek mind and the Teutonic technical skill as we know it. Only the external form—at least to a certain degree—shows the traits of an Asiatic inspiration. It is not true, as some believe, that Japan adds European technique to a culture of her own. The truth rather is that European science and techniques are just decked out with the peculiar characteristics of the Japanese civilisation. The foundations of actual life in Japan today are not those of the native Japanese culture, although this characterises the external features of the country, which features strike the eye of European observers on account of their fundamental difference from us; but the real foundations of contemporary Japanese life are the enormous scientific and technical achievements of Europe and America—that is to say, of Aryan peoples.

"If, from today onwards, the Aryan influence on Japan would cease, and if we suppose that Europe and America would collapse—then the present progress of Japan in science and technique might still last for a short duration, but in a few decades would dry up, and the native Japanese character would triumph while the present civilisation would become fossilised and fall back into the sleep from which it was aroused about seventy years ago, by the impact of Aryan culture. We may therefore draw the conclusion that, just as the present Japanese development has been due to Aryan influence, so in the immemorial past an outside influence and an outside culture brought into existence the Japanese cul-

ture of that day. This opinion is very strongly supported by the fact that an ancient civilisation of Japan actually became fossilised and petrified. Such a process of senility can happen only if a people loses the racial cell which originally had been creative, or if the outside influence should be withdrawn after having awakened and maintained the first cultural developments in that region. If it be shown that a people owes the fundamental elements of its culture to foreign races, assimilating and elaborating such elements, and if subsequently that culture becomes fossilised whenever the external influence ceases, then such a race may be called the depository but never the creator of a culture."

The leaders of Nipponism are not altogether unaware of these views of the Fuehrer, which completely knock the bottom out of their own Evangelic Mission, and which have given rise to misgivings as to the permanence of the Axis affection. The ultimate aims of these two Axis partners are anything but friendly. Already the pro-Axis paper *Hochi*, warning the Government against pushing aid to Germany, that would jeopardise Japan's interests, wrote in May 1941, paraphrasing Aristotle, "We love our friend Germany, but we love our own country more." The truth of the matter is that both the systems are today rotten ripe for social revolutions, which are only staved off by installing totalitarian regimes at home and launching continuous expansions abroad. But two expanding systems on this limited globe are bound to collide sooner or later, and as for the totalitarian oppression of the people, Bismarck once said that you can do almost anything with bayonets except sit on them.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE TANAKA MEMORIAL

During less than three score and ten years, the proverbial span of human life, of Japan's Kampf, she has succeeded in adding to her material wealth, economic and political powers more than any older Imperial Powers, not only in percentage increases, but in absolute quantities. This is the counterpart, as it were, of the development at a combined rate of her belated industries. The year 1874 was the year that witnessed the march of Nipponism wearing her seven-league boots on an expedition to Formosa. What colossal results have taken place since then! Judged purely numerically, and ignoring for the moment the social realities and power behind the arithmetic, an island with an area of 380,000 square kilometres and a population of 31 millions, has today become an Empire with an area of 2,500,000 square kilometres with a population of 180 millions. That means that, in the last seventy years, the area of the Island Empire has increased by 565 per cent., and the population by 500 per cent. (In 1872 382,561 sq. km. and 31 millions; in 1932 674,401 sq. km. and 93 millions; in 1941 2,544,701 sq. km.—Manchukuo 1,303,000 sq. km. and occupied territories 567,300 sq. km., 15 per cent. of the total area of China proper and 180,397,000 population—Manchukuo 39,454,000, and occupied territories 40 millions—*i.e.*, 9·5 per cent. only of the total population of China).

When, therefore, the apologists of Nipponism, like

many others of the same tribe, say that they never had and have not now any designs on other people's territories, our retort is the apt Chinese saying: "A red-nosed man may be a teetotaller, but no one will believe it."

Remembering this incontrovertible fact, let us inquire: What was the primary motive-power behind this gigantic expansion? Whether and how far was it planned and how much of it "just happened"? From the first of her expeditions—that to Formosa (needs of new textile industries) in 1874—through all the various "incidents" to the latest ventures in the South Seas (need of heavy industries, oil, rubber, etc.), Nippon's struggle has been one quest of her economic needs, domination and power. This has become clear from our study of the historical-material conditions in which the system has been operating. In the early stages this was not so openly expressed as it is now, officially and without batting an eyelid. The Premier, Konoye, in a statement made after an Imperial Conference, presided over by the Emperor, said (July 1941): Whatever could not be procured within Japan must be obtained in East Asia; "this is a matter of absolute necessity for the country's existence."

In the earlier period of the evolution of Nipponism, as in the more general evolution of society, the struggle was "instinctively" directed by the need and greed, and only later was there to appear a more "conscious" and planned system. This is, after all, how things happen in general. Facts come first; a theory, an abstraction, follows later. Systematic plans of action were made only after reaching a certain degree of technical progress and superiority, which enables a double achievement of internal consolidation and external development. But this does not mean that the expansion of Japanese Imperialism has not been primarily motivated by economic

needs and power, nor that it has been "unintentional." What is called the "fit of absent-mindedness" (Sir John Seely's well-known description of the expansion of the British Empire) is only a dumb homage of empiricism paid to inexorable history; this might explain many things, but not history. If, in the history of Nipponism, too, plans, systems and theories appeared only later, it is because, as has been profoundly put, of mind limping behind reality.

When the task of formulating the aims and objects of a movement starts, its leaders do not always come directly to state the issue. For example, the spokesman of the Press Bureau of the Japanese War Ministry said recently that since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Japan had been conducting a lone and heroic struggle to free 1,100 million "oriental souls" from the clutch of the "Whites." The aims are generally couched in all kinds of extraneous phraseology. It is sometimes the "race," and sometimes the wider call of "sacred duty," the trust of Providence, and, of course, God. So often do the leaders of Nipponism, like others, to be sure, drag God into their schemes that it may be said of them, what Victor Hugo said of Napoleon, that God is bored by them. Official heads of religions bless their holy crusades that violate others' cultures; national writers, artists and leaders of culture conpire at their imperial deeds, and musicians write cantatas dedicated to the "Eastward Expedition of the First Japanese Emperor." Dr. Nitobe, the Quaker leader, says imperialism is inherent in the soul of Japan. Thus different people attempt to explain Japan's struggle in a general manner with their vaguely idealistic and "pure" theories.

But mere generalities, indecision and absence of precise formulation would not do for long. In the race against time and against other competitors, the more

consciously and systematically organised is the struggle, the greater chances there will be of its success. The plans have to be made beforehand, and the aims explicitly stated and propagated, even if such an unconventional method, with its embarrassing revelations, would shock the sensitive souls. During the first sixty years of Japan's struggle, left to "the blind fates," the gains were only 78 per cent. in area and 200 per cent. increase in population (this includes the natural population increases). But during the remaining ten years, thanks to a more systematic planning, the total gains have been carried further to 566 per cent. increase in area and 500 per cent. increase in the population.

The plans and formulations are made by the spear-head of the leadership, whose evident frankness and directness, incidentally, are no special virtues in them, but are demanded by the pressing needs of Nipponism. The moderates, with all their vacillation, trail behind. Again, in the Praetorian guard itself there is by no means unanimity about particular tactics on a particular sector at a particular time. But they are all agreed about the main strategy, and still more about the main objective. We have already seen the statements of the objective of Japan's struggle made by several of her leaders—Chiefs of the Army, Navy, big trusts, political parties and of Patriotic Societies, and individuals like Baron Araki, General Tojo, Admiral Sugiyama, Mr. Matsuoka and Prince Konoye. Each one of them is a virtuoso good enough to play the title-role in the set "Tanaka Memorial."

The document which is popularly known as the Tanaka Memorial is the blue-print of Nipponism, and contains, besides the general aims, an elaborate study of the various stages that the struggle would have to go through before it consummates in a world of domina-

tion. This programmatic document was prepared by a group of Japanese Imperialists led by General Baron Tanaka and formally presented later to the new Emperor Hirohito in 1927, when Tanaka was the Prime Minister of the Seiyukai Government. Its authenticity has been denied unofficially by the Japanese leaders, who say that it is a Chinese forgery. In the parallel case of *Mein Kampf*, its irredentist aims had been during the early years put in cold storage by the Nazis, while its author even tried through the French Law Courts to prevent its publication in France. But the Tanaka Memorial, like *Mein Kampf*, has never once been disowned officially. Foreign circles have thrown a veil of strange reticence over it, firstly because the contents of this testament of Japan's Kampf, no less vertiginous than *Mein Kampf*, are too fantastic to be credible, secondly because of the desire to be politic and not to offend the proud Japanese by vexatious exposures, and lastly because the Japanese affairs did not constitute a live issue until very recently. When it is recalled to what lengths the official and unofficial circles in the outside world went in order to appease Herr Hitler in every matter, and particularly as regards *Mein Kampf*, by preventing the publication of its unabridged text, then it will be realised why so much consideration, and of such a kind, has been shown towards Nippon, which has held the world balance, in the Pacific, between various Powers. However, none of such tergiversations in some quarters and reticence in others can exorcise the "Tanaka Memorial" away. This is an authentic historical document, and, as such, there it stands, and can do no other.

We have already seen how, in 1882, on the historical occasion of introducing the new Constitution, the leading clan chieftains officially sent abroad Prince

Hirobimi Ito to study the Western Constitutions, and how on his return he prepared a draft Constitution "in absolute secrecy," discussed it privately with a small clique, and presented it later to the Emperor, who gave the Royal assent. A similar procedure was adopted regarding the "Tanaka Memorial." General Tanaka, who was once the War Minister in the Seiyukai Government (September 1918-November 1921) that sent the Siberian Expedition, and who later became the Prime Minister from April 1927 to July 1929, was the eminent spokesman of the Militarists and the Mitsui Trusts. A conference held among these men, and presided over by the figurehead, Emperor Taisho (mentally affected, died in 1926), sent Tanaka on an exploratory visit to the Western capitals. On his return from this sentimental journey, Tanaka and his group re-edited the provisional memorandum, which, after various alterations, was formally presented to the present Emperor (still in his teens) in 1927. "Evidently the Divine Providence," says Baron Tanaka, "wishes me to assist Your Majesty in ushering in a new era in the Far East, and to develop a new Continental Empire." This leader of Nipponism, of course, realises that the "new continental empire" can only be developed by armed force, and suggests successive methods for it. "It is necessary to understand clearly," said the Fuehrer of Nazism, "that the re-conquest of the lost territories cannot be achieved by solemn appeals to Almighty God or pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only by armed force."

The Tanaka Memorial surveys meticulously Japan's present status, potentialities and handicaps, her geographical position and over-population, her natural resources and vulnerability regarding raw materials. It also makes a careful note of the minerals and raw materials in the neighbouring regions like Tibet,

Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria and China. Then it suggests a plan of action. Manchuria and Mongolia are not China's territories; Japan must get them. She must open negotiations with the Princes ruling Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria, who have "sovereign powers." There should be secret funds of the Army Department's budget, to be used in sending retired officers as teachers, etc. Capitalisation is the weapon to beat back China, so also banking and gold notes against Chinese silver notes. "The first step in gaining financial and commercial control of Manchuria and Mongolia lies in the monopoly sale of their products," and by acquiring it Japan must oust Chinese traders. Koreans who have become naturalised as Chinese should be used for buying land through the South Manchurian Railway and Co-operative Societies. "When we remember that the Chinese are our sole customers, we must beware of the day when China becomes unified and her industries become prosperous."

"Our best course is to take positive measures to obtain rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. These will put us in the position to develop our trade. This will have the effect not only of arresting the industrial development of China, but also the penetration of the European Powers."

Japan has got to fight Russia to secure the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway (in 1935 Russia sold it to Japan). "It seems that the inevitability of crossing swords with Russia on the fields of Mongolia in order to gain possession of the wealth of North Manchuria is part of our programme of national development."

Japan must drive out, says the Memorial, the U.S. traders from the Far East. "One day we shall have to fight against America. If we wish in the future to gain control over China, we must crush the U.S."

This astounding scheme of conquest proposes wars of destruction against all Powers, all but Britain, which was then Japan's ally. In this, as in many other aspects, the Tanaka Memorial, the famous blue-print of Nipponism, resembles *Mein Kampf*, the blue-print of Nazism. Hitler wrote: "An alliance whose aim does not include the intention of war is senseless and worthless." Nippon's alliance with Britain (1894-1902-1923) has served this very purpose during the 1894-5 Sino-Japanese War, 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War and subsequently. Again, Hitler originally in *Mein Kampf* proposed an alliance with Britain (and Italy) to enable him to deal with others in Europe. Such an alliance had a positive advantage, because "at a stroke Germany would be freed from its unfavourable strategic position," and besides, it would in no way be a deterrent to future development; and "at the present day we are not fighting for the position of a World Power." Similarly, the Nipponists of the Tanaka Memorial said nothing, *pro tem*, about Britain. But since then much water has flowed under the Riogoku-Bashi in Tokyo. As we have already seen from the later course and aim of Nippon's expansion and from the statements of her leaders, Nippon's new alliance with the Axis Powers had included the intention of war against Britain.

Indeed, the Tanaka Memorial explicitly proposes the world conquest too. "Having all China's resources at our disposition, we will proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago, the Islands of the South Seas, Asia Minor, Central Asia and even Europe itself. Our capture of control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step." After recommending "the policy of Blood and Iron," the famous Memorial sums up: "But in carrying out this policy we have to face the U.S., which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison

with poison. In the future, if we want to control China, we must first crush the U.S., just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But, in order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender. Then the world will realise that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence."

Such is the historical document, the Gospel of Nipponism. Any secularist refusal to believe this inspired Gospel according to Baron Tanaka will be made short shift of by historical facts which have been corroborating it since then. Neither is it any use dismissing it for the simple reason that the Nipponists are but crying for the moon; even if such is the case, it is necessary at least to know that they are crying. Like *Mein Kampf*, the Nipponist Kampf will be ignored at one's own peril. Recently a well-known British daily published a cable from its "Own Correspondent" in Japan, saying that the new Premier, General Tojo, on assuming office, flew over to pay his homage at the Tanaka Memorial, as in other shrines, on which, it was alleged, are written the details of Japan's policy! So little is known of this historical document, whose authenticity had been hitherto left in doubt, as no direct proofs were forthcoming—until very recently.

But not only the corroborating facts of history since 1931 and the contents of the Tanaka Memorial itself provide the circumstantial proof of its existence. There is now a direct proof furnished for the first time. Leon Trotsky, the exiled Bolshevik leader, wrote, shortly

before his assassination in the summer of 1941, a special article on the "Tanaka Memorial," which has been posthumously published in *The Fourth International*, the monthly organ of the American Workers' Party (Section of the Fourth International). The editors state that Trotsky was still verifying exact dates when the assassination took place. In the article Trotsky tells us why he thinks the document cannot be a forgery. The Imperial Government of Japan, he says, "constitutes an ancient and traditional *milieu*. Whoever has carefully followed the evolution of Japanese politics cannot fail to acknowledge that the document, with its cynical realism and icy fanaticism of the ruling caste, originates in this *milieu*. The document is credible. The text is valid. The contents gain credence because they speak for themselves.

"Japan is today the weakest link in the Imperialist chain. Her financial and military superstructure rests on a foundation of semi-feudal agrarian barbarism. Periodical explosions within the Japanese army are only a reflection of the intolerable tension of social contradictions in the country. The regime as a whole maintains itself only through the dynamics of military seizures. The programmatic basis for these seizures is supplied by the 'Tanaka Memorial'."

After stressing the important evidence of proof provided by the historical events, Trotsky furnishes us with the first positive proof of the Tanaka Memorial. "One day in 1925 in the summer or early autumn," Dzerzhinsky, as the head of the G.P.U., announced that a photostatic copy of the Tanaka Memorial had arrived in Moscow. He had previously informed a few members of the Political Bureau of the Soviet Government that a Japanese agent of the G.P.U. had succeeded in photographing the document kept in the archives of

the Japanese Ministry of Naval Affairs. The photo-static copy, bought for about 3,000 American dollars, had been flown to Moscow. An English translation of it was made. Trotsky, still a member of the Polit-bureau, who had recently left the War Commissariat and was then the head of the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, was, he writes, "perhaps the very first person to become acquainted with the document in English and Russian translation of the Japanese text." For various reasons, especially of the position of the Soviet Union in international politics then, it was thought preferable to publish it in the U.S.A., and this was eventually done.

"The document did not leap," comments Trotsky on the most probable nature of the genesis of the now proven Gospel of Nipponism, "full blown from Baron Tanaka's brow. It constitutes a generalisation of the plans formulated by the Army and Navy leaders and, in a certain sense, a reconciliation and a theoretical summation of these plans. It is to be assumed that many variants preceded the final draft; and that many discussions were held in intimate, 'non-official' and hence all the more influential circles. The task was to affix the seal of Imperial Will upon these aspirations of the Army and the Navy circles. The old Emperor's physical and mental condition was such that his signature could not prove authoritative for the initiated. That is why the Imperialist conspirators waited for the enthronement of Emperor Hirohito before presenting for his signature the document, which from all indications had received its final formulation under General Tanaka's direction."

The document, which is at once an *exposé* of Nipponism and a guide to its future course, shows clearly and without the trappings of idealism what really

inspires the policies of the national leaders, and their speeches, as pretty as the postcards of Fujiyama—the oracular utterances of the exponents of "Bushido" and "Kato" gospels like General Araki, the transpontine speeches on "Imperial Virtue" and "Immutable Policy" of extremist leaders like the present Premier, General Tojo, and the more diplomatically phrased speeches of moderates like Prince Konoye on duty, peace and "national unity." Moreover, the far-reaching contents of the document, like the various statements regarding the aims and policies made by the leaders from time to time, are no longer merely airy nothings as dreams are made of; history has now clothed them with blood and flesh. So much so that one might say, in the style of Voltaire, that if the Tanaka Memorial were not existing it would be necessary to invent it.

## CHAPTER X

### GREAT EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

A moderate people who go on from concessions to concessions, was how the French statesman M. Briand once described the Japanese statesmen. The course of Nipponism has fully justified this lucid judgment.

Nippon's leaders themselves are, in a sense, the victims of their perpetually expanding system, which, once set in motion, refused to be cribbed, cabined and confined. Indeed, while some of them have stood amazed in awe and wonderment, a few others have been perturbed, at the shape of things to come, and overcome with what is called *sabishima*, or a kind of loneliness in the face of life's imponderables. But individuals may come and go, Nipponism goes on for ever; it must keep on expanding or—and burst.

The need for greater and greater *lebensraum* has been always openly stated by the Nipponists and the Nazi-Fascists alike. "Germany has too many people for her territory," said Hitler in October 1933. "To deprive a great nation of its necessary livelihood is, after all, against the interest of the world. We believe we have the same ability as other nations in the matter of the control and administration of Colonies." Mussolini, addressing the Fascist Congress in March 1934, also used the familiar formula: "Our mission is dictated by history and by the facts of geography. Italy, of all European Powers, lies closest to Asia and Africa. We have no territorial ambitions, but we desire to achieve a natural

expansion which promises close co-operation between Italians and the peoples of Africa and the Orient. I warn those nations that are already arrived at their goal, not to obstruct Italy's powerful spiritual development and economic expansion." How fortunate for these men that they rarely fail to discover, in spiritual and material things, that harmony which has eluded the rest of mankind throughout the ages!

The Nipponists' case was put clearly in a pamphlet published by the Japanese Ministry of War in 1935: "Among certain circles of our people, there are some, perhaps, who thoughtlessly imagine that the Manchurian incidents have been successfully closed. This is a grave mistake — the density of the population of Japan is 170 per square kilometre; including the colonies, the density is 137 per square kilometre. This density of population is the highest in the world. Moreover, the annual increase of the population of Japan proper is 900,000: including the colonies the increase is 1,300,000 per annum. There is nothing like it anywhere else in the world. In twenty years' time the population of Japan would have reached 100 millions. Moreover, Japan lacks the necessary resources. The food supply is mainly dependent upon home production. Japan occupies first place in the world in regard to density of population and the last place among the first class countries in regard to resources. If things continue in this way the Japanese people will enter a period of famine, and their very existence will be at stake. That is why our people has only one road before it — whose place of settlement is the continent of Asia, which holds half the population of the world? As a result of the century-old struggle for colonies between the Powers

our Asia has become the colony of the European and American Powers. The only exceptions are Japan,

China and Siam, and the only one of these who can play a leading role is Japan. Asia is the place of settlement for the Asiatic peoples. Asia is the life-line of the Asiatics. There is no reason why the Asiatic peoples should live in danger of losing their right to existence.

In order to avert the possibility of such a fate we must imperatively have sufficient military force to protect Eastern Asia."

Nipponists knew all along that their much-vaunted "Japan-Manchukuo-China Bloc" was neither self-sufficient nor even a success. By the middle of 1940 they had therefore decided to launch a further campaign of extending their sphere of activities. They christened the new stage of Nipponism as the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." This enlarged sphere of influence resembles closely the Nazi Professor Haushofer's *geopolitik* schemes, but has nowhere yet been precisely defined by the Nipponist leaders themselves. Only, Mr. Matsuoka, while still the Foreign Minister, told the House of Representatives in February 1941, that "my theory is that Oceania, which is 1,200 miles north and south, and 1,000 miles east and west, must be a place to which Asiatic people can migrate. This region has sufficient natural resources to support between 600 and 800 million people. I believe that we have an actual right to migrate there. While it is difficult to conduct political affairs according to advocated ideals, I believe that the white race must cede Oceania to the Asiatics."

Another authority, Admiral Sankichi Takahashi, a former naval Commander-in-Chief, said: "It begins with Manchukuo in the north and extends to Australia in the south. In the east it begins at the 180th parallel and extends west to the Bay of Bengal and Burma." The Admiral envisages the fulfilment of this latest phase of Nipponism in several stages. Manchukuo, China,

Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, the Netherland Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, the Philippines and Australia, one after another, will be annexed. "Greater East Asia will be built up in proportion to our national strength. The greater our strength, the larger will be our sphere."

In order to justify this new imperialistic venture, the familiar explanations of a "Great Mission" and "Divine Justice" are at once given by the leading missionaries of Nipponism. "Five hundred million people in Annam, Cochin China, the East Indies, the Malay Peninsula, Burma, India and the Philippines," said a manifesto issued in January 1941 by several well-known Admirals and Generals, including the "Moderate" Hayashi, "are now groaning under injustice. South-East Asia has been invaded and conquered by the Whites for the past seven centuries. The emancipation of these people is essential for the construction of the New Order in Asia and the establishment of lasting peace in the East."

Nothing could be more unwise than to ignore either the substantial truth in many of such statements or the great propaganda value they must have among the perennially exploited peoples of the colonies. At the same time, those people whose conduct entitles them to pronounce judgments will not find it difficult to expose Nippon's pose as the bastion of civilisation as sheer hypocrisy.

Not that all Nipponists at all times resort to the use of the tribute that vice pays to virtue. The Press Bureau of the Japanese Navy Office stated in 1939 in a pamphlet, with no embellishment: "Japan lacks some thirty-eight important raw materials necessary for its further development as an industrial nation. Of these only coal, iron and salt can satisfactorily be obtained on the continent. Japan is still extremely short of cotton

and wool. As for lumber, rubber and oil, they are almost entirely unavailable at present. Moreover, copper, phosphorus, potassium ore, tin, sulphites, gold, bauxite, etc., must be sought elsewhere than from the continent by way of the sea. Again, there is the question where to obtain the vast sums needed for the long-term construction. They can be raised only through the promotion of foreign trade by expanding the market throughout the world by way of the seas. It is seen therefore that the continental expansion is not a problem confined to the continent itself but one which embraces the seas surrounding it, calling urgently for a solid Oceanic policy."

The Far Eastern sector of the "New Order" covers an area of over 16 million square kilometres—*i.e.*, about 12 per cent. of the world's total area—and has a population of nearly 700 millions—*i.e.*, 32 per cent. of the world's total. Japan proper herself, with 73 million people and an area of about 2·0 per cent. of this "New Order," is to be the metropolis of the new culture—and, of course, of finance and heavy industry; while the remaining countries, consisting of hewers of wood and drawers of water, are to provide the raw materials, food-stuffs and light industries. The total imports and exports of the countries in this sphere amounted in 1939 to a little over 11 per cent. and 10 per cent. respectively of the world's total. Within the sphere itself the share of imports and exports of the leading countries are: of Japan 44·8 per cent. and 45·7 per cent.; of British Malaya 12·3 per cent. and 13·3 per cent.; and of the Dutch East Indies 10·4 per cent. and 15·4 per cent.

What were the economic motives for offering the procrustean bed of this New Order to the peoples of the Far East? The national economy of Japan is most vulnerable not only because of her dependence on foreign

trade, but also because of her lack of chief raw materials. In her foodstuffs, Japan is self-sufficient in normal times. She has her own supply of barley and fish, while she gets more than enough soya beans from Manchukuo—spoils of the war of 1931—which produces 70 per cent. of the world's output. Rice, accounting for more than half the expenditure on food, is home-produced up to 90 per cent. of her needs, the rest being supplied by Korea and Formosa. But in recent years of war she had to import rice from Indo-China, Thailand and Burma, partly because of a poor yield of her own rice harvest and also because of labour withdrawal from rice-fields into the army.

As regards coal, though its coking quality is far inferior and reserves limited, Japan's output—a little less than 6 per cent. of the world's production—suffices for her consumption. Besides, the country has made an extensive use of its water-power, and is now the sixth largest producer of electricity. Raw silk, of which Japan produces 80 per cent. of the world's supply, is exported mainly to the U.S.A., and together with the silk piece-goods makes over 15 per cent. of her exports.

It is in the case of the other raw materials, especially those most indispensable to a more or less prolonged war, that Japan's weakness and vulnerability become evident. And uninterrupted supply of cotton is essential—as the Nazis are finding out, for example—for making tyres for the armoured cars using irregular road surfaces and for aeroplanes landing and taking off with inadequately trained pilots. But in cotton, as well as in wool, Japan is wholly dependent on foreign imports (though Korea supplies a small quantity), which in 1936 formed 31 per cent. and 7·3 per cent. (mostly from Australia) of her total imports. Nearly 20 per cent. of her exports (about 600 million yen worth) comprised cotton yarns

and piece-goods; and over half of her industrial workers are employed in textile factories alone. But there beyond Burma and within the range of Japanese bombers operating from the new bases lies India, which produces, after the U.S.A.; the largest quantity of cotton in the world.

Japan imports much of her manganese, tungsten and zinc, and most of her tin, lead, nickel and bauxite (ore of aluminium) requirements. Her own steel output is about 6 million metric tons per year; over a quarter of that depends on imported pig and scrap iron and another three-eighths on imported ore. Her supply of iron is meagre, the annual production being less than 3 per cent. of the world's total; all her total reserves amount to less than one year's production in the U.S.A. In 1937 she imported 72 per cent. of her iron (two-thirds from Malaya, remainder from Australia, the Philippines and China), 23 per cent. of her pig iron (India, etc.) and 50 per cent. of her scrap-iron needs. It is estimated that in 1940 she imported altogether about 2 million tons of scrap iron from the U.S.A.

Japan's position is no better in the case of her essential war needs of ferro-alloy and non-ferrous metals. Though the monopoly concerns of the Zaibatsu produce large quantities of copper (3·8 per cent. of world's production), half of her growing needs are still imported from the U.S. Before the war, chrome supplies came from China, manganese, cobalt and molybdenum (U.S.A. 93 per cent. of world's output, Mexico 3 per cent.) were imported from America. Japan is short of mercury and nickel, and imported two-thirds of her lead, tin and zinc requirements from abroad, and most of the bauxite needed for her aluminium industry from the Netherland East Indies. In the case of fertilisers, her dependence on foreign imports—potash from the

U.S., nitrates from Chile—is bound to cripple her agriculture in war time.

Rubber and oil combine with iron, cotton and wool to make the Achilles heel of Japan's industry. Of mineral oil, Japan used to import 90 per cent. of her total requirements of 6 million tons per annum, more than three-quarters from the U.S.A., and the rest mainly from Borneo and Sumatra; while her own production from coal-oil plants, substitute fuel and crude oil amounts to about 600 tons a year, and a quarter of a million tons a year is supplied from a concession in North Saghalien granted by Russia. All her rubber supplies, of course, come from abroad—Indo-China and Thailand. It is said that during the last two years Japan bought 85 per cent. of her war material from Britain, the U.S. and the Netherlands East Indies.

Such being the economic insufficiency of the Island Empire, the Nipponist owners of the starving industries find in the projected Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere a veritable dish fit for the gods. Japan could import freely many of her dire needs under the New Order. Of the world's total, Indo-China produces 7·8 per cent. rice, 1·5 tungsten and 1·0 tin. Thailand produces 9·1 per cent. tin, 4·6 rubber, 4·9 rice. The Netherlands East Indies produces 16·9 per cent. tin, 6·7 rice, 4·8 coffee, 29·5 palm oil and palm-kernel oil, 2·4 flax, 9·0 sugar-cane (in Java), 5·9 bauxite, and above all 2·7 per cent. petroleum and 33·3 rubber. New Caledonia produces 5·0 per cent. of chrome and 6·6 per cent. nickel, second only to Canada's monopoly of 87·0 per cent. Rubber to the extent of 3·1 per cent. of the world's total is produced in Borneo and Sarawak. 5·4 per cent. sugar (cane) output of the Philippines would increase by a third Japan's own production, mainly in Formosa.

Here at last in her long, arduous flight Nippon spied at, in Bunyan's words, "as fruitful a place as any the crow flies over". However, there were still two kinds of obstacles to the consummation of Nipponism. Firstly the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" itself was not self-sufficient. None of the countries included in this sector of the "New Order" could supply Japan's sore needs of iron, lead, zinc, mercury, manganese and molybdenum, or her requirements of phosphates and potash for fertilisers and, above all, of cotton, jute and wool. Less than 30 per cent. only of Japan's imports in 1938 came from these regions. The provisional character of the sphere was, of course, known to the exponents of Nipponism, who would nevertheless stake everything in prosecuting their struggle to the next stage. "The bloc containing Japan, Manchukuo and China", wrote Fumio Yamada, the Chief of the Investigating Section of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Contemporary Japan*, July 1941), "has begun to make sound development, but it is not yet sufficient to reach an economic stage of self-supply and self-sufficiency. A larger economic sphere must be sought by including the South Seas region as component countries, the economic self-supply and self-sufficiency, *even though a minimum one*, is to be realised within this sphere."

The second and greater obstacle to the establishment of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" consisted in the fact that the region was already the stronghold of the mighty western Powers. The resistance of single-handed and ill-equipped China, despite the heroism of her long-suffering people, was a molehill compared to the mountain of military strength of the combined Powers. During the last decade of *kampfzeit*, Nippon had complained that China had throughout adopted the policy of II Chih I (using barbarians to control the barbarians),

but such a policy was no longer necessary now all of them are well mixed up; China's lone and long struggle in a remote part of the world had now become just one aspect of the World War.

Nipponists knew the dangers they were running into. Their subsequent assault on French Indo-China was the least aggravating part of their new campaign. Apart from the strategic military position that Indo-China occupies in the Archipelago, there were no special interests of Britain and the U.S. in that country. The French Imperialists had, in addition to suppressing all radical national movements of the people, and throwing their leaders into camps and confinement, monopolised the exploitation of the country, putting a barbed wire against infiltration of others' capital. Whereas the sphere of foreign investments other than those of the metropolitan power was 50 per cent. in the Philippines, 20—30 per cent. in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, it was only 3 per cent. in French Indo-China.

Thailand, on the other hand, was a different kettle of fish. This country had joined since 1932, the sterling bloc, with which and with the U.S. she had carried on 80 per cent. of her foreign trade. Britain is Thailand's greatest market, investor and holder of her foreign debt; two-thirds of her loan redemption funds are deposited with London banks, and six of her foreign banks are British, including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Chartered Bank of India, and Australia, China and the Mercantile Bank of India. More than one-third of the vessels entering Thailand are British owned. The Thailand Chamber of Mines at Puket, which produces tin, has British membership. The British own, too, four of the six companies that control the teak production (which, with that of Burma and Indo-China, makes the world's total); 88

per cent. of the timber industry is in foreign hands, and the investments amounted in 1937 to 124 million U.S. dollars.

Nipponists knew, too, that the hornet's nest in their new-fangled sphere was the Netherlands East Indies, with a population of 70½ millions, and owned by a metropolitan Power with less than 9 million people. The Netherlands East Indies, the largest producer of rubber next to British Malaya, produce one-third of the world's output; 40 per cent. of the capital invested in rubber is British. Then there is, of course, the manna of the modern world, petroleum. The Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (affiliated to the Royal Dutch) produces 62 per cent. of the world's crude oil; and the Dutch Colonial Petroleum Company (affiliate of Standard Oil of America) 30 per cent. In 1939 the British oil interests amounted to 73 per cent. and the American to 27 per cent. Germany's direct interest in the Netherlands East Indies was in a railway-car factory erected in 1923 by the Hugo Stinnes Concern; but the property was seized in the spring of 1940 after the capitulation of the Netherlands. Japan's capital entered much later in 1930. In all, rentier investments amounted, in 1937, to 853 million U.S. dollars, about four-fifths of which were in the hands of the Dutch, and the remainder were owned by Britain and the U.S. Of the total entrepreneur investments amounting to 1,411 million U.S. dollars, 1,040 millions are held by the Dutch, 200 millions by the British and 95 millions by the Americans. Altogether the U.S. alone has invested 800 million dollars in the whole Orient.

Such were the great obstacles to the accomplishment of Nippon's latest task of "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere". Never before in Nippon's struggle had she come up against such stern economic realities

that refused to yield to any changes in the *status quo*. Anticipating the U.S. threat of a probable war in the Pacific, Admiral Suetsugu, the then Chairman of the Co-operative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, said in June 1941: "This is a life or death issue for greater East Asia, and it is but natural that Japan could not acquiesce in its present status."

Baulked in their further moves, Japan's imperialists bluffed and bulldosed, and blamed China, Russia, Britain and the U.S.—everyone but themselves; and Nippon, the be-all and end-all of their ideals and practices, cried Ichabod!

The beginning of 1940 had found Nippon's leaders in a great perplexity. Doubtless the domestic crisis and the disastrous "China Incident," combined with rare opportunities provided by the development of the World War, spurred the dashing militarists to more aggressive excursions. But which way they should move, though move they must, having arrived at that uneasy stage—against Russia in the north, or to the south—they were not sure. Like Alice in Wonderland, Nippon asked: Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here? (That depends a good deal on where you want to get to). I don't much care where (then it doesn't matter which way you go), so long as I get somewhere. Any Cheshire cat would have told her: Oh, you are sure to do that, if you only walk long enough.

## CHAPTER XI

### FINALE

"Our temptation is still to look upon the European stage as of first importance. It is no longer so," said General Smuts as long ago as 1921 at the Imperial Conference. "There are not really first-class events any more. . . . Undoubtedly the scene has shifted away from Europe to the Pacific. The problems of the Pacific are to my mind the world problems of the next fifty years or more."

During the last phase of Japan's *kampf* her governments used all the familiar weapons from the ancient armoury—complaints of encirclement, need of *lebensraum*, war of nerves, armed diplomacy, *faits accomplis* and alibis, setting one of the would-be victims against another and mediating between them later (Treaties of Friendship), and so on. Already on the eve of the Dutch capitulation in May 1940, the Japanese Minister at The Hague had presented a Note to the Dutch Government, giving a one-day ultimatum regarding shipment of raw material to Germany. Later, on June 3, after the capitulation, the Foreign Minister Arita said his Government could not "remain indifferent" to the change in the existing conditions of the Netherlands East Indies. Long ago, Joseph Chamberlain had advocated the shrewd policy of giving political independence to Colonies if necessary, provided their economic control was retained. Now Nippon's Foreign Minister stated: "Our economic relations with the areas of the Southern

Pacific are of the most intimate. Our concern is not confined to the maintenance of the political *status quo*. Because of their resources . . . it is only natural that this country should be seriously concerned about the *economic status* of the Netherland Indies."

Ominously enough, a Treaty of Friendship and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity, valid for five years, was signed on June 12 between Japan and Thailand. (A similar treaty was signed between Britain and Thailand on the same day). Two days later the Nazi Wehrmacht entered Paris, and on June 17 Marshal Petain's Government capitulated. This brought more wind into the sail of Nippon's Navy, which had, to the great discomfiture of foreign appeasers, who had long tried to keep to its windward side, already succeeded in exacting the Tientsin agreement, and was soon to enforce the closure of the Burma Road. Now the Governor-General of French Indo-China was forced to stop all traffic to China over the Haiphong-Kunming Railway. Nippon's fleet arrived triumphantly until the Japanese inspectors who were sent to regulate the traffic landed. Declaring that *realpolitik* of the epoch admitted no independence or neutrality of smaller nations, Nippon added that he that is not with me is against me.

The previous governments of Japan had regarded as friends all Powers which aided her in China and rejected those who had spied her, said the new Foreign Minister of the new Konoye Cabinet formed in July 1940. "That is still our policy; the Cabinet will make all the friends it can to accomplish its new foreign policy, but some countries can be made into friends while others cannot. From now on Japan will not make vain efforts to shake hands with countries who cannot be made into friends. The Japanese Government is through with toadying."

It was at this time that the new fascistic State Structure (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) was being forged at home, and the South Seas Federation, amalgamating the sixteen existing societies, was formed "to secure closer co-operation with the Government in achieving Japan's southward policy." In August, Britain withdrew her troops stationed in Shanghai and North China, and Japan stepped in. She decided to hit the iron while it was hot. In September, when the three Axis countries were signing the Ten-Year Pact, and Ribbentrop was declaring that the struggle was not against other nations but against an "international conspiracy" of warmongers, his Far Eastern partner sent troops against French Indo-China. To the U.S. demands for an assurance, Japan had previously stated that she had no designs on Indo-China. Now the Imperial Headquarters announced that French troops had subsequently surrendered. The agreement reached on September 22 granted Japan "certain facilities of a military nature without further delay," according to a statement of the Indo-Chinese Government, while Japan guaranteed to respect the territorial integrity of the Colony. The terms of the agreement included also (a) immediate landing of a limited number of Japanese troops at Haiphong, and their maintenance there as a garrison; (b) establishment of three Japanese air bases in Tongking, north of the Red River, including one near Hanoi, with permission to garrison them with a maximum of 6,000 Japanese troops.

The all-too-familiar technique of pushing their own cause, and of getting the best for themselves by claiming to do good to others was, with its regular pattern, again adopted. Japan would only seek to liberate the Netherlands East Indies, long exploited and oppressed as a foreign colony, General Kunaiki Koiso, the newly

appointed Japanese Envoy to the Netherlands East Indies told the Press in August (1940), although such action might lead to a clash with the U.S., because rubber is indispensable to American industry. A Mission was sent to Batavia to explore the possibilities of obtaining rights to develop the new areas, and mining and fishing rights, rights of opening an air-line from Japan and of admitting the Japanese traders and professional men. In November 1940 the Mitsui interests negotiated successfully regarding increased exports of oil to Japan.

Mr. Matsuoka said, too, that he sympathised morally with Gandhi's movement in India, but when it was pointed out that the Indian National Congress was supporting China, he "admitted the necessity for making the Indian masses understand Japan's real intentions" (according to Domei). Regarding Thailand, Foreign Minister Matsuoka told the Diet in January 1941 that there was a movement of the Thais for a restoration of lost territories, and Japan, as the leader of East Asia, could not remain indifferent to the struggle. On September 17 Thailand made new demands on Indo-China and invaded Cambodia after the failure of the frontier commission in November. Mr. Matsuoka, the exponent of Nippon's exclusive policy, warned any other Powers against attempting mediation. In the recognised fashion of the leaders of the "New Order" in Europe, he himself opened, in Tokio early in February, a Peace Conference between Thailand and Indo-China, where the Thai delegate declared that Japan's policy was "prosperity for each, stability for all". Indo-China ceded certain territories to Thailand, and the two countries gave their assurance that they would not join any hostile combination against Japan. The conference was a great diplomatic success for Japan as the leader of the Far Eastern countries. Later in May a treaty was signed

between the two countries incorporating the same agreements; also two independent agreements regarding economic collaboration were signed between Japan and Indo-China closely resembling China's Special Concessions and Japan's own "unequal" treaties with "Western oppression" of a century ago.

"Not for the sake of Japan, but for the sake of humanity", was the reason given by Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the Diet, as to why Japan must dominate the Western Pacific. He was replying to Mr. Cordell Hull's charges against the Axis Powers, made in his evidence on the "Lease and Lend Bill". Mr. Matsuoka declared it was preposterous for the U.S. to call Japan impudent in dominating the Western Pacific. "Japan must demand America's reconsideration of her attitude, and if she does not listen there is slim hope for friendly relations between Japan and the U.S. I will try my hardest to make the U.S. understand, but I declare that this cannot be accomplished by courting—the only way is to proceed with unshakable resolve."

This *chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*, having once thus given the angle on Japan-U.S. relations, left on his idyllic expedition to Moscow, Berlin and Rome. The Press and the rest left behind worked out the theme. When the U.S. Government decided, in the spring of 1941, to convoy cargo ships, the Japanese Government spokesman described any such plan extended to the South Seas as an "unwise policy, and America should be very cautious about carrying it through". The *Japan Times and Advertiser*, the Foreign Office organ, wrote that Japan would disapprove of the presence of American warships at Singapore, and would consider any such move in the light of open hostility: "That point being clear, any American proposals to convoy ships through the Red Sea will have considerable repercussions on the

Far Eastern situation". Again, while his Foreign Minister was palavering in the Courts of Europe, Premier Konoye told the Japanese Press: "Speaking frankly, one of the real objects of the Tripartite Pact lies in preventing the U.S. from joining the war. Therefore the Ambassador is putting forth his efforts in this direction."

Thus it is clearly seen how the tension and estrangement were gradually increasing between the U.S. and Japan, and how dark clouds were gathering over the troubled waters of the Pacific. Constant complaints of encirclement and of discrimination against her with respect to economic restrictions were made by Japan. But Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, like Mr. Hull regarding the embargo on aviation petrol, stated that war efforts needed all Britain's supplies; besides, Japan's own attitude in China did not ingratiate her with foreign Powers. When the Australian troops arrived in Malaya, and defence talks began between Britain, America, Holland, Australia and New Zealand in February, Mr. Matsuoka said: "One might guess that these measures are being aimed at Japan and her actions." A Cabinet spokesman at Tutuila and Samoa. The *Asahi* furnished the reply: because the American fleet, by linking with Manila and Singapore, is encircling Japan. The Foreign Office spokesman advised the U.S. to mitigate the situation by confining their activities in the Western hemisphere. Later, on July 20, the *Kokumin Shinbun* wrote that Britain and the U.S. were steadily extending their horse-shoe-shaped encirclement of Japan establishing bases from the Aleutian Islands to Singapore. Thanks to their aid to Chiang Kai-shek, their patronage of the Netherlands East Indies Government and of the de Gaulists in Indo-China, and to their instigations of Thai Government, "Japan is the one who is being picked on for a quarrel".

The two points of view of the U.S. and Japan, which are not, at any rate theoretically, irreconcilable, and the disagreement on which led directly to the war, were stated at this time by their official spokesmen. Mr. Sumner Welles, the Assistant Secretary of State, told the Press in July, following Mr. Hull's statement of September 1940, that the U.S. would recognise no change in *status quo* of the Pacific under "duress." Domination in Indo-China is not necessary for Japan's defence, because there is no threat to Japan. Therefore it must be for further use. The steps taken by Japan "endangered the peaceful use by peaceful nations of the Pacific. They tend to jeopardise the procurement by the U.S. of essential materials, such as tin and rubber, which are necessary for the normal economy of this country and the consummation of our defence programme. Steps which the Japanese Government has taken also endanger the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands."

Nippon's own comprehensive demands had been put in June, *a propos* of her policy towards the Netherlands East Indies, which incidentally reveal the economic basis of the intended "New Order." She had previously protested against the insincerity of the Netherlands Government, who, however, denying it, said that they had no desire to participate in the "New Order" nor to co-operate in supplying the enemy with war materials. Thereupon, in an official statement, Japan argued that because her demand for the resources of the Netherlands East Indies would "steadily increase in the course of her establishment of a high degree of defensive preparation," therefore there must be "the participation of the Japanese in the development of the abundant resources of the East Indies, increased immigration facilities, the right of involvement in their enterprises,

shipping, air service and communications, the admission of Japanese to participation in such development, permission for Japanese ships to call at closed ports for transporting the materials produced by such development, the partial opening of coastwise navigation to Japanese ships, and the development of the fishing industry by Japanese residents." There are no chinks in Nippon's Imperialist ambition.

Hitler's assault on Russia on June 22 naturally created an immediate stir in Tokyo. It caused the raising of brows in some quarters and shrugging of shoulders in others, and elsewhere cleared the heads of the ideological haziness that had been produced by the Nazi-Soviet Alliance of 1939, but in itself made no essential difference in Nippon's main objective. Mr. Matsuoka, who had shot his bolt, was rapped over his knuckles and dropped afterwards from the reorganised Cabinet (July 1941). Thenceforth Nippon's Governments were bidding their time, watching closely the shifting scenes on the Western War front, including especially the U.S., scanning the co-relation of the Axis forces with their opposite, and getting ready to strike when the knell sounded. On the one hand, they had the heartening spectacle of Nazi panzer divisions and Luftwaffe forging ahead on Russian territories. Vichy France had broken off relations with Russia, and Germany and Italy, who had expelled the U.S. consular officials, recognised, on July 1, the puppet "Nanking Government." On the other hand, there was a growing collaboration among their potential enemies, which would undermine their own cherished domination in the Far East. The Soviet Military Mission had arrived in London, and four days later, on July 12, the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of mutual assistance against Hitlerite Germany was signed in Moscow. The U.S., who had

very promptly declared their support of "any defence against Hitlerism," sent naval forces to occupy Iceland in the first week of July. Again, the Allied success in Syria and the mission of Mr. Duff Cooper to the Far East made it imperative for Nipponists to take time by the forelock—and to hasten their sanguinary schemes without delay.

A barrage of Press accusations was suddenly let loose in the middle of July against Indo-China for "betraying" the East Asian Co-Prosperity principles (similar charges had been made previously against the Netherland East Indies). Japan had demanded bases in Indo-China, announced the Vichy Government later, "as a temporary measure to defend Indo-China against de Gaullists, China and Britain," and negotiations were in progress. Within a fortnight, on July 24, Japanese troops began occupying Indo-China.

Such had been the high tension caused by the gradual deterioration of relations between Japan and Britain and the U.S. during the past eighteen months, that within twenty-four hours Britain and the U.S. issued orders "freezing" Japan's assets in their countries. Other parts of the British Empire and the Netherlands followed suit; and Britain denounced, too, all commercial treaties with Japan from 1911 onwards. Altogether about 200 million dollars worth of Japanese assets were thus frozen. Japan replied with retaliatory measures. The U.S. Government ordered all troops in the Hawaiian command to be placed "on a training and a precautionary alert status." President Roosevelt created a new Army Command, known as the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, and his Government allocated 10 million dollars for immediate strengthening of the defence of the Philippines.

However, on July 26 a statement was issued in

Vichy and Tokyo that "complete agreement of views was reached between the Japanese and the French Governments last Monday (July 21) concerning the joint defence of Indo-China." The Chief of the Japanese Information Board broadcast to the effect that the U.S. had misunderstood Japan's intentions; her move into Indo-China was in every way similar to the U.S.'s move into Iceland. After all, the Vichy Government was the legal ruler of the Colony, and was no declared enemy of the U.S., either; judged thus by the horse-trading precepts of high diplomacy, there was something to be said about the Nipponists' contentions. In her last communication to the U.S. Government before the war, Japan stressed once again this point that the occupation of certain parts of Indo-China was the result of a complete agreement with the (Vichy) Government of Indo-China.

On July 29 it was announced that an agreement had been concluded earlier by Japan and Vichy France, who, "taking into consideration the present international situation, and recognising as a result that there exist reasons for Japan to consider that in case the security of French Indo-China should be threatened the general tranquillity in East Asia and her own security would be exposed to danger, and renewing at this opportunity the promise made by Japan, on the one hand, to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia, especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and French sovereignty over the whole of the union of French Indo-China; and the promise made by France, on the other hand, not to conclude with any third Power or Powers any agreement or understanding regarding Indo-China envisaging the political, economic, or military co-operation which is directly or indirectly aimed against Japan, have agreed upon the following

provisions: (1) the two Governments mutually promise military co-operation for the joint defence of French Indo-China; (2) the measures to be taken for such co-operation shall be the object of special arrangements; (3) the above stipulations shall be valid as long as the situation which motivated their adoption exists."

The text of the Agreement, which was itself a result of a panzer diplomacy, spoke volumes for what lay ahead, besides explaining a good deal about Nipponist technique, for which reason it is reproduced here extensively. It is every syllable a Fascist handiwork; how could it be otherwise? Scratch a Nipponist, and you will find a Nazi.

It was said that under a secret Protocol dealing with the "special arrangements", Marshal Petain's Government gave Prince Konoye's Government extensive rights over Indo-China. Thus French Imperialism, which had mercilessly crushed, during the past two decades, the national struggle for independence of the people of Indo-China, now gave away their country as a free gift to the Fascist Nippon. Of course, in this it is not unique. In the various precedents of Spain and elsewhere it will find its sole consolation—and explanation: blood is thicker than water.

Hot on the heels of Indo-China's came Thailand's turn again. While the Japanese wireless kept on referring to British "military oppression" in Thailand, the Press began a tirade against herself early in August. Thailand was accused, as Tokyo Radio later stated, of permitting the stationing of British troops on the Thai-Malaya border, an attitude which, if persisted in, might "cast a dark shadow on the relations between Japan and Thailand and be unfortunate for Thailand and the whole of East Asia." The upshot of it all was that the Thai Banking Syndicate granted the Yokohama Specie Bank

a credit of 10 million bahts for the purchase of rice, despite the British "freezing". Thailand recognised, too, Manchukuo on August 5. Anticipating future developments, Britain and the U.S. Government, simultaneously in the now regularised manner, lost no time on this occasion in expressing their disapproval. On August 6, Mr. Cordell Hull told the Press that any Japanese move into Thailand would be regarded as threatening American security and territory in the Pacific. On the same day Mr. Eden told the House of Commons, during the debate on the war situation, that, coming on the top of the recent action in Indo-China, "any action which would threaten the independence and integrity of Thailand would be a matter of immediate concern to this country, more particularly as threatening the security of Singapore. I hope that these words may yet be heeded"

But Nippon, of course, saw no evil, heard no evil and spoke no evil; and her leaders would not now be deflected by any such threats from carrying out their immutable holy task. From then onwards they set about more zealously than ever preparing for the final combat. There was little time to be lost. The Allied embargo and freezing orders would be taking deadly effect, cutting off Nippon's vast export trade, indispensable imports and vulnerable economy. The Domei Agency stated that "the U.S. had now brought relations with Japan to a state of virtual severance through total economic pressure". Japan could not now afford to draw upon her vast and long-accumulated reserve of stocks of oil, iron and other war needs, which are at best just enough for a short war lasting for a year or two. Time was running short, declared Mr. Makano, the President of the Fascist Tohokai Party, addressing a mass meeting in September (1941); and unless Britain

and the U.S. accepted Japan's terms, Japan and Germany would have to blast a way through Singapore and the Persian Gulf to establish contact. The Government was telling the people that a drop of petrol was like a drop of nation's blood. Japan was now bleeding without the means of transfusion.

Right from the beginning of August, Nipponists were clearing the decks for action. On August 11 the full provisions of the General Mobilisation Act, the anticipatory measure of enforcing State control, passed three years earlier, were invoked; and in September a General Staff for the defence of Japan proper was created. Steps were taken to put the civilian population on a war footing, and arrangements were made with Britain and the U.S. to facilitate the transport home of their mutual subjects.

Despite the totalitarian mobilisation of public opinion through the corrupt and docile Press, the larger bulk of the people had no stomach for the coming crowning venture of Nipponism. But the enthusing leaders would fight it out at the risk of—the people's blood. The Director of the Intelligence Section of the Imperial H.Q. warned them on August 21: "If there are any people in this country who feel any insecurity over the international situation, they should make a fresh appraisal of our national power. Such insecurity is a pretty issue when viewed from the standpoint of our objective in the war."

The Navy spokesman gave stout assurances of Nippon's prowess, of the Navy, that had over 500 vessels, and of the Air Force, that had over 4,000 aircraft. He blamed, as always, not Nippon, but Britain and the U.S. for having failed to see the real truth of the situation, and "if the encirclement comes to a head, Japan will not be to blame, because she is animated by no

territorial ambitions or Imperialistic motives, and will move only when compelled to take a life-or-death question".

More than once in the past the Nipponists had tried to do a good turn to their Nazi partners of the Axis by issuing peace feelers. But realising the adamant attitude of Britain, the official Domei Agency, in September, urged Germany to end the war with Russia in order thus to conserve all man-power for an all-out attack on Britain. The Japanese Press attacked the Atlantic Charter as an attempt of Anglo-American Imperialism to dominate the world, and warned Russia not to accept a proposal of Three-Power Conference that would encircle Japan. The *Nichi Nichi Shimbun* wrote that the "freedom of the seas" declared by Churchill and Roosevelt camouflaged an Anglo-American move for *status quo* and desire to act as "policemen of the world". "Japanese-American relations have reached the final cross-roads," said Captain Hideo Hiraido, the head of Naval Intelligence at the Imperial H.Q., on October 16. "The Japanese Navy has already completed preparations to meet the worst, and is now itching for action."

Under the hard hammer-blows of world events, the vanguard of Nipponism forced the resignation of Prince Konoye's Cabinet on the same day. In the new Premier, General Tojo, nicknamed "The Razor," who was hailed abroad by the Nazi Press as capable of delivering the goods, the Nipponists found a suitable leader for the coming avalanche. "We must go on to develop in ever-expanding progression," Premier Tojo told the high officials at Osaka. "Naturally difficulties will arise, but if a hundred million people merge into one in iron solidarity and go forward, nothing can stop us. If this state of preparedness is completed, diplomacy will

become an easy affair. Wars can be fought with ease. No international pressure can disturb me." On another occasion, addressing a joint meeting of the Japan East Asia Development League and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Nippon's leader said: "Mankind is engaged in the most ruthless struggle ever known in the history of the world, and no one can tell where it will stop. At this time it is a great honour . . . to shoulder the great task of completing the China incident and establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the side of a lofty ideal. . . . I propose to do everything in my power to lead the nation on this Heavenly Mission. Our Empire is at the cross-roads to rise or fall, and the consummation of this holy task cannot be accomplished by myself alone. You are asked, therefore, to separate yourselves from past usages, eliminate all minor differences and walk on the broad path, and so promote our country's glorious three thousand years' history."

Nippon knew she had only two alternatives. Having once set upon the purple path of expansion and war, she must keep on to it "in ever-expanding progression". Or, she could turn back and return to a rational state of existence. Her official Domei Agency said that much. A statement issued on November 2, regarding an impending armed clash "which now seems inevitable", warned against the "vainglorious assumption that the U.S. can force Japan to abandon her national policy of establishing the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by general economic pressure without resort to arms". To abandon this policy, the statement added, would mean to set back the Japanese Empire to the status before the Manchurian incident (which, of course, Heaven forbid! Nipponists would never dream of doing that).

All attempts at negotiating a *modus vivendi* with

Nipponism had only served its cause in the long run. Past policies of appeasement, will-o'-the-wisp notions of the "reasonable" Navy in contrast with the recalcitrant Army, hair-splitting views of "moderates" and "extremists" among the Nipponists and delusive theories that Nippon had merely been bluffing—foreign policies based on such *ignis fatuus* have only been grist to the mill of Nipponism. In contravention of every international Agreement solemnly concluded, China had been, for all practical purposes, thrown on the mercy of the ruthless aggressors, who, for their own part, had regarded the Incident as a dress rehearsal for the World War. "For five years we have waged a big war on the Asian Continent," wrote the extremist *Hochi* in November 1941, "and whether we like it or not, it will be training for a great war in the future." However, the "moderate" Prince Konoye, the keeper of Nippon's conscience, anxious to leave no stone unturned in the matter of finding a *rapprochement*, decided to get into personal contact with President Roosevelt.

While Nippon was standing on the brink of war and planning to time her blows, her Finance Minister told the long-suffering masses who had little in common with the warmongering leaders, to lower still more the standard of living, "so as to divert surplus capital to industrial production." Because, as the Premier told the Diet, which had been convened (*a la* Reichstag) after a seven months' interval: "We are planning to realise the ideal of *Hakko Ichiu* (one world, one household)". The Throne-Aid League of the Lower House, claiming support of 80 per cent. of the Members, blame Britain, Russia, China, U.S. and the Netherlands East Indies for forming an anti-Japanese encirclement. Introducing a similar resolution in the Lower House, the Government spokesman said: "The cancer in the

Pacific lies in the minds of arrogant American leaders who are seeking for world hegemony and who are meddling even in Europe by assisting Britain." On the eve of the new Armageddon, Nipponists, drunk with power and dizzy with success, blamed everything and everyone else, and read signs of conspiracy, encirclement and insincerity everywhere. But alas! they could not read the words appearing on the plastered palace wall of Nipponism: *Mene, Mene, Tekel Upharsin.*

The negotiations with the U.S., first begun early in 1941, but interrupted, were resumed after Prince Konoye sent a personal letter to Mr. Roosevelt on August 28th. Japan's Premier had originally suggested a personal meeting between President Roosevelt and himself, similar to the Atlantic Charter meeting of the heads of the British and U.S. Governments. But "informal exploratory conversations" were started at Washington between the U.S. Government and the Japanese Ambassador, who was later (from November 5) assisted by Mr. Kurusu, a Special Envoy. In pursuance of increasingly concerted action, Great Britain had given the U.S. Government a *carte blanche*, and her Prime Minister announced that if the U.S. were involved in the war in the Pacific, Britain would be at her side "within the hour". Various Notes and proposals were exchanged during the three months' negotiations. In the final Note handed by Mr. Cordell Hull to the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, the U.S. Government aimed at "working out a broad-gauge programme for peace throughout the Pacific". Their proposed settlement, "based on the principles of peace, law, order and fair dealing among the nations", conceived after Mr. Hull's statement of 1937, was but essentially the extension of the principles of the Open-Door policy and the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty to the whole Far

Eastern area. Farther than that, the Chinese Government, too, once again said they were not prepared to go. But the exclusivist Nippon flatly refused, in their final reply on December 6, to contemplate a system "similar to the Nine-Power Treaty structure, which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament in East Asia". Other methods must be sought to reach the consummation devoutly wished by the leaders of Japan's *kampf*.

"Hallowed Spirit of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding us from above, we rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our Subjects in Our confident expectations that the task bequeathed by Our forefathers will be carried forward," said the Rescript issued on Sunday, December 7, by the Emperor Tenno. "We by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon you, Our loyal and brave subjects: We hereby declare war on the U.S.A. and the British Empire."

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY

(a) JAPAN

- 552. Buddhism introduced into Japan.
- 1338-1602. Muramachi Period.
- 1542. The Portuguese discover Japan.
- 1549. Francis Xavier, the first Christian missionary, arrived.
- 1587. The first prosecution of the Christians.
- 1589. Hideyoshi's edict forbidding Christianity, only revoked in 1873.
- 1592-3. With 150,000 men, Hideyoshi overran Korea; his ambition to conquer China.
- 1603-1868. Yedo Period. The Tokugawa Dynasty of Shoguns.
- 1622-4. Foreigners (Westerners) forbidden. Persecution of the Christians at its greatest.
- 1638. The Portuguese finally expelled and Christianity stamped out. Policy of Seclusion.
- 1853. Arrival of Commodore Perry from the U.S.A. with his "black ships".
- 1854. March 31. The first Treaty with the U.S.A. enforced.
- 1857-9. First Treaties with European Powers—Great Britain, France, Russia and Holland—signed by the Shogun and not by the Emperor.
- 1864-5. Naval demonstration of the Allied Fleet

- (British, French, Dutch and American) forces the Emperor to sign.
1866. June. A Tariff Convention sets 5 per cent. as general duty.
1868. The revolt against the Shogunate, which was abolished. The Emperor (Meiji) restored.
- 1868-1912. The Meiji Era.
- 1868-72. General reforms. New organisation of the Government and the country. Surrender of the fiefs by the feudal lords. The National School System inaugurated, etc.
1873. Universal military service introduced. Agitation for a punitive expedition against Korea.
1874. Expedition in Formosa.
1876. The Bonin Islands annexed.
1879. The Liuchiu Islands annexed.
1889. Popular Constitution proclaimed.
1890. First elections to the new Diet.
1894. July 16. The new Anglo-Japanese Treaty of "equality," after 25-year campaign to get the 1858 Treaties—the extra-territoriality, etc.—revised.  
Similar treaties with other Powers follow.
- July 25. Japan sinks a Chinese transport of troops to Korea.
- Aug. 1. Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) formally declared.
1895. April. Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan gets Formosa, the Pescadores and a huge indemnity, and secures "independence" of Korea.
1899. New Treaties come into operation; all foreigners are henceforth subject to Japanese law.  
The Boxer Trouble. China pays indemnity to

- all Powers, including Japan.
1902. Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed.
- 1904-5. Russo-Japanese War. Aug. Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed.
- Sept. 5. Portsmouth Treaty. Russia recognises Japan's supremacy (protectorate) in Korea, hands over to Japan the lease of Liaotung Peninsula, South Manchurian Railway (symbol of Japanese power in Manchuria) and the mining rights in the southern half of Saghalien.
1907. Russo-Japanese Convention recognising independence and territorial integrity of China.
1910. Korea annexed.
1911. Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed. End of the old Tariff Schedules.
1912. Emperor Meiji died. Emperor Taisho succeeds.
- 1912-26. The Taisho Era.
1914. Aug. Japan enters the 1914-18 War.
1915. Treaty with China—The "Twenty-One Demands".
- 1921-2. The Washington Naval Conference fixing 3 : 5 : 5 ratio to Japan, Britain and U.S.A.
1923. Great earthquake.
1925. Manhood suffrage.
1926. Dec. Emperor Taisho died. The Showa Era commenced.
- 1927-9. The Tanaka Cabinet.
1928. First General Elections under the manhood suffrage.
1930. Premier Hamaguchi, Minseito leader, assassinated.
1932. Feb. 9. Inouye, a former Finance Minister and the campaign manager for the Minseito, and Baron Dan (March 5), Chief Direc-

- tor of Mitsui, assassinated.
- May. 15. *Coup d'etat* to seize the Government. Premier Inukai, the Seiyukai leader, and others assassinated. End of Party Governments.
1933. Feb. The League Assembly vote against Japan regarding Manchurian War.
- March 27. Japan gives notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations (with effect March 1935).
1934. April 18. The Amau Statement. Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.
- Dec. 19. Japan notifies the U.S. Government to terminate Washington Naval Treaty.
1936. Jan. 21. Mr. Hirota's (Foreign Minister) "Three Principles".
- Jan. 25. Japan withdraws from London Naval Conference. Limitations imposed by naval agreements of 1922 and 1931 lapse, including a provision against fortifying the Far Eastern naval bases.
- Feb. 20. General Elections. Minseito gains.  
"Feb. 26 Affair". *Coup d'etat*.
1937. April 30. General Elections.
- Industrial Mobilisation Law. Cabinet Planning Board.
- Nov. Establishment of the Imperial H.Q. Central Economic Councils; extension of State control of foreign trade and finance.
1938. March 24. National Mobilisation Act. "Movement for Industrial Service" supersedes Labour Unions.
1940. Feb. 2600th anniversary of the foundation of the Empire. National Spiritual Mobilisation campaign; foreign influences in the

- Christian Missions, Salvation Army, etc., removed. Political Parties "voluntarily" dissolved.
- June 12. Treaty of Friendship with Thailand.
- July 17. Prince Konoye's Cabinet: Mr. Matsuoka Foreign Minister.
1941. Jan. 31. Thailand-Indo-China armistice signed on Japanese warship.
1941. March 2. Vichy accepts Japanese plan regarding Indo-China and Thailand.
- ,, 12. Matsuoka leaves for Moscow, Berlin and Rome.
- .. May 5. Two Agreements of economic collaboration with Indo-China.
- July. Konoye Cabinet (reorganised). Matsuoka leaves the Foreign Office.
- ,, 26. Japan "freezes" all British and U.S. assets.
- ,, 29. Announcement of Japan-Indo-Chinese Pact ceding bases to Japan.
- Aug. General Mobilisation Act; all provisions invoked. Attempt on Baron Hiranuma, the Seiyukai leader.
- ,, 28. Premier Konoye's personal letter to President Roosevelt. Japan-American informal conversations begin.
- Sept. 18. General Tojo forms a new Cabinet.
- Nov. 5. A Special Envoy, Mr. Kurusu, sent to Washington for the negotiations.
- ,, 11. The Diet convened.
- ,, 26. The U.S. final Note.
- Dec. 6. Japan's reply.
- ,, 7. Japan declares war on Britain and the U.S.

## (b) CHINA

1931. Sept. 18. The "Mukden Incident". Manchurian War begins.
1932. Fighting in Shanghai.  
 March. "Independence" of Manchukuo proclaimed. One political party. (April 1934 Henry Pu yi the Emperor.)  
 Sept. Japan "recognises" Manchukuo.  
 Dec. Lytton (League of Nations) Report published.
1933. Jan.-March. Campaign in Jehol.  
 May 31. Tangku Truce creating a demilitarised zone under Japanese domination.
1934. April 18. The Amau Statement ("Asiatic Monroe Doctrine").  
 June 9. Ho-Umezawa Agreement.
1935. June. Subjugation of Chahar.  
 Nov. 25. Japanese sponsored "East Hopei Autonomous Council".
1936. Dec. 15. "The Hopei-Chahar Political Council" (agreement between China and Japan).  
 Invasion of Suiyuan by Mongolian irregulars—Inner Mongol-Manchukuo forces aided by Japanese tanks and planes.  
 Dec. Sianfu episode. "Kidnapping" of Chiang Kai-shek.
1937. July 7-8. Lukouchio incident. The Sino-Japanese War begins.  
 Aug. Japan sets up several Peace Maintenance Commissions in place of the "Hopei-Chahar Political Council".  
 „ 13. Fighting begins in Shanghai.  
 Sept. Japanese Navy blockades China coast, excepting territories leased to Western

- Powers.
- Dec. 13. Japanese enter Nanking. The Chinese Government had moved to Hankow and Chungking.
- ," 18. Japanese-sponsored "Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic" set up at Peiping, with a new political party, the Hsiu Min Hui.
1938. March 28. Japanese-sponsored "Reformed Government of the Republic of China" set up at Nanking.
- June. Attack on Hankow. China appeals to the League of Nations.
- Oct. Canton occupied. Chungking the new seat of Chinese Government.
- Nov. 3. Brussels Conference.
1939. Feb. 10. Hainan Island occupied.
- March 30. The Spratley Islands in South China Sea occupied. (The French were there since 1930.)
1940. Jan. 21. A peace treaty signed between Japan and Mr. Wang Ching-wei. China sends a Note to all the League Members denouncing Mr. Wang's Government. Trade Agreement between China and Russia.
- Nov. 30. Treaty between Japan and the "National Government of the Republic of China" of Mr. Wang Ching-wei.
1941. April 21. Japan occupies Foochow.
- July. The Axis recognises the "Nanking Government"; China breaks off relations with the Axis Powers.
- Dec. China declares war on Japan.

## (c) THE AXIS POWERS

1936. April 30. German-Manchukuo Trade Agreement.  
Nov. 25. Japan signs the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, joined by Italy on 6-11-37, by Hungary and Manchukuo 15-1-39 and by Spain 7-4-39.
1938. Feb. 2. In his address to the Reichstag, Hitler recognises Manchukuo.  
July. Germany's—like Italy's—military advisers leave China.
1939. Aug. 23. Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression signed.  
Sept. 1. Germany invades Poland.  
" 29. Russo-German partition of Poland.
1940. April 9. Germany invades Denmark and Norway.  
May 10. Germany invades Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.  
" 15. Dutch capitulation signed.  
June 17. Marshal Petain's Cabinet formed, and asks for terms.  
Sept. 27. A Ten-Year Pact signed between Germany, Italy and Japan.
- 1941 March-April. Japan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka, in Berlin and Rome.  
April 6. Germany invades Greece and Jugoslavia; Croatia proclaimed "independent" by Germany.  
" 17. Jugoslav capitulates to Nazis.  
" 20-22. Greece evacuated.  
May 20. Germans invade Crete; ten days later British forces withdraw.  
June 8. Japan recognises Croatia.

July 1. Germany and six other Allies of the Axis recognise Japanese-sponsored "Nanking Government".

Dec. 11. Germany and Italy declare war on the U.S.

(d) GREAT BRITAIN

- 1931. Britain negotiates with China to end extra-territoriality, but talks suspended by outbreak of Manchurian War.
- 1932. British Foreign Office *communiqué* rejects suggestions in Stimson note.
- 1935. The Federation of British Industries (Barnby) Mission to Japan.
- 1935. Sept. Sir Fredrick Leith-Ross (Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government) Mission to China and Japan, regarding a joint loan to China.
- 1936. Hoare Plan for the Pacific.
- 1937. Aug. Anti-British campaign in Japan. The first bomb explosions destroy British property in China. Japanese aircraft machine-gun British Ambassador and Embassy cars.
- Dec. British warship (H.M.S. *Ladybird*) and merchant vessels on the Yangtze River attacked from air and land.
- 1938. Britain accepts an arrangement of Japan regarding the British share of Chinese customs.
- June. Anglo-French *démarche* at Tokyo against Japanese Foreign Office Statement of impending attack on Hainan.
- Nov. Great Britain, the U.S. and France protest against continued closing of the Yangtze except to Japanese trading vessels.

1939. Jan. British Note to Japan protesting against restrictions to British trade in China.
- March 8. British Government (like that of the U.S.) credit to China and support of Exchange Stabilisation Fund.
- July. British concessions at Tientsin blockaded. The Craigie-Arita Agreement. Britain recognises "special requirements" of Japanese Army.
1940. Britain removes twenty-one Germans from the Japanese liner *Asama Maru*. Protests. Nine of them released.
- March 28. British Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie's speech at Tokyo—"for the same objective."
- June 19. Japanese-British agreement regarding the Tientsin blockade. Japan requests closure of Burma Road.
- July 17. The road closed for three months.
- Aug. British subjects arrested in Japan and anti-British outbursts.
- Aug. 9. British troops stationed in Shanghai and North China being withdrawn.
- Oct. 3. Mr. Churchill the new Prime Minister.
- Dec. 23. Mr. Eden Foreign Secretary.
1940. Dec. 10. £10 million credit to China.
1941. July 19. Mr. Duff Cooper to go on mission to the Far East.
- July 25. Britain freezes Japanese assets; denounces all Commercial Treaties with Japan.
- Aug. 14. Atlantic Charter announced.
- Dec. 8. Britain declares war on Japan.
- (e) THE U.S.A.
1899. Sept. 6. John Hay, the American Secretary of

- State, issues a circular regarding the "Open-Door" policy and the "spheres of interest" in China "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity."
1924. The Exclusion Act (immigration) resented by Japan.
1932. Jan. Mr. Stimson's (the Secretary of State) statement on Japan's attack on Manchuria.
- Feb. 24. His letter to Mr. Borah, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
1937. June. The Export-Import Bank of Washington arranges an industrial credit for China.
- Sept. 13. President Roosevelt forbids Government-owned vessels to transport arms and munitions to China or Japan.
- Oct. 5. Roosevelt, in his "quarantine" speech at Chicago, says Japan has violated the provisions of the Nine-Power and Kellogg Pacts.
- Mr. Stimson's letter in the *New York Times* advocating an economic boycott of Japan by Great Britain and the U.S.
- Dec. 12. The *Panay* and three oil tankers sunk by Japan. Tokyo pays over two million dollars.
1938. June. The American Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce warns exporters to Japan to do cash-in-hand business.
- Oct. 6. The U.S. Note to Japan protesting against Japan's violation of "open-door" principle in China.
- Dec. 15. The Export-Import Bank places, a credit of 25 million dollars at China's

disposal. The Treasury extends further the facilities to obtain dollar exchange against the proceeds of the sale of China's silver stocks.

1939. April. The U.S. Government's sudden transfer of the fleet to the Pacific.  
July 26. The U.S. denounces the Japan-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (six months' notice).  
Oct. 27—Nov. 4. Neutrality Bill passed.  
Dec. The "moral embargo" of last June extended (following the bombing of Canton) from planes and their parts to plants, material, etc.
1940. Jan. 26. The U.S. abrogates Japan-U.S. Treaty of Commerce.  
Aug.-Sept. 3. Anglo-American Agreement regarding the basis for destroyers.  
Sept. The U.S. puts embargo on export of aviation petrol. The Conscription Bill passed.  
Nov. 13. Financial credit granted to China.  
Dec. 29. President Roosevelt's "The Arsenal of Democracies" broadcast.
1941. April 11. President Roosevelt declares Red Sea and Gulf of Aden open to U.S. shipping.  
April 25. Admiral Raeder's warning against American convoy system.  
May 6. Mr. Stimson advocates U.S. navy protection for supplies to Great Britain.  
June 6. The U.S. Government requisitions all foreign ships idle in the U.S. ports.  
,, 14. Freezing of all German and Italian assets in the U.S.  
,, 16. German Consulates ordered to be

closed.

- „ 23. Mr. Welles supports British policy and "any defence against Hitlerism."
- July 7. U.S. naval forces in Iceland.
- „ 25. Japanese assets frozen.
- Aug. 28. Premier Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt.
- Sept. 23. The U.S. Government consider arming of merchant ships and repeal of Neutrality Act.
- Dec. 8. The U.S. declares war on Japan.
- Dec. 11. „ „ „ Germany and Italy.

#### (f) RUSSIA

- 1918-22. Siberian expedition of Japan; occupation of Saghalien.
- 1925. Treaty. Japanese Armies withdrawn.
- 1935. The Chinese Eastern Railway sold to Japan.
- 1936. Nov. Japan-Germany's Anti-Comintern Pact.
- Dec. Russia refuses to ratify a long-term fisheries convention with Japan.
- 1937. (Spring). Russo-Japanese armies clash on the Amur river.
- Aug. 21. Russia and China sign a Non-aggression Pact.
- 1938. July-Aug. Two weeks of large-scale hostilities at Changkufeng.
- 1939. May-July. Clashes with Japan in Outer Mongolia.
- Aug. Russia's credit to China of 140 million dollars, Russo-German Pact.
- Sept. 16. Armistice in Outer Mongolia.
- Nov. Russia invades Finland. Trade negotiations between Russia and Japan reopened.

- Dec. Russia extends her fisheries convention for another year. Manchukuo pays Russia her long-deferred final instalment for the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
1940. Feb. Russo-German trade agreement.  
March 12. Russo-Finnish Peace signed.
1941. Jan. 10. Russo-German Pact renewed in Berlin;  
Trade Agreement signed in Moscow.  
April. Russo-Jugoslav Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression. Mr. Matsuoka in Moscow.  
,, 13. Russo-German Pact of Neutrality.  
June 22. Nazi Germany attacks Russia.  
,, 30. Vichy France breaks off relations with Russia.  
July 12. Anglo-Soviet Agreement against "Hitlerite Germany."

## APPENDIX II

### EXTRACTS FROM TREATIES, ETC.

#### (a) *The Covenant of the League of Nations.*

Art. 10. The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Art. 12. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matters either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to an enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report by the Council.

Art. 16(1): Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade and financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not

Art. 17(1). In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

(2) Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

(3) If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

(4) If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

(b) *The Nine-Power Treaty of Washington Feb. 1922, signed by Belgium, the British Empire, China, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the U.S.A.*

Art. 1: The contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government;

(3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing actions inimical to the security of such States.

Art. 4. The contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

Art. 5. China agrees that throughout the whole of the railways in China she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind

(c) *The Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg Pact) of August 27, 1928, ratified by sixty-five States which:*

(1) solemnly declare that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another;

(2) agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.







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